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Abstract
With the advent of globalisation, Japanese agriculture is under strong pressure to
reform. Despite highly protectionist policies, Japanese agriculture has declined
significantly and now faces problems relating to sustainability and the livelihood of
rural communities. The failure of Japan to develop its agricultural structure,
especially the enlargement of fanning units, has been a key factor. This thesis
analyses the farmland market in Japan, testing its efficiency against theoretical
models and examining farmland policy and structural change. Using time series data,
test results support the theoretical model, with the possibility of structural breaks also
recognised in some regions in 1967 and 1980, when the regulation of farmland market
changed drastically. Results also indicate that the market is not as efficient as in the
UK or US.
The thesis also examines the recent increase of abandoned farmland in Japan. A
theoretical model is developed to include the effect of ageing of the agricultural
population. The results imply that farmland abandonment is mainly caused by the
rapid increase of farmland supply and ageing of the agricultural population, but that
the level of cash rent (i.e., profitability of land) is of little or no importance. The
protective agricultural policy and strong regulations on agricultural land transactions
helped small-scale fanners to remain in agriculture until the 1980s. However, these
farmers face difficulty in surviving due to the serious fall in producers' prices
(especially rice) and the high rate of ageing in the agricultural population. Moreover,
in these circumstances, fanners are not motivated to extend their scale.
Small-scale family fanning system played a major role in Japanese agriculture after
post-war period, but the recent increase of farmland abandonment shows the limit of
this type of fanning system. Farmland policy needs to be reformed in order to
achieve an agricultural structure that is more competitive. In the past this has failed
due to the strong regulations on farmland transactions. However, the development of
an agricultural policy framework is necessary to support agriculture's
multifunctionality. Finally, farmland abandonment is also a problem in other parts of
the world, for example the mountainous areas of Europe, and the Japanese
experience may provide an interesting insight for other countries.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
"We abuse land because we regard it as a commodity belonging to us. When we see
land as a community to which we belong, we may begin to use it with love and
respect".
(Aldo Leopold (1886-1948), quoted in The Quiet Crisis by Stewart L.Udall, 1963)
1-1. Japanese Agriculture under Globalisation
With the advent of globalisation, Japanese agriculture is under strong pressure to
reform, as is the case in many countries. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) is
insisting that countries open-up their domestic markets to imports of agricultural
commodities and food products. Japan's bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)1
also require the elimination of trade barriers, including those in the agricultural
sector.
Modernisation and development of the fanning structure has been an important aim
of Japanese agricultural policy. Several policy instruments have been applied to
encourage the enlargement of the scale of farming. Nevertheless, the increase in
average size of farm has been minimal (e.g., from 0.99 ha in 1960 to 1.79 ha in
20002), and far from that achieved in other OEeD3 countries. Besides, the status of
agriculture in the national economy has rapidly declined. For example, the share of
agricultural production in gross domestic production decreased from 9.0 % in 1960
1 FTAs with Singapore in 2001, and with Mexico in 2004. Future agreements are expected
with Korea, ASEAN and Thailand.
2 MAFF, Japan, 'Report of Farm Economy Survey' in 1960, and 'Survey on Farm
Management Trend' in 2000. Non-commercial farms are not included in the data for 2000.
3 Or ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
1
to 1.2 % in 19984• The proportion of farm households in total households was 29.0 %
in 1960 and 7.2 % in 1999, while the share of the agricultural workforce in the total
workforce was 26.8 % in 1960, dropping to 4.6 % in 19995• Depopulation and ageing
of the agricultural population is widely evident in many fanning areas, and the need
of rural development and an increase in the number of farming successors have been
stressed at the grass root level and by policy makers.
Meanwhile, the area of farmland abandonment in Japan has increased dramatically,
particularly in both urban farming areas and hilly and mountainous areas, more than
doubling from 99,000 ha in 1975 to 210,000 ha in 2000. This issue is considered
very important in terms of loss of multifunctionality: landscape degradation, loss of
biodiversity and water ecosystem, and in some cases is linked to natural disasters
such as flooding and landslides which may block community roads. It is also noted
that farmland abandonment in rural areas invites production damage due to the
invasion of wild animals, which also often leads to a chain reaction of further
abandonment (Ohe, 2001). Japan introduced in 2000 a new direct payment to support
farmers in hilly and mountainous areas in order to prevent further increases of
farmland abandonment. This is categorised as falling in the Green box6 in WTO
terminology,
There is also a concern expressed in some quarters about Japan's low self-sufficiency
4 Ministry of Finance, Japan, 'National Economic Accounting'.
S Min istry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, Japan,
'Labour Force Survey' and 'Population Census'.
6 WT 0 distinguishes the type of domestic support into three categories; amber, blue and
green boxes. All domestic support measures considered to distort production and trade (with
some exceptions) fall into the 'amber box'. Conversely, a subsidy which would not distort
trade, or at most cause minimal distortion, is categorised in the 'green box'. Subsidy relating
to production control such as production quota and set aside, which is said to distort trade
less than alternative amber box subsidies, falls in the 'blue box' (see also,
http://www.wto.org/).
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rate, although over production of rice has been a serious problem.
1-2. Rational or Irrational?
As in many countries, agricultural policy in Japan has mainly targeted improvements
in production and farmers' income. However, responding to a series of domestic
agricultural problems and international trends, a new agricultural policy framework
aims at four main pillars: to achieve a stable food supply based on an increase of
domestic production; enhancement of multi functionality subject to agricultural
production; sustainable agricultural development; and rural development.
Thus, the concept of 'development' in Japanese agricultural policy has changed
dramatically. Development as defined by neo-classical economists tends to be
evaluated by financial success. This is because, conventionally, it is assumed that
economic suppliers (or producers) are profit (or income) maximisers; and economic
demanders (or consumers) are utility (or satisfaction) maximisers (Brockway, 1995).
Thus, man in the neo-classical economic theory is a 'rational' animal, maximising
both profit and utility. However, what is rationality? Hahn and Hollis (1979) claim
that rationality can be interpreted as an 'egoism' if a person's choice is all explained
as the choosing of 'most preferred' alternatives. However, to examine actual choices
of people is the only way to understand their real preferences, and those actual
choices are not always explained by their most preferred choice. Sen (1979) aims to
depart from the 'unsympathetic isolation abstractly assumed in Economics', which is
based on the word of Edgeworth (1881), in order to explain these phenomena, and
claims that it is important to distinguish between two separate concepts: 'sympathy'
and 'commitment'. In the case of 'sympathy', a person's concern for others directly
3
affects that person's welfare. In other words, the knowledge of torture of others
makes a person sick, which is sympathy. Thus, in this case well-being is
psychologically dependent on someone else's welfare. Meanwhile, 'commitment' is
that the knowledge of others' pain does not make one feel personally worse off, but
he/she thinks it is wrong and is ready to do something to stop it. Thus, the behaviour
based on sympathy is in a sense egoistic, and commitment is a sense of duty. Sen
also defines that in the terminology of modem economic theory, 'sympathy' is a case
of 'externality'{ (e.g., pollution, loss of the natural environment), and 'commitment'
is close to 'moral', which of course may cover a very broad spectrum (from religion
to politics). The government often applies law or regulations in order to prevent the
events brought by a sum of egoistic behaviours. However, the world market
distortion by some government interventions has been highlighted especially in
recent international trade negotiations, and the free market system has been favoured.
It is believed that a free market system induces 'rational' behaviours, while a
regulated market system encourages 'irrational' behaviour, in the neo-classical
economics use of these terms.
Now, a question is raised: is farmland abandonment the result of rational behaviour
of Japanese farmers, or irrational behaviour stemming from the distorted market
system? However, it needs to be noted that the area of abandoned farmland in Japan
is increasing even though the farmland market system has become less and less
regulated. Godo (1998) stresses that the farmland market system in Japan is heavily
distorted, and it is a failure of policy that even inefficient farmers can own land as a
source of wealth-seeking benefit (e.g., capital gain or tax preference). He also claims
that farmland abandonment would not have appeared if the farmland market was
7 Sen claims that many economic models (e.g., a Pareto optimum) rule out 'externality'.
4
efficient. This thesis exarmnes these Issues from both aspects; policy and the
farmland market system.
1-3. Objectives and Methods of the Study
1-3-1. Objectives
Research into the farmland market is very important for the further structural reform
of agriculture in Japan. However, farmland issues in Japan have been conducted
mainly in the areas of sociology, geography and agricultural engineering, and not
much in the area of economics. A lot of aspects are considered as factors leading to
farmland problems (e.g., financial, geographical and family). Nevertheless, there is a
belief that the Japanese farmland market is inefficient in economic terms, but at
present there is not enough evidence to support this claim. In this study, the main
interest is to analyse the Japanese farmland market; how the farmland market
structure influences farmers' behaviour to land, namely decisions of selling, letting or
abandoning.
First, it is necessary to understand farmland policy and its background, to identify
what factors influence the farmland market. It is also of interest to test if the Japanese
farmland market is inefficient as is believed. Has there been policy impact on the
farmland market throughout the observed period (from 1955 to 2000)? It is also of
interest to find out how the farmland market system is associated with today's
farmland problems, which may provide useful insights for strategies of farmland
policy reform as a part of future agricultural structural reform. In addition, this study
may also provide meaningful insights for the enlarged EU in which some new
member countries have experienced rapid change in terms of their farmland market
5
system, and are already facing a high rate of farmland abandonment.
1-3-2. Research methods
1-3-2-1. Farmland valuation theory
In order to understand the farmland market, farmland valuation theory has been well
researched in the UK, US and Canada. Shi et al. (1997) divide the literature on
agricultural land price into two categories; studies which use asset-pricing or
capitalisation models, and studies which use hedonic pricing models. The former
implies that the value of an asset is equal to the discounted value of all future
expected earnings, the Present Valuation Model (PVM), and the latter uses non-farm
factors to explain variation in agricultural land prices, ranging from the valuation of
urbanisation and urban fringes, to soil and site characteristics, and erosion control
and soil conservation (OItmer and Florax, 2001). In order to understand the impact of
farmland policy on the farmland market over time, the former method is applied in
this thesis.
1-3-2-2. Testing farmland valuation theory
If the farmland market functions efficiently, then land prices should be determined by
market fundamentals, e.g., agricultural land profitability. In order to test the market
efficiency, the PVM has been widely applied in studies assuming that there is a
consistent relationship between asset prices and returns. However, the farmland
market has some unique characteristics - high transaction costs, immobility and
differences in farming conditions, etc. Since the late 1980s,it has been pointed out
that farmland price movements cannot be explained well by the asset-pricing model,
although this model embodies economic theory (e.g., Burt, 1986; Featherstone and
6
Baker, 1987). Meantime, the issue is raised that if time series data are not integrated
by the same order, then the traditional time series regressions may show a spurious
relationship (Engle and Granger, 1987). Responding to this, unit root tests and
cointegration analysis have been applied in more recent studies in order to test the
PVM in farmland price formation. In this study, unit root tests and cointegration
analysis are applied to Japanese time series data on farmland prices and rent.
1-3-2-3. Building a model for farmland abandonment
The next point of interest is to understand the increase of farmland abandonment
within the theoretical framework. A model is constructed for this purpose based on
the PVM. Due to the limitation of time series data on farmland abandonment, a panel
data set. Recently, unit root tests and cointegration have been developed for panel
data (e.g., Levin and Lin, 1992; 1993; 1m et al., 1997; Harris and Tzavalis, 1999;
Harris and Sollis, 2003). Some of these tests are applied in the present study.
1.4. Organisation of the Study
This thesis consists of eight chapters. Organisation of the remaining seven chapters is
as follows, with a summary in Figure 1-1.
Chapters 2 and 3 provide an understanding to the policy background. Chapter 2
describes the history of agricultural policy and characteristics of the Japanese
farming system. The problems that Japanese agriculture has faced, mainly relating to
farmland issues, are also outlined in this chapter. In Chapter 3, the development of
farmland policy is overviewed since the basic framework of agricultural land policy
should have strongly influenced land use and farmland transactions. As well as
7
detailing the characteristics of the Japanese agricultural policy framework, the
impacts of regulations on farmland market are also discussed.
Chapters 4 and 5 are theoretical and methodological reviews. Chapter 4 tracks the
theoretical development relating to land from Ricardian rent theory to recent PVM
models. Due to land being a unique commodity compared to the normal agricultural
products, the theoretical concept of the farmland market (e.g., the stock and flow
concept) and price determination in the land market are carefully reviewed. Recent
developments in time-series analysis, i.e., the concept of unit root and cointegration
analysis, as well as testing procedures, are reviewed in Chapter 5.
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 contain the empirical analysis. Chapter 6 tests if the
Japanese farmland market follows the theoretical price determination. First, a simple
unit root test is applied, and subsequently the possibility of a structural break in the
tested period is also considered. After applying a test for a cointegration relationship,
the presence of a rational bubble in farmland prices is tested. Chapter 7 studies the
mechanism of recent increases of farmland abandonment. First, the mechanisms of
the farmland market and farmland abandonment are discussed. A model for farmland
abandonment is constructed, based on the PVM model, including the rate of ageing
in the agricultural population, and tested.
Chapter 8 is a concluding chapter which consists of a summary of each chapter, and
discussion of the results, providing implications for farmland policy reform and
possible future research.
8
Figure 1-1 Thesis organisation
ChI. Introduction
Clarifies the purpose, background
and methods of this study
-> ~
Ch2. Japanese Agriculture Ch4. Rent and Farmland
Describes the history of policy Valuation Theory: A Review
and characteristics of of Theory and Emperical
Japanese agriculture Application
"0
Theoretical background of
~= farmland market and Cl"= ~e e
!J development of empirical ~~~ analysis =~ Ch3. Farmland Policy, c..~ :=Regulations and Prices ~....
Describes the history of
Cl"ec..
farmland policy and data ChS. Time Series Analysis
relating to farmland market Recent development of time
series analysis for application
on farmland data of Japan
Ch6. Empirical Analysis of Japanese
Farmland Market
Application of time series analysis to test if
farmland market is efficient and the possibility
of structural breaks
I
Ch7. Farmland Abandonment and The Farmland Market
Discusses the mechanism of farmland abandonment, using a
model including the rate of ageing in the agricultural
population, applied to Japanese data
Ch8 Summary, Discussions and Conclusions
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Chapter 2. Japanese Agriculture
2-1. Introduction
Japanese agriculture is unique compared to European agriculture in terms of land use
and agricultural policy. In order to understand Japanese agricultural land issues. it is
also important to understand the history and basic principle of agricultural policy.
and characteristics of the Japanese farming system. Japanese agricultural policy can
be characterised into four time periods; the post-war period, the rapid economic
growth period. the production surplus period. and the policy reform period. The aim
of this chapter is to overview the development of agricultural policy in Japan first.
and then outline the problems which Japanese agriculture has faced. highlighting
characteristics of the farming system.
2-2. Development of Agricultural Policy in Japan
2-2-1. Post -war period
From the end of World War II to the mid 1950s was the period of economic recovery
and social reconstruction from feudalism to democracy. Providing the staple food
supply was one of the most important objectives in order to underpin the stability of
the national economy. Staple foods (rice. wheat and barley) were controlled and
distributed by the Food Agency of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
(MAFF) under the Food Control Law enacted during the war (1942). That basic
system lasted until 1995 when the New Food Policy was introduced. Under the new
10
policy framework, the government controls only stockpiled rice I and rmrumum
access rice2, and the price determination of rice has shifted to the market system
since then.
2-2-2. Rapid economic growth period
From the mid 1950s until the early 1970s, Japan achieved rapid economic growth. In
this phase, the focal agricultural problem was how to adjust to the growing Japanese
economy. The Agricultural Basic Law, enacted in 1961, reflected the central issues
of Japanese agriculture at that time. The main policy objectives addressed were to
diminish the productivity gap between the agricultural sector and the non-agricultural
sector, and to equalise the living standards between them. The Japanese government
tried to speed up the growth in agricultural productivity through the improvement of
the agricultural structure (Hayami, 1990). The major task had been to expand farm
size to enable farms to utilize modem labour-saving technologies efficiently, while
shifting production from commodities such as rice to commodities such as meat and
milk, which are more income elastic and in which Japan is not at so great a
comparative disadvantage as in field crops (Hayami, 1990).
Price support policy reinforced by border protection was the main policy instrument
for achieving income parity with other sectors. Before the Agricultural Basic Law in
1961, the only products covered by agricultural pricing policies were rice, wheat, raw
silk, feedstuffs, and potatoes for industrial use. However, since then, pricing policies
IAs Japan faced a serious shortage of rice in 1993 due to the poor harvest of rice,
stockpile of rice was institutionalised in this new policy framework.
2 The minimum amount of imported rice, which is agreed at the Uruguay Round of
multilateral trade negotiations (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT) in
1994.
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have been extended to cover livestock products, vegetables, fruit, soybeans, rapeseed,
sugar beet and sugar cane. The prices received by producers for most commodities
covered by price support are based on production costs and some concept of income
parity'(Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 1988). Import
quotas were used to protect domestic producers and maintain price stability. In
addition to the import quota restrictions, imports of several agricultural commodities
were controlled by governmental or semi-governmental agencies. For example, rice,
wheat, and barley imports were regulated by the Food Agency; imports of beef,
butter, and powdered milk were controlled by the Livestock Industry Promotion
Corporation; sugar and silk imports were controlled by the Silk and Sugar Price
Stabilization Corporation; and leaf tobacco imports were regulated by the Japanese
Tobacco Corporation (Hayami, 1990). Deficiency payments from the government
were applied to a limited number of products such as soybeans, rapeseed, and milk
for processing.
The other objective for Japanese agricultural policy after 1961 was to attain higher
productivity through improving the structure by enlarging farm size. A large
percentage of capital formation was financed by government subsidies, especially in
the case of investment in land infrastructure (e.g., improvement in the size and
congruence of farmlands, and improvement of irrigation systems). As for other
measures, farmers have received preferential treatment in the taxation system in
terms of their income and properties. These preferential treatments became obstacles
to overcome in the development of an efficient agricultural sector in Japan because
3 For example, as to rice, the government buying-up (producers') price was based on a
'price parity system' which reflects the producers' purchase index such as production
materials and daily commodity until 1960. The price determination system was changed to a
'production cost and income compensation system' in 1960, and stronger producer
protectionism had been reflected on the rice price since then (Kusakari, 1998).
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they were a disincentive to inefficient small-scale fanners to move out of agriculture
(Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 1988).
2-2-3. Production surplus period
As the result of price support, increases in the price of rice stimulated domestic
production, although domestic demand of rice declined steadily after the peak in
1963. An accumulation of surplus rice in government storage increased, and the
fiscal burden from the rice control programme escalated to the level of about 40 % of
the agricultural budget at the end of the 1960s (Hayami, 1990). In response to this,
the government introduced a production control programme from 1971, which
encouraged farmers to convert from rice into other production, as well as
implementation of set-aside with compensational subsidies. Faced in 1987 with the
prospect of surplus accumulation for the third time, the government reduced the
producer price of rice by 5.95 percent (see Figure 2-1), the first reduction in 31 years
(Hayami, 1990). Table 2-1 shows the implementation of rice production control since
1971. The targeted area has been increased year by year. This has also brought some
conflicts in local communities between farmers who do not want to follow the
production control and administrators who must allocate it equally in regions,
although the 'achievement ratio' has not been worsened visibly.
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Figure 2-1 Producer price of rice (Government buying-up prtce)"
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Source: Food Agency, Japan, Document on Producer Price of Rice (1960-72),
MAFF Japan, Annual Statistical Report of Food Supply (1973-)
4 Th e price is for unpolished rice. As the rice price is strongly controlled by the government
buying-up price until the introduction of the market pricing system in 1995 under the New
Food Policy, producer price of rice is close to the government buying-up price.
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Table 2-1 Implementation of production control for rice
Targeted
Achievement
Year Area Name of Programme
(I,OOOha)
Ratio (%)
1971 547 98
1972 520 108
1973 498 112 Measures for conversion of rice
1974 325 98
1975 244 111
1976 215 91 Measures for multi-utilisation of paddy
1977 215 99 field
1978 391 112
1979 391 121 Stage
I1980 535 109
1981 631 106 Measures for restructuring of
1982 631 107 StageII paddy field utilisation1983 600 106
1984 600 103
1985 574 103 StageIII1986 600 103
1987 770 102
First1988 770 103
1989 770 103 Stage Measures for establishment of
1990 830 103 paddy agriculture
Late1991 830 103
1992 700 108 Stage
1993 676 106 Measures for development of paddy1994 600 102
1995 680 101 farming
1996 787 100 Measures for promotion of new
1997 787 102 production control
1998 963 99.5 Measures for promotion of urgent
1999 963 100.0 production control
2000 963 100.9
2001 1,010 100.2 Measures for establishment of paddy
2002 1,010 100.5 agricultural operation
2003 1,060 -
Source: MAFF, Japan
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2-2-4. Policy reform period
The Japanese high protection system of domestic production has prevented the
achievement of one of the most important objectives, that of improvement of
agricultural structure. Moreover, international pressure on Japanese protectionism
has become stronger because the price of products such as beef, oranges and rice
were so far out of line with international prices (Hayami, 1990). Thus, the structure
of Japanese agriculture has not been competitive with world markets. Low
self-sufficiency, except for rice, also became a major concern in terms of food
security (see Table 2-2), as well as rural community sustainability due to ageing in
the agricultural population and the decline of agriculture in general. Beginning with
the report released by MAFF in 1992, entitled The Basic Direction of New Policies
for Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas, the new policy system has been introduced
gradually. The biggest change was that the Food Control Law was abolished, and the
New Food Policy implemented in 1995. Under the new policy, the government
controls only rice for national stock and minimum access rice from abroad; the direct
intervention in the rice market was abolished and the price of rice has become
determined under the market system. In 1999 The Basic Law on Food, Agriculture
and Rural Areas was enacted in order to establish a new policy structure aiming to
harmonise producers and consumers, and urban areas and rural areas:
"The objective of this Law is to stabilise and improve people's lifestyle and to
develop the national economy through comprehensively and systematically
implementing policies on food, agriculture and rural areas by means of establishing
basic principles and basic matters for realising them and clarifying the
responsibilities of the state and local governments. (Objective, Article J)"
This basic law has four principles: 1) Securing a stable food supply, 2) Fulfilment of
16
multifunctional roles, 3) Sustainable agricultural development, 4) Development of
rural areas. The change of policy objectives and targets is overviewed in Figure 2-2.
In achieving a stable food supply, the self-sufficiency rate is targeted at 45 per cent
for example in 2010, which is a 5 per cent point increase in 2000 in calorie base
(Table 2-2). Furthermore, under this new policy framework, bringing to the end the
price support policy, direct payments for fanners in less-favoured areas were
introduced in 2000. A workshop on production control has been established by the
MAFF from 2002 to discuss the future system, evolving towards a system whereby
fanners can chose either acceptance with compensation, or rejection without subsidy
from the authorities which allocate the quota.
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Table 2-2 Self-sufficiency of major products in Japan
Unit: %
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Source: MAFF, Japan 'Overview of The Basic Law on Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas'
2-3. Agricultural Land
Agricultural land is defined as land which is used for agricultural production. Arable
land is only used for agricultural crop production, not including pasture. However in
Japan extensive livestock production based on pasturing which is dominant
especially in less-favoured areas in European countries is still rare. Grassland and
orchard are often included in 'vegetable fields' in the official data, as the amount is
very small. Therefore, it is noted that the analysis of agricultural land in this section
is focused on arable land use.
2-3-1. Area of arable land
The area of arable land has decreased gradually as can be seen in Figure 2-3. For
example, total area of arable land was about 6 million ha in Japan (excluding
Okinawa prefecture) in 1962, but 4,830,000 ha in 2000. This large reduction of
farmland area is caused mainly through natural disaster and artificial farmland
conversion into non-arable uses. Figure 2-4 shows that a lot of farmland was lost
during 1960s and 70s. As seen by the breakdown of ruined land6 into 'conversion for
non-arable use', 'farm or forest road / afforestration', and 'abandonment etc. 7"
farmland conversion to non-agricultural use is outstanding during this period,
because of the strong demand for non-agricultural land following rapid urbanisation.
During this period, a conflict became clear between urban planning, which tried to
enclose a lot of farmland for urban use, and agricultural policy, which tried to keep as
S Here, non-agricultural use means converting to woods, wasteland, pasture and ponds as
well as building industrial factories, roads or railways, and residential houses. The definition
is from MAFF Survey on Area of Arable Land and Area under Cultivation.
6 Land ruined by natural disasters is excluded.
7 Altho ugh most of land is abandoned, this category includes lands that have sunk under the
water, and used for river site. Converted land for 'uncertain reason' was added here as well.
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much farmland as possible, even in urban or suburban areas. The decade from 1966
was the peak of the reduction of farmland; from 80,000 to 100,000 ha of farmland
disappeared every year. This was also attributed to 'Farmland abandonment, etc'
categorised in Figure 2-4. This was the first big phase of farm retirement, because of
labour demand in non-agricultural industries and the clear gap between agriculture
and non-agricultural sectors in terms of productivity and living standards. Although
the rapid urbanisation which invaded farming areas slowed down, the farmland loss
through abandonment etc. has continued due to the ageing of farmers and the
shortage of successors.
Figure 2-3 Total arable land
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Source: MAFF Japan, Survey on Area of Arable Land and Area under Cultivation
Note: Orchard and grassland are contained in 'vegetable',
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Figure 2-4 Breakdown of non-natural ruined agricultural land
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Source: MAFF Japan, Survey on Area of Arable Land and Area under Cultivation
Note: The data breakdown is only available from 1969.
2-3-2. Land use
Table 2-3 shows the state of land use of Japan, Hokkaido, and the prefectures''. The
area of paddy field in 2000 is 2,641,OOOhawhich is 54.7% of total arable land in
Japan, while vegetable land is reported at 2,189,OOOha (45.3%). As seen in the
breakdown of non-paddy fields, land for vegetables is 1,188ha (24.6%), orchard is
356ha (7.4%), and grassland is 645ha (l3.4%). However, Hokkaido has a very
different land use from other prefectures. In Hokkaido, the ratio of paddy field is
about one fifth of total area of arable land, whilst the percentage of grassland is larger
than that of vegetable fields. Conversely, the ratio of paddy field is almost two-thirds
of total arable land in the prefectures. With regards to non-paddy field, the rate of
vegetable fields is largest and that of grassland is quite small. The area of orchard is
9.7 % of all land use.
8 Hokkaido is excluded from this data.
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The land use in classified farming areas" is seen in Table 2-4. Paddy field is mostly
dominant in the urban farming area; 65% of total arable land in this area. However,
in other faming areas - flat, hilly and mountainous - more than half of arable land is
paddy field. In terms of orchard and grassland, all farming areas have very small
percentages. Considering that the flat farming area tends to have large-scale
physically favoured farms, while less-favoured areas (LFAs) tend to be located in
hilly and mountainous areas, the land use is not obviously different with regard to the
condition of farming area.
Table 2-3 The state of arable land (2000)
Unit: 1,000ha (%)
Non-Paddy
Total Paddy
Total Vegetables Orchard Grassland
2,641 2,189 1,188 356 645
Whole Japan 4,830
(54.7) (45.3) (24.6) (7.4) (13.4)
235 950 414 4 532
Hokkaido 1,185
(19.8) (80.2) (34.9) (OJ) (44.9)
2,406 1,239 774 353 112
Prefectures 3,646
(66.0) (34.0) (21.2) (9.7) (3.1)
Source: MAFF Japan, 'Survey on Area of Arable Land and Area under Cultivation'
9 As to definition of farming areas, see Appendix 2-1.
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Table 2-4 Land use in classified faming area (1995/2000)
Unit: %
Area Paddy field Vegetable field Orchard
(Grassland)
1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000
Urban 63 65 24 (4) 25 (2) 9 8
Flat farming 58 59 34 (2) 36 (1) 5 5
Hilly farming 50 52 35 (5) 36 (2) 10 9
Mountainous farming 53 55 35 (6) 36 (3) 6 6
Source: MAFF, Japan, Agricultural Census 2000
Note: Grassland is the area which is used for pasture or grazing in addition to arable land.
2-4. Problems of Japanese Agriculture
2-4-1. Agricultural population and change in farming structure
Depopulation has been serious in rural areas since the mid-1950s. Particularly, young
labour flowed from rural areas to urban and industrialised areas seeking job
opportunities. Table 2-5 shows the number of farm households and the agricultural
population. The number of farm households was 6,057 in 1960, which was 29.0% of
the total number of households, however it declined rapidly and halved to 3,120
(6.7%) in 2000. The Japanese MAFF has been involved actively in rural
development programmes mainly through agricultural supports, because agriculture
has been still the main industry in the majority of rural areas (OECD, 1995). Since
first establishment of the Rural Community Integrated Development Project in 1973,
projects for the improvement of rural living conditions have been implemented in
many ways. Besides, the establishment of non-agricultural industries was also
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encouraged in rural areas based on the Rural Industry Promotion Act, enacted in
1971, in order to create new employment opportunities.
Table 2-5 Farm household and farm population
Unit: 1,000 (% of total)
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Farm 6,057 5,342 4,661 3,835 3,120
household (29.0) (19.7) (12.9) (9.3) (6.7)
Farm 344,110 265,950 213,660 172,960 134,600
Population (36.5) (25.4) (18.3) (14.0) (10.6)
Source: MAFF Japan, Agricultural Censes and Ministry of Public Management, Home
Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, Japan, National Census
Note: Farm population is total number of farm household members. The numbers in the
brackets are the rate of farm households out of total households and the rate of
agricultural population out of total population respectively.
This kind of policy movement also induced a particular farming type in Japan:
small-scale part-time farming operated by senior farmers. Table 2-6 shows that the
ratio of part-time agricultural households is quite high, especially for type II, which
mostly engages in off-farm work increased from 1960 to 1975. A lot of farmers have
been able to find full-time or part-time job opportunities whose payment is relatively
high within their commuting area, accompanying the development of infrastructure
and cars. In addition, Table 2-7 shows the farm population according to age category,
with the ratio for the whole agricultural population. It is noted that members of farm
households who are less than 40 year-old decreased as well as the proportion of total
farm household members, while senior members have increased. Especially,
members who are over 65 years old notably increased in the last decade.
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As rice is a staple food and a key production for the majority of farmers in Japan,
government stressed the price stability of rice through the price support system as
well as the improvement of technology, including breeding. The Japan Agricultural
Cooperatives (Nokyo) have taken important roles not only to spread new technology
and new breeding, but also to collect regional agricultural production and distribute it
to wholesale markets. Therefore even with scale inefficiencies and lower intensity of
cultivation, a part-time farmer is guaranteed a fairly good return (Hillman and
Rothenberg, 1988), and it is even possible to farm by spending only weekends due to
a quite well-organised rice production support system by the government and the
Nokyo (Kusakari, 1998). These support systems enabled a lot of small-scale part-time
farm households to maintain themselves financially and physically even for aged
farmers. Actually, they have attained a higher average income than that of other
households'", mostly because of increases in off-farm income (Figure 2-5).
10 Hillman and Rothenberg (1988) mention one reason for the rise in farm household income
was commodity price supports. However, according to Figure 2-5, the main reason is due to
off-farm income increase.
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Table 2-6 The type of farm household
Unit: 1,000 households (%)
Number of Farm Households
Full-time Farm Part-time farm households
households Type! Typen
1960 2,078 (34.3) 2,036 (33.6) 1,942 (32.1)
1965 1,219 (21.5) 2,081 (36.7) 2,365 (41.8)
1970 831 (15.6) 1,802 (33.7) 2,709 (50.7)
1975 616 (12.4) 1,259 (25.4) 3,078 (62.1)
1980 623 (13.4) 1,002 (21.5) 3,036 (65.1)
1985 626 (14.3) 775 (17.7) 2,975 (68.0)
1990 . 473 (15.5) 521 (17.1) 2,058 (67.4)
1995 428 (17.7) 498 (17.2) 1,977 (68.1)
2000 426 (18.2) 350 (15.0) 1,561 (66.8)
Source: MAFF Japan. Agricultural Census
Note: Type I is farm households which engage mostly in agriculture, and Type II is fann
households which engage mostly in off-farm work (see Appendix 2-2).
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Figure 2-5 Real agricultural income and non-agricultural farm income of one
farm household (Prefectures)
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Source: MAFF Japan, Farm Household Economy Survey (1960-1994), Farm Management
Statistical Survey (Farm Management Trend Survey) (1995-)
Note: The data from 1991 is the average for one commercial farm household II. Data is
deflated by GDP deflator (1995=100).
II As to the definition of commercial farm household and non-commercial farm household,
see Appendix 2-2.
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Table 2-7 Ageing of agricultural population
Unit: 1,000 (%)
age 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
< 19
14,273 8,834 5,451 4,003 2,573
(41.5) (33.2) (25.5) (23.1) (19.1)
20-29
4,945 3,375 2,867 1,664 1,308
(14.4) (12.7) (13.4) (9.6) (9.7)
30-39
4,329 3,314 2,378 2,185 1,202
(12.6) (12.5) (11.1) (12.6) (8.9)
40-49
3,427 3,733 2,933 2,043 1,863
(10.0) (14.0) (13.7) (11.8) (13.8)
50-59
3,218 2,894 3,206 2,478 1,710
(9.4) (10.9) (15.0) (14.3) (12.7)
1,383 1,332 1,201 1,470 951
60-64
(4.0) (5.0) (5.6) (8.5) (7.1)
> 65
2,835 3,111 3,330 3,452 3,851
(8.2) (11.7) (15.6) (20.0) (28.6)
Source: MAFF, Japan, Agricultural Census
Note: The numbers in the brackets show the proportion of total agricultural population.
Table 2-8 shows the farm economy of one farm household in real terms from 1960 to
2000. Although the average farm size has almost doubled, from 0.98 to 1.79, this
farm scale is too small not only to have international competitiveness but also to
diminish the productivity gap between agriculture and non-agricultural sectors, as the
government has aimed to achieve since 1960 when the Agricultural Basic Law was
enacted. Agricultural gross return reached 3 million yen in the late 1970s, and then
has kept at that level. However, since the operation cost has increased, agricultural
income has decreased: the deterioration in agricultural income in the last decade is
serious. 'Farm economy surplus', which also takes into account non-agricultural
income, had two peaks, in the early 1970s and early 1990s. Since 1990, farm
economy surplus has been dropping gradually. Regarding the profitability of
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agricultural land, Table 2-9 shows the farm economy in real terms per 10 are (0.1 ha)
of agricultural land. Agricultural gross return and agricultural income have decreased
steadily after the peak of around 1975, while operation cost kept increasing until the
middle of the 1980s.
Table 2-8 Farm economy of one farm household (in real terms)
Unit: 1,000yen / household
Farm size Agricultural Farm Agricultural Farm
(ha) Gross operation Income Economy
Return cost Surplus
1960 0.98 1,628.5 606.1 1,022.4 230.2
1965 1.03 2,210.1 946.6 1,263.5 417.2
1970 1.09 2,637.0 1,276.4 1,360.5 598.9
1975 1.13 3,440.6 1,545.5 1,895.1 1,523.0
1980 1.18 3,063.9 1,858.7 1,205.2 1,105.1
1985 1.26 3,243.6 2,050.6 1,193.1 1,180.6
1990 1.33 3,140.3 1,923.7 1,216.6 1,794.6
1995 1.70 3,791.4 2,349.3 1,442.1 1,769.6
2000 1.79 3,507.6 2,483.0 1,110.9 1,520.5
Source: MAFF Japan, Farm Household Economy Survey (1960- 1994), Farm Management
Statistical Survey (Farm Management Trend Survey) (1995-)
Note: The data from 1991does not include non-commercial farm household. Data is deflated
by GOP deflator (1995=100). Farm economy surplus is disposable income of farm
household (including off-farm income) minus family expenses.
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Table 2-9 Farm economy per 10 are agricuIturalland under operation
Unit: 1,000yen/l 0 are
Agricultural Farm Agricultural
Gross operation Income
Return cost (Real)
1960 165.8 61.7 104.1
1965 214.2 91.7 122.4
1970 242.6 117.4 125.2
1975 304.2 136.6 167.6
1980 260.1 157.8 102.3
1985 257.4 162.7 94.7
1990 236.8 145.1 91.8
1995 223.0 138.2 84.8
2000 201.0 135.5 62.1
Source: MAFF Japan, Farm Household Economy Survey (1960-1994), Farm Management
Statistical Survey (Farm Management Trend Survey) (1995-)
Note: The data from 1991 does not include non-commercial farm households. Data is
deflated by GOP deflator (1995= 100). 1 ha = 100 are.
2-4-2. The scale of farming
Although policy objectives were aimed at the development of a competitive
agricultural structure, farmland scale has not enlarged enough, although a lot of
policy effort has been implemented since 1961 with the enactment of the Agricultural
Basic Law. Table 2-10 shows the average farmland size owned by one farm
household in Hokkaido and at prefecture level, from which Hokkaido is excluded.
Hokkaido has a much bigger scale of farm than those in the prefectures. The average
size of farmland under agricultural operation by one farm household in the
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prefectures has increased barely between 1960 and 1990, but since 1990 the rate of
increase has speeded upl2. In order to see the trend in farm scales respectively, the
rate of households in each farm scale to total households is displayed in Figure 2-6.
Although the small-scale farm which operates less than 1.0 ha is still dominant, the
larger scale of farm (over 2 ha) has been increasing. The rate of farm scale by the
classification of agricultural area in Figure 2-7 shows that the flat farming area has
almost 20% of farms which have more than 2 ha, being about 50% if more than 1 ha
farms are included. To see the detail of agricultural land enlargement, Table 2-11
shows the rate of agricultural land leasing in each scale of farm. The small farm
holding of less than 1 ha of land tends not to lease land much; the bigger the farm
scale is the more percentage of households tend to lease land, reaching 56.3 % of
area leased in more than 10 ha farm households. The average area leased by one farm
household also rises following the increase in scale of farm; farm households which
hold more than 10.0 ha tend to lease 10.14 ha on average.
Three types of farms are typically considered for Japanese agriculture. First, the
small scale farm individually operated, where the farmer is willing to diminish the
scale gradually and likely to retire in the near future due to ageing. This is labelled
'potentially retiring farm'. Secondly, the average scale of farm which tends to keep
the current scale as long as it can, and labelled as 'maintaining farm'. The last type of
farm, to which the second type of farm may shift, is active farm (i.e., developing
farm) operated sometimes by a group such as an agricultural production corporation.
In Figure 2-8. the vertical axis shows profitability of farm, and horizontal axis shows
time which also shows the ageing process of farms. Because of the chronic drop in
12 A part of the reason is assumed to be that the data has excluded non-commercial farms
which normally keep only small-scale farmland since 1995.
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agricultural profitability and ageing of the agricultural population, the scale of farm
has polarised between high profitability farms with high productivity, and low
profitability farms with low productivity. Farmland abandonment has increased
rapidly, especially from the latter farm type following the process of ageing when
fanners have to diminish the scale of operation or retire without anybody to take over
the running of all, or a part, of the farm.
Table 2-10 Average farm size
Unit: ha / household
Hokkaido 6.63 7.14 9.08 10.53 11.05 12.54 14.02 18.15 17.77
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Prefectures 0.87 0.90 0.92 0.93 0.97 1.02 1.06 1.35 1.45
Source: MAFF, Report of Farm Economy Survey (till 1995), and Survey on Farm
Management Trend (form 1995)
Note: The data from 1995 is the average size of agricultural land owned by one commercial
farm, not including non-commercial farms.
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Figure 2-6 Distribution of farm size (Prefecture level)
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
- -10> 5.0 ha02.0-5.0 ha
.1.0-2.0 ha
0<1.0ha_ J
oco
0>
LOcoen
LOco
0>
ocoen
oenen
ooo
N
LO
r-en
Source: MAFF Japan, Agricultural Census
Figure 2-7 Distribution of farm size by agricultural area (2000)
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Source: MAFF Japan, Agricultural Census, 2000
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Table 2-11 Agricultural land lease (Prefectures, commercial farm household)
Scale of farm The ratio of leasing area The leasing area per
out of total arable land (%) farm household (ha)
1995 2000 1995 2000
<0.5 ha 5.3 6.0 0.13 0.13
0.5-1.0 6.1 7.2 0.21 0.21
1.0-2.0 8.7 10.3 0.39 0.40
2.0-3.0 13.2 15.8 0.73 0.77
3.0-4.0 19.0 22.9 1.18 1.24
4.0-5.0 25.2 30.0 1.69 1.80
5.0-10.0 35.7 41.7 2.96 3.21
10.0 ha< 47.2 56.3 9.38 10.14
Source: MAFF Japan, Agricultural Census, 2000
Note: Commercial farm households are farm households which have more than 30 are of
operating farm, or the amount sold of agricultural products is over 500,000 yen (around
£2,631 when £ 1= ¥ 190).
Figure 2-8 The change in farm structure
Profitability (scale of farm)
Developing farm Developing farm
Maintaining farm Maintaining farm
Potentially retiring farm
Keeping farm (e.g. pasture)
time
Abandoned farm Abandoned farm
Note: Drawn by the author
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2-4-3. Farmland abandonment
Recently, the amount of abandoned farmland'{ in Japan has been increasing quite
dramatically, especially in hilly, mountainous and urban areas" (see Table 2-12).
The issue is considered important in terms of loss of multifunctionality - landscape
degradation, and loss of biodiversity and water ecosystem - and in some cases is
linked to natural disasters such as flooding and landslides. Under the urgent need for
the further agricultural policy reform, the increase of farmland abandonment is one
of the serious concerns for the sustainability of Japanese agriculture. Farmland
abandonment occurs when agricultural profitability reaches a minimum threshold
and alternative productive uses for land cannot be found, and nobody takes over the
land. The deterioration of agricultural profitability and the elimination of price
support have seriously affected the increase of farmland abandonment in Japan
recently.
The proportion of terraced paddy field is often high in LFAs. Farming activities on
the terraced paddy field are still labour intensive, because modem machines cannot
be introduced to such physically disadvantaged areas. For example, it is claimed that
labour requirements on such fields are 3-5 times more than that of normal paddy
fields (Shigeto and Hubbard, 2004). While Japanese rice production has become
more capital-intensive with the increase of part-time farmers, production on terraced
paddy fields has remained labour-intensive. Furthermore, an ageing farm population
(Table 2-7) and a lack of successors have led to an oversupply of farmland,
especially that which has disadvantages in terms of its location and physical
13 That is, farmland which is possible to cultivate again after being kept idle with some
treatments; it does not include land diverted for housing and afforestation, or wasted lands
(Definition in Agricultural Census, Japan).
14 F . . ban areas i . Jarmmg In ur an areas IS not uncommon In apan.
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condition (Kashiwagi, 1994; Odagiri, 1994). Coupled with a low demand (Tanimoto,
1994), this has brought about farmland abandonment.
Table 2-12 The area and proportion of abandoned farmland in Japan
Unit: ha (%)
Urban Flat Hilly Mountainous
Farming Areas Farming Areas Farming Areas Farming Areas
1990
21,472 18,156 36,349 16,694
(2.04) (1.06) (2.52) (3.62)
1995
27,324 42,182 65,450 24,515
(4.15) (2.22) (5.23) (5.59)
2000
35,225 58,171 83,501 31,088
(5.76) (3.15) (7.00) (7.55)
Source: MAFF Japan, Agricultural Census
Note: The figure in the brackets shows the proportion of abandoned farmland".
IS (Proportion of abandoned farmland) = (the area of abandoned farmland) I {(the area of
abandoned farmland) + (arable land under operation)}*100
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2-5. Summary
Japanese agricultural policy has changed subject to the social situation. In the
post-war period, to assure the staple food supply (rice, wheat and barley) was a very
important policy aim. However, a productivity gap became visible between the
agricultural sector and non-agricultural sector. The policy instruments were targeted
mainly to diminish that gap. The structure of strong agricultural protectionism has
been framed since then, which is often criticised by other nations. Meanwhile, Japan
has faced over-supply mainly of rice since the end of 1960s. due to high price
support on rice and diversification of food culture. Since 1971, the production
control system has been applied continuously in order to reduce the amount of
production of rice and to give incentives for farmers to switch into other crops which
are not over-supplied. Since the end of the 1980s, Japan has experienced drastic
agricultural policy reform responding not only to international trade pressure, but
also to address modern agricultural problems systematically. Policy objectives
extended to four points: food security, enhancement of agricultural multifunctionality,
sustainable agricultural development, and rural development.
Japanese agriculture has declined rapidly. The first turning point was the end of the
1970s. Agricultural land decreased drastically due to high demand for
non-agricultural use and abandonment. An important characteristic of agricultural
land use in Japan is that there is no obvious difference between urban farming areas
and mountainous farming areas. As the main land use is paddy field all over Japan,
except for Hokkaido, high government support was placed on rice production. which
enabled small-scale farmers to remain in agriculture. Meanwhile, the government
introduced several policy instruments which might support enhancement of farming
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scale in order to improve the efficiency of agriculture. Nevertheless, the increase has
been minimal.
In discussing Japanese agricultural problems such as depopulation in rural areas,
ageing of the agricultural population, minimal increase of farming scale, and increase
of abandoned farmlands, one of the key aspects is the failure in development of the
farming structure. It is of interest to focus on agricultural land policy and market
structure here, because those should have strongly influenced the development of the
farming structure. In the next chapter, Japanese agricultural land policy and prices
are outlined.
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Appendix 2-1 Definition of farming areas in Japan
MAFF statistics define four types of areas, taking account of farming condition
(DECD, 1995).
1) Urban area: municipalities whose proportion of densely inhabited districts
(DIDs) in liveable area (total land except lake or forest) is 5 per cent or more, and
population density is 500 inhabitants/ km2 or more (or population in DIDs is
20,000 inhabitants or more), or municipalities whose proportion of cultivated
land in the liveable area is less than 40 per cent, and population density is 500
inhabitants/ km2 or more except those whose proportion of forest land and
grazing land in total land is 80 per cent or more.
2) Flat farming area: municipalities whose proportion of cultivated land in total
land is 20 per cent or more, and the proportion of forest land and grazing land in
total land is less than 50 per cent, except those whose paddy field of inclination
tangent is 1/20 or more and upland field of inclination angle is 8 degrees or more,
exceed 90 per cent of the total land. Or municipalities whose proportion of
cultivable land in total land is 20 percent or more, whose proportion of forest
land and grazing land in total land is 50 per cent or more, and whose paddy field
of inclination tangent is 1/20 or more and upland field of inclination angle is 8
degrees or more, is less than 10 per cent of the total land.
3) Hilly farming area: municipals whose proportion of cultivated land in total land
is less than 20 per cent except those which are classified as "Urban area" and
"Mountainous farming area". Or municipalities whose proportion of cultivated
land in total land is 20 per cent or more except those which are classified as
"Urban area" and "Flat farming area".
4) Mountainous area: municipalities whose proportion of forest land and grazing
land is 80 per cent or more, and the proportion of cultivated land in total land is
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less than 10 per cent.
Appendix 2-2 Definition of farm household (OECD, 1995)
Farm house/wid: Farming households whose area of cultivated land is 0.1 ha or
more after census in 1990, whereas it was 0.05 ha or more in Western Japan in earlier
censuses. Even if a farm's area of cultivated land is less than this, it is included if its
sales of agricultural products amount to or exceed ¥ 150,000 after 1990 (¥20,000 in
1960, and ¥50,000 in 1970, and ¥100,000 in 1980).
1) Full-time farm household: farm household which has no household member
engaged in non-farm employment.
2) Part-time farm household: farming household which has one or more
household members engaged in jobs other than farming and where they have
been employed for 30 days or more, or engaged in their own non-farm business
from which they have earned ¥ 100,000 after 1990 (¥ 70,000 in 1980) or more,
during a year before the survey year
3) Part-time farm household type I: farm household where at least 50 per cent of
income was earned in farming.
4) Part-time farm household type II: farm household where more than 50 per cent
of income was earned from non-farm jobs.
5) Commercial farm household: farm household whose area of cultivated land is
0.3 ha or more, or whose annual sales of agricultural products amount to
¥500,000 or more. This new classification was introduced in 1990.
6) Non-commercial farm household: farm household other than commercial farm
household.
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Farm household as policy target
i) Self-supporting management farm household:
This farm household was advocated as the basic farm unit in the Agricultural
Basic Law and was defined as a household which earns total agricultural income
comparable to the income of a salaried worker's household. More specifically,
agricultural income per household member was used for making this
comparison.
ii) Core farm household:
This notion of the core farm household was introduced in the MAFF Annual
Report on the State of Japan's Agriculture in 1973, for the first time as an
alternative to the previous self-supporting management farm household. As the
active engagement in farming is the key element for this type of farm household,
this is defined as a farm household with males of 16-59 years of age who are
engaged in farming for more than 150 days per year. This category includes a
broader range of farm households than the previous target.
iii) Individual farm management body
This notion was introduced in the New Policy Direction in 1992. Comparable
working hours and life-time income to those of workers in other industries are
the main elements of this new policy target. Unlike the core farm household, the
individual management body could include those farms run by women or elderly
persons. Furthermore, this farm unit could also be involved in food processing,
sales or other non-farm business. The notion of full-time and part-time farm
households was not used because these definitions cannot explain the whole
farm household situation in Japan.
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Appendix 2-3 Map of Japan
1
Hokkaido: 1
Tohoku Region:
2 Aomori, 3 Iwate, 4 Akita,
5 Miyagi, 6 Yamagata, 7 Fukushima
Kanto Region:
8 Ibaraki, 9 Tochigi, 10 Gumma
11 Chiba, 12 Saitama, 13 Tokyo
14 Kanagawa, 21 Yamanashi
Tokai Region:
19 Gifu, 22 Shizuoka, 23 Aichi,
27 Mie
Hokushin Region:
15 Niigata, 16 Toyama, 17 Ishikawa
18 Nagano, 20 Fukui,
Kinki Region:
24 Shiga, 25 Kyoto, 26 Hyogo,
28 Nara, 29 Osaka, 30 Wakayama
..
Chugoku Region:
31 Tottori, 32 Shimane, 33 Oakayama,
34 Hiroshima, 35 Yamaguchi
Shikoku Region:
36 Kagawa, 37 Tokushima, 38 Ehime, 39 Kochi
Kyushu Region:
40 Fukuoka, 41 Saga, 42 Nagasaki, 43 Oita,
44 Kumamoto, 45 Miyazaki, 46 Kagoshima
Okinawa Region: 47 Okinawa
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Source: http://www.japan-guide.com/listiel002.html
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Appendix 2-4 Destroyed or converted farmland
Unit: ha
Destroyed or Converted Farmland
Artificial Destroyed Land
Farmland
Conversion abandonment.
into Farm or etc.
Natural non-agricultur forestry roads/ (Farmland
Total Disaster Total al use Afforestation Abandonment)
1960 34.300 10.500 23,800 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1961 36,100 8,720 27,400 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1962 34,000 4,580 29,400 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1963 48,600 2,080 46,500 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1964 49,400 2,040 47,400 28,400 19,000 n.a.
1965 70,100 1,110 69,000 31,200 37,800 n.a.
1966 49,600 3,230 46,400 26,500 19,900 n.a.
1967 85,800 2,670 83,100 34,400 48,700 n.a.
1968 80,100 5,640 74,500 33,100 41,400 n.a.
1969 94,400 3,450 90,900 41,900 17,700 31,400
1970 103,000 2,020 101,000 52,000 18,000 31,000
1971 112,500 1,450 111,000 50,200 23,100 32,600
1972 99,400 8,830 90,600 47,400 22,900 20,300
1973 88,200 1,160 87,000 48,700 19,200 19,100
1974 110.500 1,890 108.600 41,900 15.800 50,900
1975 89,100 457 88,600 29,200 11,600 47,800
1976 80,800 1,890 78,900 26,800 9,220 42,800
1977 60,300 1,450 58,800 22,700 7,730 28.400
1978 57,000 1,060 55,900 23,900 8,260 23,800
1979 50,400 337 50,100 23,000 7,890 19.200
1980 45,000 476 44.500 22,000 7,090 15,400
1981 43,800 308 43,500 22,000 6,690 14,800
1982 39,800 958 38.800 19,300 5,880 13,700
1983 37,300 1,890 35,400 18,300 4,960 12,100
1984 35,500 1,140 34.400 17,200 4,550 12,600
1985 36,300 252 36,000 16,800 4,560 14,600
1986 38,500 66 38,400 17,800 4,320 16,300
1987 37,000 212 36,800 17,300 3,780 15,700
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1988 40,900 422 40,500 18,200 3,840 18,400
1989 52,600 156 52,500 20,300 6,240 25,900
1990 47,100 1,050 46,000 22,900 4,880 18,200
1991 47,000 315 46,700 23,800 4,310 18,600
1992 47,500 117 47,400 25,000 3,620 18,700
1993 47,200 1,530 45,700 22,600 2,980 20,000 (18,400)
1994 48,700 1,470 47,300 22,000 2,930 21,100 (21,100)
1995 50,300 1,110 49,200 21,300 2,740 25,100 (23,900)
1996 47,900 81 47,800 21,300 2,510 23,900 (22,500)
1997 47,800 121 47,700 20,800 2,480 24,400 (23,100)
1998 46,400 53 46,400 19,100 2,800 24,400 (23,200)
1999 43,100 2,530 40,500 16,800 2,500 21,300 (20,000)
2000 39,700 974 38,700 15,660 2,306 20,800 (20,800)
Source: MAFF, Survey on Area of Arable Land and Area under Cultivation
Note:
1) Data shows the change from August to the following July.
2) The data in Okinawa prefecture is excluded until 1974.
3) Non-agricultural Use is for building factories, roads and rails, housing, and so on.
4) Farmland abandonment implies farmlands whose owners are not willing to keep it under
cultivation. or rough lands which used to be farmlands and are impossible to restore.
S) The data of Farm or forestry roads/ Afforestation between 1964 and 1968 includes the
area of farmland abandonment etc.
6) Abandoned farmland is land which was used for agriculture, but is verified to be
unable to restore for agricultural use anymore.
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Chapter 3. Farmland Policy, Regulations and Prices
3-1. Introduction
In the previous chapter, Japanese agricultural policy and the farming system were
overviewed. In order to analyse farmland problems in Japan, it is important to
understand the development of farmland policy and regulations as well as aspects of
the social structure, such as land ownership and social customs in rural communities,
because they are very distinctive due to historical reasons and, of course, have
affected farmers' behaviour to land use. Post-war farmland policy was formed on the
strong principle of 'owner-cultivators', which has been interpreted more recently as
'cultivators' protection' (Sekiya, 2002). This principle has influenced Japanese
farming structures strongly. The aim of this chapter is to focus on policies relating to
agricultural land, to understand the nature of Japanese farmland policy and to
overview farmland price movements.
3-2. Development of Agricultural Land Policy
The foundation of Japanese agricultural land policy and ownership structure was
formed after the World War II as one of the important social transformations towards
a democratic society in order to prevent the centralisation of wealth and authority.
The decomposition of large landowner farms and reinforcement and protection of the
cultivators' right was the first priority for this reform. Small-scale farming has
become a characteristic of Japanese agriculture since then. However, the rapid
economic growth in Japan highlighted the gap in living standards between city and
rural areas, and policy developed to achieve productivity increases and
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modernisation of agriculture but within the constraint of the strong protection on
cultivators' rights. Therefore, the farming environment was very protective, even for
small-scale or part-time farmers. Meanwhile, the government-dependent farming
system has brought domestic and international pressure for fundamental reform in
terms of the farming structure in Japan, especially after 1980s. However, due to the
strong regulation and protectionism on cultivators' right, the government has
struggled to reform farming structure towards greater efficiency through the
enlargement of farming scale. In this section, the policy development is followed in
order to highlight the struggle of Japanese farmland policy to transform the farming
structure within the owner cultivators' principle. Policy development is divided into
three periods according to the social situation; post-war period (1945-55), rapid
economic growth period (1955-1980), and after 1980.
3-2-1. Post -war period: Land reform and "owner-cultivators" principle
Land reform was carried out from 1945 to 1950 as a part of the social structure
transformation from feudalism to democracy. The abolishment of the landlord system
was a high priority. The main pillars of land reform were: (1) the reduction of rent
and the conversion of rent in-kind to money rent; (2) the creation of
'owner-cultivators'; and (3) the democratisation of the agricultural land committees
(Koppel and Kim, 1993). As it was a serious social problem that the status of tenant
farmers were oppressed before the war, land reform was considered as an essential
action in order to remove feudalism in rural society. Land reform was undertaken
between 1946-50; government bought out tenant farms compulsorily from landlords
and sold them to tenant farmers. In this period, approximately a third of the
ownership of all farmland passed to tenants under the agricultural land reforms
(OEeD, 1995). Table 3-1 shows the area of owner-cultivated land and tenanted land
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in 1945 and 1950. The area of owner-cultivated land increased to 4,685ha in 1950
from 2,787ha in 1945, and accounted for 90% of all agricultural land, while tenanted
land decreased to 10%. Through the process of passing land to tenants, the scale of
farm diminished (see Table 3-2). In 1941, 8% of farms operated more than 2.0 ha
agricultural land, which decreased to 3.5% in 1950. Meanwhile small farms of less
than 0.5 ha and 0.5-1.0 ha increased from 34% to 42% and from 31% to 33%,
respectively. The agricultural Land Law enacted in 1952 was formed on the principle
that owner-cultivators should take a central role to improve agricultural productivity.
Under the law, the maximum size one farmer could own was 3 ha (12 ha in
Hokkaido), and the level of rent was also controlled to protect the tenant. The
original form of post-war farmland control was established during this period
through land reform and formulation of the Agricultural Land Law (Sekiya, 2002).
Tabata (1990) claims that this has been important in the post-war agricultural
protection system in Japan.
Table 3-1 Owner cultivated land and tenanted land
1945
Total
ha
Owner cultivated
ha(%)
Tenanted
ha(%)
5,156
5,200
2,787 (54)
4,685 (90)
2,368 (46)
515 (10)1950
Source: Sekiya (2002) (Original source is "The report on performance of emancipation of
agricultural/and etc.")
Note: The data of Okinawa prefecture is excluded.
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Table 3-2 The scale of farm
Unit: 1,000 farm households, (%)
Total
0.5- 1.0- 1.5- 2.0-
< 0.5ha > 3.0ha
1.0ha 1.5ha 2.0-ha 3.0ha
5,226 1,752 1,610 1,446 313 83
1941
(34.0) (31.0) (28.0) (6.0) (2.0)
5,931 2,461 1,952 945 363 176 27
1950
(42.0) (33.0) (16.0) (6.0) (3.0) (0.5)
Source: Sekiya (2002). (Original source is MAFF Japan, Agricultural Census)
Note: The data of Okinawa prefecture is excluded.
3-2-2. AgricuIturalland law under rapid economic growth
As Japan achieved rapid economic growth after 1955, the modernisation and
development of agricultural structures became an important target of agricultural
policy. The Agricultural Basic Law was enacted in 1961 in order to clarify the basic
policy goals. As the main policy objectives were to diminish the productivity gap
between the agricultural sector and non-agricultural sector, and to attain the
equalisation of living standards with people engaged in other sectors, the following
projects were set up: the expansion of farm size to enable farms to utilise modem
labour-saving technologies efficiently, and the shifting of production from
commodities such as rice to commodities such as meat and milk, which are more
income elastic and in which Japan is not at so great a comparative disadvantage as in
field crops (Hayami, 1990). The first revision of the Agricultural Land Law in 1962
was undertaken following the establishment of the Agricultural Basic Law, as the
Land Law had to be adjusted to meet new policy objectives. The details of the first
revision were to enlarge the maximum size of farmland which one farmer could own,
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to allow Agricultural Production Corporations I to acquire farmlands, and the
establishment of a farmland trust system. To protect tenant status, more priority was
put on tenancy rights under this law.
By the end of the 1960s, the speed of economic growth became rapid, and the strong
demand for land from the non-agricultural sector boosted farmland prices above the
fundamental prices based on agricultural earnings, and encouraged housing
development and speculative land possession. Around this period there were two
concerns for agricultural policy-makers; first, it became difficult to encourage
farmland transaction by the transference of property rights, which was the targeted
policy method until this period, due to booming farmland prices, and second, the area
of farmland rapidly decreased because of high demand for non-agricultural use.
Therefore new policy directions were sought. One was to switch the strategy for
enlargement of farm scale from property right transfer (i.e., sales transaction) to
cropping right transfer (i.e., rental transaction), which required further mitigation of
farmland regulation based on the Agricultural Land Law (Ishii, 1982). Responding to
a high demand for non-agricultural use, urban planning tried to enclose a certain area
of farmland in urban areas. This movement led to the establishment of the New City
Planning Law (1968) which created zones between urbanization promoting area and
urbanization control area', The former area enclosed a large area (300,000 ha) of
farmland which was no longer under farmland control and therefore free to convert
into non-agricultural use (Tabata, 1990). Meanwhile, in order to cope with the rapid
IAgricul tural Production Corporation is a general name for a corporate body, with several
members, which operates a farm. The scale and formation of these corporate bodies varies.
Before this revision, only an individual could hold land.
2 Urbanization promoting area is where an urban area is already formed, or an area where
urbanization should be planned preferentially within the next ten years. These areas are
excluded from the agricultural improvement plan, besides farmland is allowed to convert
into non-agricultural use with a simple procedure.
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decrease of farmland, a certain area of farmland was also enclosed under the Land
Use Planning Law, which led to the Agricultural Land Use Promoting Law in 1969
as a response to the New City Planning Law. This law designated 4,360,000 ha of
farming area (79 per cent of all agricultural land at that time), and policy measures
for agricultural promotion such as infrastructure development were selectively
implemented (Tabata, 1990). Since then the Agricultural Land Use Promoting Law
has complemented the Agricultural Land Law. The implementation of the new policy
framework required a further revision of the Agricultural Land Law in 1970. This
revision can be interpreted as a very important transition in terms of agricultural land
policy from the conventional owner-cultivator principle, under the Agricultural Land
Law since the end of the world war, to the encouragement of leasing transactions
rather than sales transactions in order to achieve enlargement of farm scale. The main
pillars of this revision were mitigation of regulations mainly on property right) and
establishment of some projects for promoting farmland transactions'' mediated by
public institutions or the Japan Agricultural Cooperative (Nokyo). Under the previous
policy framework, it was said that once farmland was leased, it was almost
impossible to receive it back due to the preferential system on tenancy right.
Nevertheless, the policy method for enlargement of farmland scale was focused on
encouragement of rental transactions. Until then, cash rent was totally controlled at a
maximum level. However, this control was abolished in the second revision of the
Agricultural Land Law, which introduced the standard cash rent system', regarded as
3 Th is includes the abolishment of the limitation in the farm size one farmer can own,
mitigation of the regulation on cancellation of leasing contract, and abolishment of the direct
control on the level of maximum rent level.
4 "The project for promoting rationalisation of farmland holdings" and "the project for
entrusting operation to Japan Agricultural Cooperative". These projects have not performed
well in encouraging farmland transactions.
S Th is system is that the local Chamber of Agriculture sets the standard level of cash rent in
the region, and then has a role to advise on the reduction of the rent to the standard level
when the rent is notably high.
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an important change in the history of the farmland control system since rents are the
core part of farmland leasing relationships (Sekiya, 2002). In 1975, the Agricultural
Land Use Promoting Law was revised to encourage further farmland leasing,
establishing a new project, the objective of which was to legitimise farmland
transactions undertaken on the black market. Sekiya (2002) notes that farmland was
strictly controlled by the Agricultural Land Law until 1970. Since then, the policy
direction has moved to deregulation on property right and farm rent.
3-2-3. Agricultural land policy after 1980
In 1980, the Encouragement of Agricultural Land Use Law, which started as a project
in 1975, was enacted with three projects in order to encourage further farmland
leasing: the project to promote the right to use transfers; the project to improve
agricultural land use; and the project to promote commissions of farming operations.
Following the enactment of this law, the Agricultural Committee Law was revised,
and the third revision of the Agricultural Land Law was carried out in the same year.
Farmland policy in the 1980s was developed to target farmland preservation and
management, and the effective use of farmland, further mobilisation of farmland
through leasing transactions, and the expansion of farm scale with policy frameworks
and projects established in 1980 (Tabata, 1990). The 'Basic Direction of Agricultural
Policy Towards the 21 st Century' was released in 1986 by the Agricultural Policy
Council (APC). Suggested themes by the end of the 1980s were the need for basic
restructuring in the agricultural sector and improving market access for imported
agricultural products, and further agricultural structural improvement combined with
agricultural pricing policy", Following these policy targets, the Encouragement of
6 Agricul tural structural reform became an urgent policy aim because of the cut in price
support under international trade pressure from the GAIT Uruguay Round.
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Agricultural Land Use Law was revised in 1989. The details of this revision were to
improve the prior adjustment procedure for the smoother and more efficient
implementation of the agricultural land-use promoting project, especially on 'core'
farmers 7 who were expected to expand their scale, and to provide a new structure for
promoting utilisation of idled farmland. Tabata (1990) claims that this reform is
notable in the sense that targeted farmers for farm scale expansion were clarified for
the first time in the policy statement, and that the policy instruments were also
applied to support those farmers at the same time.
The fourth revision of the Agricultural Land Law was at the same time as the
enactment of the Law for Promoting Reinforcement of Agricultural Management
Bases in 1993. The requirements to be registered as an Agricultural Production
Corporation were loosened to a large extent. Being very different from this revision,
the fifth revision was motivated by the move to decentralise the authorities in 1998.
Through this revision, the authority to give permission for farmland conversion into
non-agricultural use was transferred from the MAFF to governors of prefectures. The
most recent revision (6th) of the Agricultural Land Law was in 2000 (implemented in
2001) and is characterised as a further moderation of the requirements in terms of
Agricultural Production Corporations, which was an extension of the fourth revision
of the Agricultural Land Law. Under these revisions, it was accepted for people who
are neither directly engaged in farming activities nor farmland owners, but receiving
goods or services from corporate bodies regularly, to be members of Agricultural
Production Corporations. However, it should be noted that the principle of
"owner-cultivators" is still dominant in the Japanese farmland system. Moreover, the
7 'Core' farmers are defined by the local authorities as those under 60 years old and working
on ran:ns more than 150 days each year. They are seen as having and important role in
achieving greater efficiency in agriculture. (Also see Appendix 2-2 in Chapter 2.)
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central issue of the discussion for this revision was the possibility for business
corporations to own farmlands in order to operate agriculture, because it was a
concern that such business corporations may possess farmland expecting speculation
or land laundering, and that those businesses may disrupt the regional agricultural
operation system, water management, and land use, etc. Of course, there were also
positive expectations such as an increase in employment opportunities in rural areas.
The discussion, however, reached the agreement that business corporations are
permitted only as a special case of Agricultural Production Corporations. Besides,
through the revision of the Law for Promoting Reinforcement of Agricultural
Management Bases in 2003, community farming'' was added as an encouraged
farming style in the marginal areas. The Law of Structural Development in Special
Zones was established in the same year for encouraging the further entry of corporate
bodies, other than Agricultural Production Corporations, in agriculture.
Table 3-3 shows a summary of all policy movements relating to agricultural land,
listed by chronological order. The characteristics of Japanese farmland policy
movement are mainly summed up in two points. Firstly, each time the law has been
revised the regulations have been loosened in terms of farmland ownership and rent
control. There is an expectation behind that various corporation bodies, such as
Agricultural Production Corporations, will bring more competitive agriculture in
Japan with more efficient land use and agricultural production systems than
conventional small-scale family farms. Secondly, the principle of 'owner-cultivators'
8 Com munity farming is a farming system which has been encouraged in marginal
communities which face a serious shortage of successors and an increase of farmland
abandonment. As the system varies from community to community, some communities own
farming equipment and let each farm household use if the majority of farmers do not have
money to invest in new machines, and others have operators who help farmers when more
labour is required.
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still underlies the farmland policy.
Table 3-3. The history of agricultural land policy
Year Establishment of Law or Policy Purpose or comments
1951 Enactment of "Agricultural Committee To deal with agricultural land
Law" administration at the local
authority level. Committee
members are elected by local
farmers.
1952 Enactment of" Agricultural Land To persist and protect the right of
Law" owner-cultivators for improving
agricultural productivity.
1954 Revision of "Agricultural Committee Establishment of National
Law" Chamber of Agriculture
1957 Revision of "Agricultural Committee Expansion of work with which
Law" the committee can deal
1961 Enactment of "Agriculture Basic Law" To improve agricultural structure
and encourage farmland
transactions.
1962 Revision of "Agricultural Land Law" Mitigation of regulations
(First Revision) following the enactment of
"Agricultural Basic Law"
1968 Enactment of "New City Planning Law" To enclose a certain area of
farmland especially in urban
areas
(urban planning side)
1969 Enactment of "Agricultural Land Use To establish zoning area and the
Promoting Law" plan for land use promotion
(agricultural policy side)
1970 Revision of" Agricultural Land Law" Mitigation of regulations on
(Second Revision) leasing transactions to encourage
Enactment of "Farmers' Pension Fund the enlargement of farming scale
Law" and establish new projects for
Project for promoting moderate that purpose.
farmland mobility Towards promotion of farmland
Establishment of the project for mobilisation by leasing
promoting rationalisation of farmland transaction
holdings Abolition of control on
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maximum amount of farm rent,
and establishment of standard
rent system
1972 Introduction of residential-type taxation
on farmland in urbanisation promotion
areas
1974 Enactment of "Act for Planning the
Utilisation of the National Land"
1975 Revision of "Agricultural Land Use For the further encouragement of
Promoting Law" farmland mobilisation through
Beginning of the project for promotion leasing transactions.
of agricultural land utilisation
1978 Establishment of actions to restructure
the use of paddy fields
1979 Enactment of" Act for Promoting
advanced agricultural land use"
(subsidising to mobilise farmlands)
1980 Enactment of "Encouragement of Mitigation of regulations
Agricultural Land Use Law"
Revision of" Agricultural Land Law"
(Third Revision) and "Agricultural
Committee Law"
1987 Beginning of actions to establish paddy
field farming
1989 Revision of "Encouragement of For encouraging leading farmers
Agricultural Land Use Law" to expand their farm scale
Enactment of "Act for special cases in
Agriculture Land Law in terms of
leasing certain farmlands"
Revision of "Criteria for Farmland
Conversion Permission"
1993 Enactment of "Law for Promoting Drastic mitigation of criterion to
Reinforcement of Agricultural be registered as an agricultural
Management Bases" production cooperative
Revision of "Agricultural Land Law"
(Forth Revision)
Beginning of Production Green Areas
System
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1998 Revision of "Agricultural Land Law" For decentralisation of authority
(Fifth Revision)
1999 Enactment of "The Basic Law on Food,
Agriculture and Rural Areas"
2000 Revision of" Agricultural Land Law" Further mitigation of criterion to
(Sixth Revision) be registered as an Agricultural
Production Corporation (the
possibility of farmland
acquisition by business
corporations)
2003 Revision of "Law for Promoting To encourage various corporate
Reinforcement of Agricultural bodies, not only Agricultural
Management Bases" Production Corporations but also
Enactment of "Law of Structural business corporations, to enter
Development in Special Zones" agriculture.
Note: Arranged by the author. The law in bold is the law directly relating to regulations on
agricultural land.
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3-3. Farmland Regulations
Following the process of development of agricultural land policy in the previous
section, this section focuses on the details of the four main farmland regulations
which may have strongly influenced farmland transactions. Firstly, the purpose of the
Agricultural Land Law is reported:
"The law shall reinforce the stability of cultivators' status and agricultural
productivity through approving the basicprinciple that farmland should be owned by
its cultivator, encouraging cultivators to own lands. protecting their property right
and adjustingfor the application of those right in order to achieve the efficient use of
landsfor agriculture." (Article 1)
This article implies the principle of "owner cultivator", and is often criticised as a
policy anachronism (Sekiya, 2002). As the actual state, Sekiya (2002) says that it is
appropriate to call "cultivator protectionism" nowadays as the policy target is not on
'owner cultivator' anymore. In order to protect cultivators' rights, there are three
pillars of regulation framework: property right transaction, cultivators' right
protection and farmland conversion. These were formed as an integrated regulation
system mainly to prevent anticipated asset-holdings of agricultural land and to retain
good lands for agriculture. As regulations on property right and farmland conversion
have played important roles for the above purpose, the strong restriction on tenancy
contract has been recognised as an obstacle for smoother transactions in the rental
market, although the regulations loosened gradually, as stated in the previous section
(Sekiya, 2002). Here the details of the regulations are overviewed.
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3-3-1. Regulation on property right transfer and land ownership
The transfer of farmland property right is strongly regulated under Article 3 of the
Agricultural Land Law. Under this law, permission is required when farmers want to
transfer property right (i.e., sales transaction) or use right (i.e., rental transaction).
There are several rules for property right transfer. Firstly, it has to be guaranteed that
buyers or tenants use those lands for agriculture. In terms of possession of land by
corporation bodies, only Agricultural Production Corporations are permitted, though
business corporations are also allowed as a special case of Agricultural Production
Corporations from 2003. In addition, it is required that owners of property or use
right or family members of those owners have to engage in agriculture at the regular
base'', There is also a minimum possession of land after the property right transfer;
more than 2.0 ha for Hokkaido and 0.5 ha for prefectures. It is also examined if new
owners of property right are able to farm effectively in light of the distance from the
place they live and their financial status. This regulation has played a central role to
prevent asset-holding acquisition of agricultural land.
The especially strong restriction on possession of tenant farms was built under
Articles 6 to 14 of the Agricultural Land Law, which has been argued as the obstacle
to smooth transaction of the rental agreement. For example, farmers are not allowed
to obtain tenant farms out of their residential areas. There is also the maximum area
which they can own as a tenant farmer; 4 ha for Hokkaido, and from 0.5 ha to 1.5 ha
according to the rule that each prefecture defines.
The area of farmland for which land right has been transferred is shown in Table 3-4.
9 The definition of "regular base" is considered the working on agriculture for over 150 days
during the year, or the necessary duration of days for the particular farming style.
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The increase in the area of transactions means an improvement of mobility of
farmland use which has been targeted by the government since the enactment of the
Agricultural Basic Law in 1961. The area of use right transfer has been increasing,
especially under the Law for Promoting Reinforcement of Agricultural Management
Bases, and reached 99,610 ha in 1999, while the area for which property right has
been transferred is decreasing. The total transferred area peaked in the 1970s with
more than 70,000 ha, but recently dropped below 30,000 ha. Sekiya (2002) explains
the reasons for the decrease in the number of sales transactions as: (1) the number of
sales due to agricultural retirement decreased, (2) the demand for alternative
farmland acquisition in agricultural areas became rare because farmland conversion
to non-agricultural use in urban areas was almost completed, and (3) the high
agricultural land prices and slump in agriculture were a disincentive to purchase land
(see 3-4 in terms of farmland prices). In addition, about 46 per cent of farmland in
Hokkaido and 32 per cent of farmland in the prefectures was handed over, for
example when farmers retire, when farmers shift to part-time farming, and when
farmers are too old to handle the existing scale of'farmland'" (Sekiya, 2002).
10 This resu It is from a survey in 1999.
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Table 3-4 The area of farmland for which land right is transferred
Unit: ha
Law for Promoting
Total area of
Agricultural Land Law
Reinforcement of
land right
Agricultural
transferred
Management Bases
(% of total
Property
Use right arable land)
right
1960 56,729 2,690 - 59,419 (0.98)
1965 73,947 2,462 - 76,409 (1.27)
1970 71,211 1,838 - 73,049 (1.26)
1975 47,568 5,909 11 53,488 (0.96)
1980 40,496 10,185 27,397 78,079 (1.43)
1985 38,098 5,818 41,405 85,321 (1.59)
1990 34,435 5,396 51,880 91,711 (1.75)
1995 27,079 4,129 63,868 95,079 (1.89)
1999 29,110 4,094 99,610 132,814 (2.73)
Source: MAFF, Japan 'Survey on Collective Analysis of Land Management Information',
'Survey on Area of Arable Land and Area under Cultivation'
3-3-2. Protection of cultivator's right
Besides the restriction on possession of property right, strong protectionism has been
applied for tenant farmers, discouraging landowners to lease their lands. Until 1970 it
had been very difficult to cancel or dissolve the tenancy contracts once the
landowner had made an agreement with tenant farmers, as it required the permission
from the governor of the prefecture (Article 20). In order to encourage rental
transaction for the enlargement of farming scale, the policy reform in 1970 removed
the requirement of permission from the local governor when farmers want to cancel a
tenancy contract. If landlords do not want to renew the contract, it is permitted only
when more than 10 years tenancy contract was expired. This reform was essential
because farmers had strong fears that once they leased land it would never come
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back due to the strong cultivators' rights protection.
Cultivators' right was also protected through strong regulation on the level of farm
rent, which would have affected the amount of farmland transactions. Under the
Agricultural Land Law enacted in 1952, the maximum level of farm rent was
controlled. Through the revision of implementation in 1955, a different level of
maximum farm rent was introduced following farmland rating based on the
productivity. The rent level is determined by estimating the net profit of land;
producers' income minus operation cost which is including own labour cost, capital
interest, tax and public dues, and producer returns. As the level of rent should be
negotiated between farmers, it should not exceed the maximum level the local
authority specified. In 1967, the maximum level of farm rent was increased 4 times
for paddy fields and 2.5 times for vegetable fields, following the improvement in
agricultural profitability. A reason for the maximum level of farm rent being low was
that the city equivalent labour cost was used as own labour cost before 1970.
However, direct control on rent was abolished in 1970, and replaced with a standard
rent system. Officially, farmers can negotiate the farm rent freely under the new
system. However, the agricultural committee sets the standard level of rent in the
region and can advise a reduction when a high rent case is reported. Nevertheless, the
previous control system still applied for 10 years (until 1980) to ongoing tenanted
land as a transitional measure. Initially, a standard rent level was expected to be
revised every three years, but the law has changed to allow rents to be revised every
time when required.
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3-3-3. Regulation on farmland conversion
Regulation on farmland conversion is prescribed in Articles 4 and 5 of the
Agricultural Land Law. Permission for farmland conversion is required under the
following conditions; first, that agricultural land is converted for non-agricultural use
without transfer of property right or use right, and second, that the transfer of
property rights or use rights is required in order to convert agricultural land into
non-agricultural land. The permission for farmland conversion is examined by the
Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries when the area is more than 4 ha, and
by governors of prefectures in the case of less than 4 ha II. The cases which do not
require permission are: (1) when the main administrative body of farmland
conversion project is the government or prefectures, (2) when the conversion is
undertaken for a public purpose, for example building a public school or compulsory
purchase such as under Land Expropriation Law, (3) land conversion in urbanisation
promotion area designated under City Planning Law, and (4) when the project body
and conversion purpose is specified under implementation rules of Agricultural Land
Law.
In addition to the City Planning Law, the Agricultural Land Use Promoting Law
plays an important role in order to regulate farmland conversion. Agricultural areas
under the two laws are classified in Table 3-5 which is also drawn visually in Figure
3-3. The City Planning Law firstly drew a borderline between urbanisation
promotion area, urbanisation control area, and others. Urbanisation promotion areas
which are numbered (l) in Table 3-5 and Figure 3-3 are those which should be
urbanised preferentially in the following 10 years, and whereby there is no need for
II There are some exceptions that governors can give permission for conversion of more
than 4 ha farmland under some law. In addition, all authority passed to governors of
prefectures in 1998,which is also mentioned in 3-2-3.
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permission in the case of farmland conversion, as well as being excluded from the
long-run agricultural land-use promoting plans. Conversely, the Agricultural Land
Use Promoting Law designated agricultural land use promoting areas, and farming
areas where agricultural land use is specified. In the latter area, agricultural structural
improvement is preferentially planned through activities which mainly improve
production infrastructure'j. Thus farming areas designated under Agricultural Land
Use Promoting Law, which are (2), (4) and (6) in Table 3-5 and Figure 3-3, are not
allowed to convert agricultural land, barring exception':'.
Table 3-5 Classification of land use in Japan
Under the zoning of
Agricultural Land Use
Promoting Law
Under the zoning of Urbanisation promotion area (1) None
City Planning Law Urbanisation control area Farming Area (2)
Others (3)
Others Farming Area (4)
Others (5)
Others Farming Area (6)
Others (7)
Source: National Chamber of Agriculture "The Result of Survey on Farmland Prices", 2001
Note: Farmlands in farming area classified under Agricultural Land Use Promoting Law
should not be converted into non-agricultural land use in principle.
12 Agricul turalland use promoting area is 17,197,000 ha (agricultural land is 5,275,000 ha),
and farming area is 5,028,000 ha in 1999 (agricultural land is 4,510, 000 ha) (Sekiya, 2002).
13 Land conversion is exceptionally permitted when there is a project under the Compulsory
Purchase of Land Law etc., when land is offered for land use which is designed by
agricultural land use plan under Agricultural Land Use Promoting Law, or When the land is
temporarily offered within the conditions.
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Figure 3-3 Classification of land use in Japan
Urbanisation
promotion
area (1)
(7)
Under the zoning of City Planning Law Others
Source: National Chamber of Agriculture "The Result of Survey on Farmland Prices" 1990
Note: the numbers in brackets match those in Table 3-5.
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3-4. Regulation and Prices: Discussion
(a) Sales market
Although farmland was strictly regulated through property right, rent determination
and farmland conversion, farmland prices themselves have not been regulated
directly. Therefore, it is said that those are influenced by non-agricultural factors
such as urbanisation or infrastructures. However, level of influence from
non-agricultural factors should be different depending on the classification of land
use which was specified in Table 3-5 and Figure 3-3. It is of interest here to discuss
the farmland price movement, considering the impact of regulations on land use.
There are two data sources of agricultural land prices: "The Result of Survey on
Farmland Prices" of the National Chamber of Agriculture (NCA), and "The Survey
on Farmland Prices and Farm Rents" of the Japan Real Estate Institute (JREI). The
NCA offers agricultural land price data of the area on which farmland conversion is
not allowed (e.g., (2) and (6) in Table 3-5). Conversely, with the JREI, problematic
data which may show unrealistic prices due to expectation for non-agricultural use is
removed, in order to avoid distortion of the farmland price data. However, Ishii
(1991) points out the possibility of data distortion through too much data
manipulation. Figure 3-4 displays the farmland price movement of paddy and
vegetable field land based on the data of JREI. The NCA data gives more details in
the sense of the areas designated by the New City Planning Law and the Agricultural
Land Use Promoting Law (see Table 3-5 and Figure 3-3) as well as farmland
conversion prices. However, it should be noted that both data sets are collected
through surveys which ask the 'average' transaction price in each region every year
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from the regional chamber of agriculture". Thus, no pooled data of every transaction
case is available in Japan.
Figure 3-4 Farmland price data of Japan Real Estate Institute
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Source: Japan Real Estate Institution' The Survey on Farmland Prices and Farm Rents'
Note: The data is deflated by GOP deflator.
The survey ofNCA offers the following agricultural land price data IS: (1) agricultural
land in urbanisation promotion area, (2) agricultural land in 'farming area' in
urbanisation control area, (3) agricultural land which is not designated as 'farming
area' in urbanisation control area, (6) agricultural land in 'farming area' which is not
covered by New City Planning Law, (7) agricultural land neither in 'farming area'
nor area covered by New City Planning Law. Moreover, it also provides sales price
for housing (see Appendix 3-3). The price level is very different in five classified
areas as seen in Figure 3-5. The price of farmland located in urbanisation promotion
14 The data is not the actual transaction price, nevertheless it is said that the data is quite
close to the real transaction price, as all farmland transaction cases should be reported to the
chamber of agriculture.
15 The numbers match those in Table 3-5 and Figure 3-3.
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area (l) is extremely high, reflecting directly commercial land prices. The price level
is high in the area which is not classified as 'farming area' under Agricultural Land
Use Promoting Law in urbanisation control area (3), although still much lower than
that in urbanisation promotion area. In this survey, farmland prices in the farming
area out of the zoning of City Planning Law (6) is regarded as a representative
farmland price of rural Japan, and named 'purely farming area'. These farmland
prices are supposed to closely reflect the level of farming profit, as the farmland
conversion for non-agricultural use is strongly regulated. Meanwhile the prices
categorised in farming area (2) in Table 3-5 in the urbanising control areas under the
City Planning Law are named the prices of 'urban farming area', which is also
strongly regulated solely for agricultural use.
Figure 3-5 The farmland price level in 5 areas, 2000
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Source: National Chamber of Agriculture "The Result of Survey on Farmland Prices" 2001
Note: The numbers (1) - (5) match those in Table 3-5 and Figure 3-3.
(2) is 'urban faming area' and (6) is 'purely farming area'.
Figure 3-6 and Figure 3-7 show the movement of farmland prices in the purely
farming area (1965-2000) and the urban farming area (1974-2000) respectively. As
can be seen, the price level of land in the urban farming area is six to eight times
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higher than that in the purely farming area, although farmland conversion to
non-agricultural use is banned in both areas. This indicates that farmland prices in
urban farming areas seem to be strongly influenced by the price of non-agricultural
land, for housing, roads and public buildings, etc. The sharp rise in price from 1988
to 1992 is most likely a reflection of the so called 'bubble economy' in Japan.
Farmland prices in purely farming areas had been increasing until 1992, but have
since declined as a result of deterioration in farmland profitability due to a chronic
fall in product prices. Paddy prices and vegetable field prices have followed similar
trends, but the price level of vegetable fields is almost half (Figure 3-4) or 60-80 %
(Figure 3-6) of that of paddy fields in the purely farming areas. In the urban farming
area, they are almost the same (Figure 3-7).
Figure 3-6 Farmland prices in the purely farming area, 1965-2000
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Figure 3-7 Farmland prices in the urban farming area, 1974-2000
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Note: Data is available only from 1974.
Thus, it is clear that land use regulations failed to limit farmland prices in urban
farming areas within the existing regulation framework. However, farmland prices in
the areas which have less urbanisation pressure are expected to reflect agricultural
productivity rather than non-agricultural factors. The data of JREI (Figure 3-4) and
of NCA (Figure 3-6) show that farmland price constantly increased till the early
1980s and the late 1980s, respectively, but then started falling. As seen in Table 3-4,
there is serious decrease in the amount of property right transaction. It is often argued
that this is due to the high level of farmland prices.
(b) Rental market
As explained in 3-3, farm rent was directly controlled until 1980, and therefore the
change in farm rent is not smooth. Figure 3-8 displays the rent in Japan from 1960 to
2000. The rent of paddy fields has a higher level than that of vegetable fields,
although both of them have similar trends, with a bigger fluctuation in paddy fields.
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The big jump in rent around 1980 underlines that farm rent was controlled until then
in many areas. Sekiya (2002) says that after introduction of the standard rent system
the rent level was not 'controlled' by the government anymore, rather being
monitored as not to rise above the standard level. Thus, it can be concluded that rent
control was virtually abolished after 1980. Figure 3-9 shows the rent level after 1980
by region. Hokkaido had highest rent level in 1980, however the abolishment of rent
control caused a very big jump in rent level in all regions except for Hokkaido: the
biggest increase was in Tohoku, which also shows the largest decrease in the rent
level during 1990-2000.
Figure 3-8 Real farm rent, 1960-2000 (Good land)
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Figure 3-9 Real farm rent trend from 1980 to 2000 by regions
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(c) Establishment of intermediate agency for farmland transaction
An overview of the farmland market in Japan suggests that farmland transactions, as
well as price or farm rent determination, are not as efficient as normal commodities,
not only because of strong regulations, but also because of land-specific
characteristics such as location preference or condition of land (e.g., quality of land,
facilities such as irrigation). In order to reduce these obstacles and to achieve
smoother reallocation of land, government policy focused on the establishment of an
intermediate agency to process negotiations of land sales or rents instead of
negotiations between individual farmers. The development of this system means a
reduction in transaction cost for seeking appropriate farms or tenant farmers. The
Agricultural Land Holding Rationalisation System was firstly established in 1970,
and public corporations and agricultural cooperatives have mainly taken on this role.
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There are 613 corporations nationwide in 200416• Farmland is not only an input in
agriculture, but also is considered as an important asset for the family which should
succeed from generation to generation. Especially in rural areas, the attachment to
family farming and agricultural land is still strong. Besides, they tend to have a
strong sense of duty to maintain those lands for the memory of ancestors and the
regional environment. The establishment of an intermediate agency has been also
expected to reduce the emotional uneasiness for farmers to negotiate for sales or
rents with neighbours. There are also strong needs from farmers to lease agricultural
lands until one of the young family members becomes ready to engage in agriculture
(e.g., return migration, retirement or career change). The intermediate agency system
would give more flexible contracts for farmers to sell or lease their farms. However,
the strong restriction of property right transfer and tenancy contract remains, and is
often criticized as 'small-farmers protectionism'. In this context, it is often argued
that fundamental reform of basic agricultural law is needed. However, if there were
not enough buyers or potential tenant farmers for lands, due to regulations, the
efficient reallocation of land would not be achieved. Nevertheless, the problem of
inefficient land transaction is not only regulations, but also that the financial struggle
and ageing of the population which have been especially serious since the end of the
1980s have made it difficult to encourage farmers to enlarge their scale. Thus, it is
assumed that the recent increase in farmland abandonment is due to the increase in
supply of land and shortage of active farmers who can farm them.
16 Sour ce is "Revision of Agricultural Land Policy" (September, 2005), MAFF, Japan
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3-5. Summary
Japanese farmland policy has been developed on the basic principle of
'owner-cultivators' established in the post-war period, although it has been
interpreted as 'cultivators' protectionism' according to the policy change. As a part of
strategies for social structural transformation, the first policy target was set to
encourage owner-cultivators and to protect tenancy right and farmland, However,
since the rapid economic growth period, farmland policy has struggled with the need
of enlargement of fanning scale to achieve more competitive agricultural units and
the strong protectionism of property and tenancy right. Meanwhile, the strong
urbanising pressure inflated farmland prices, and it became difficult for the
government to encourage fanners to enlarge farm scale through sales transactions.
Therefore, their policy strategy shifted to encourage rental transactions.
The Japanese agricultural land policy has been characterised by three regulation
aspects since the post-war period: property right transaction, cultivators' right
protection and farmland conversion. Generally, only fanners who engage in
agriculture are allowed to own farmland, and in terms of possession of land by
corporate bodies, only Agricultural Production Corporations are permitted. It is
strictly checked if the owner or property or use right engage in agriculture at the
'regular base'. Regarding restriction on farmland conversion, according to the zoning
applied in 1969 under Agricultural Land Use Promoting Law, farmland designated as
'fanning areas' are not allowed to convert to non-agricultural land. The above two
regulations play important roles to prevent asset-holding possession of farmland and
to retain good lands for agriculture. However, the protection of cultivators' right
through the priority on tenant fanners and farm rent control is an obstacle for
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enlargement of farming scale by encouraging tenancy agreement.
Although there was not direct control on farmland prices, it is of interest to study the
movement of farmland prices and the influence of farmland policy on them. There
are two main data sources in terms of farmland price: the National Chamber of
Agriculture (NCA) and the Japan Real Estate Institute (JREI). The data from JREI
shows that prices increased until the end of the 1980s and since then have declined
steadily, whilst the data from NCA show prices rising until the beginning of the
1990s. As NCA provides details of price according to farming areas, we can see a big
difference in terms of price level between rural agricultural areas and urban
agricultural areas. It is obvious that land use regulations failed to control the
farmland prices in urban farming areas, as seen by the influence of urbanisation and
the general land price trend. However, it is too early to conclude that Japanese
farmland prices do not reflect agricultural productivity. Farmland prices started
falling in 1980s, probably reflecting the slump of agriculture in Japan. Nevertheless,
the farmland market may not be efficient due to the strong regulations on farmland
transaction and land-specific characteristics (i.e., immobility of land and location
preference, etc).
In order to reduce those obstacles, an intermediate agency for farmland transaction
has been established. This processes negotiation of land sales or rental instead of
individual farmers. This system is expected to reduce emotional uneasiness of
farmers' selling or leasing their land, in small community and to give more flexibility
to tenancy contracts. However, in order to achieve efficient reallocation of land the
reinforcement of demand side is also required. Recent increases of farmland
abandonment are assumed as the result of imbalance between demand and supply.
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There is still a basic regulation framework (e.g., strong restriction on property right
transfer), and it is often argued that there is a need for fundamental reform of
agricultural land policy through the entry of a wide range of farming bodies in
agricultural production, for encouraging a more active transaction of land.
In the next chapter, the theoretical aspects relating to farm rent and farmland prices
are reviewed
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Appendix 3-1 Farm rent and farmland prices by Japan Real Estate Institute
U·t nlIDm: ye are
Farm Rent Farmland Prices
GDP Deflator
Year Nominal Real Nominal Real (1995=100)
1960 2297.5 10430.9 149.3 677.8 22.03
1961 2444.5 10297.0 154.6 651.0 23.74
1962 2410.5 9744.5 155.2 627.2 24.74
1963 2415.0 9252.5 155.8 596.7 26.10
1964 2413.5 8779.2 159.3 579.5 27.49
1965 2426.5 8395.0 163.6 565.8 28.90
1966 2475.5 8158.9 172.9 569.9 30.34
1967 2563.5 8008.9 191.5 598.1 32.01
1968 3846.0 11452.6 220.7 657.2 33.58
1969 4137.5 11797.5 237.2 676.2 35.07
1970 4184.0 11205.7 256.1 685.8 37.34
1971 4689.0 11949.8 270.5 689.4 39.24
1972 5057.5 12205.0 300.1 724.1 41.44
1973 5413.0 11590.3 382.1 818.0 46.70
1974 5763.0 10214.1 462.1 818.9 56.42
1975 6610.0 10930.7 507.0 838.3 60.47
1976 7397.0 11325.3 552.0 845.1 65.31
1977 7725.0 11079.7 591.6 848.5 69.72
1978 8529.5 11695.1 631.2 865.4 72.93
1979 8877.5 11846.3 685.4 914.6 74.94
1980 9211.5 11658.1 742.2 939.3 79.01
1981 10797.5 13126.4 797.8 969.9 82.26
1982 15011.5 17928.9 848.5 1013.3 83.73
1983 16618.5 19504.4 872.7 1024.2 85.20
1984 17188.0 19653.3 897.7 1026.5 87.46
1985 17579.5 19684.3 918.2 1028.1 89.31
1986 17679.0 19455.9 925.5 1018.5 90.87
1987 17542.5 19286.2 926.8 1019.0 90.96
1988 17116.0 18689.3 923.2 1008.1 91.58
1989 16791.0 17969.6 914.4 978.6 93.44
1990 16300.5 17050.9 922.8 965.2 95.60
1991 16003.5 16304.6 934.9 952.4 98.15
1992 15685.5 15708.0 936.1 937.4 99.86
1993 15209.5 15138.3 921.4 917.0 100.47
1994 14978.0 14882.8 913.5 907.6 100.64
1995 14672.0 14672.0 902.2 902.2 100.00
1996 13951.0 14155.0 881.7 894.6 98.56
1997 13714.0 13877.3 868.8 879.1 98.82
1998 13602.5 13719.3 860.6 868.0 99.15
1999 12950.0 13176.4 847.1 861.9 98.28
2000 12602.5 12912.4 837.5 858.0 97.6
Source: Japan Real Estate Institute, The Survey on Farmland Prices and Farm Rents
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Appendix 3-2 Farmland prices of National Chamber ofAgriculture
U it I 000 nllO em: , lye ar
Purely Farming Urban Farming
Year Nominal Real Nominal Real
1965 169 584.7 NA NA
1966 182 599.8 NA NA
1967 217 678.0 NA NA
1968 263 783.2 NA NA
1969 324.5 925.3 NA NA
1970 374.5 1003.0 NA NA
1971 406.5 1036.0 NA NA
1972 451 1088.4 NA NA
1973 581.5 1245.1 NA NA
1974 735 1302.7 3397.5 6021.6
1975 795.5 1315.5 3728.0 6164.8
1976 856 1310.6 3681.0 5635.9
1977 891.5 1278.6 3692.0 5295.3
1978 952.5 1306.0 3754.0 5147.3
1979 1021 1362.4 4035.0 5384.4
1980 1104.5 1397.9 4620.5 5847.7
1981 1184 1439.4 5121.5 6226.1
1982 1265.5 1511.4 5612.5 6703.3
1983 1312.5 1540.4 6058.0 7110.0
1984 1347 1540.2 6282.0 7183.0
1985 1393.5 1560.3 6479.0 7254.8
1986 1414 1556.1 6686.5 7358.6
1987 1421 1562.2 6894.5 7579.8
1988 1441 1573.5 7542.0 8235.2
1989 1488.5 1593.0 8574.5 9176.4
1990 1566.5 1638.6 9567.0 10007.4
1991 1650.5 1681.6 10764.0 10966.6
1992 1679 1681.4 11217.0 11233.1
1993 1681 1673.1 10654.5 10604.7
1994 1690 1679.3 10373.5 10307.5
1995 1669 1669.0 9909.5 9909.5
1996 1642 1666.0 9498.5 9637.4
1997 1613 1632.2 1613 9048.0
1998 1552 1565.3 1552 8623.4
1999 1505 1531.3 1505 8247.2
2000 1479 1515.4 1479 7934.9
Source: National Chamber of Agriculture "The Result of Survey on Farmland Prices" 2001
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Appendix 3-3 Farmland sales prices for housing
Unit: 1,000yenil Oare
Under the zoning of
Agricultural Land
Use Promoting Law 1990 1995 2000
Under the Urbanisation Paddy 88,217 91,756 76,157
zoning of promotion
City area (1) Vegetable 100,848 98,899 81,788
Planning Urbanisation Paddy 29,966 32,227 29,009
Law control area Vegetable 31,522 33,185 29,558
Others Paddy 14,919 16,857 16,781
Vegetable 13,946 16,003 16,091
Source: National Chamber of Agriculture "The Result of Survey on Farmland Prices" 200 I
and authors calculation.
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Chapter 4. Rent and Farmland Valuation Theory:
A Review of Theory and Empirical Application
4-1. Introduction
Olmer and Florax (2001) review the main reasons for the recent increasing interest in
the determinants of agricultural land prices. For example, in the US there was an
explosive increase in farmland prices in the 1970s followed by an equally rapid
decrease in the 1980s, and in England and Wales farmland prices jumped after the
entry into the EC, and started decreasing in the 1980s. Meanwhile, Japanese
farmland prices increased rapidly (see Figure 3-4, 3-6 and 3-7) from the end of the
1960s till the 1980s because a lot of farmland had converted to non-agricultural use,
and the farmland price included a conversion expectation. Moreover, at the end of
the 1960s and the beginning of 1970s, the demands of farmers who lost their
agricultural lands in urbanising areas even pushed farmland prices up in rural areas.
It is believed by some in Japan that price formation is no longer based on agricultural
returns and that all farmland prices include an expectation for farmland conversion
into non-agricultural use (e.g., Kaiji, 1973; Ito, 1984; Godo, 1998). The purpose of
this chapter is to review the theoretical development of rent, land and farmland prices
and the empirical research.
Land and rent occupied a critical position in Classical Economics (Currie, 1981),
although it didn't regard agriculture as the origin of wealth like the Physiocrats'. The
economic system envisaged by the Classical Economists was based on three
socio-economic groups - landowners, capitalist tenant farmers and landless labourers,
ITh e Physiocrats believed that agriculture was unique in that the new wealth created by
agricultural production exceeded the wealth destroyed in the process of production (Currie.
1981 ).
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and Adam Smith (1723-1790) distinguishes three factors of production -land, labour
and capital (or stock) which were implied in his Wealth of Nations (1776). In
Classical Economics, labour produced the wealth, not agriculture itself. However, it
also distinguished between 'circulating capital'" and 'fixed capital": In Classical
Economics, land is treated as a factor of production and the production function takes
the form:
y=I(A, K, L) (4-1)
where Y= aggregate output, A = land, K= capital, and L= labour. Land was broadly
defined as synonymous with the "natural endowment", and was treated as
fundamentally fixed in availability, while the supplies of capital and labour were
more elastic (Randall and Castle, 1985).
With the development of neoclassical economics in the last decades of the nineteenth
century, mainstream economic theory abandoned the idea that land rent needed a
separate set of theories (Ball et al., 1998), because in developed countries the issues
of land and its ownership had declined considerably in political, social and economic
significance (Currie, 1981). Even prior to the emergence of neoclassical economics,
Marx had abandoned the tripartite division of society in classical economics and had
grouped the owners of land and capital together. Land became another factor of
production, rather than the belonging to a particular social grouping with subsequent
economic consequences (Ball et al., 1998). Following technological development in
agriculture, and increase in the importance of industries in economies, the fixity of
land and diminishing marginal productivity of the other factors were no longer the
dominant matter to neoclassical economists. They tended to give land no special
2 This is the capital which was used up in the process of production.
3 This me ans the capital which could be used for several acts of production.
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place in their model (Randall and Castle, 1985), and the aggregate production
function could be simplified from the classical function (4-1) to,
y=f(K, L) (4-2)
Neoclassical economists (Schultz, 1980), also pointed out that:
"the share of national income that accrues as land rent and the associated social and
political importance of landlords have declined markedly over time in high-income
countries, and they are also declining in low-income countries." (p642)
The modernisation of agriculture and research transformed land into a more
productive resource, and changed poor productive land into high quality land. Thus,
Ricardian rent theory based on fertility of land was recognised as being no longer
adequate, and the profitability of land became a central part of the determination of
rent. As Harvey (1974) remarked, therefore, the modern explanations (on the concept
of the land market) have been extremely brief and do not discuss the nature or role of
transactions in any details. However, it is still essential to detail the mechanism of the
farmland market and transactions, especially for this study focusing on the farmland
market structure as the main analytical instrument.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the theoretical and empirical framework of
this study; firstly we begin with the basic concept of the rent, detailing the recent
development of the theory by Currie (1981) and Lloyd (1993) followed by recent
empirical modelling.
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4-2. Nature of Rent in Classical Economics
For the classical economists, the nature of rent became an important notion to
develop commencing with a conceptual explanation by Smith in the context of the
generation of wealth. He described rent as 'the produce of those powers of nature,
the use of which the landlord lends to the farmer'(Currie, 1981):
"Rent, considered as the price paid for the use of land, is naturally the highest which
the tenant can afford to pay in the actual circumstances of the land. In adjusting the
terms of the lease, the landlord endeavours to leave him no greater share of the
produce than what is sufficient to keep up the stockfrom which hefurnishes the seed,
pays the labour, and purchases and maintains the cattle and other instruments of
husbandry, together with the ordinary profits of farming stock in the
neighbourhood." (Smith, 1970, p247)
Smith's basic theory of rent, which is based on 'natural' or 'normal' rent level or
profit, did not give a clear explanation of the decomposition of the surplus into rent
and profit (Currie, 1981). On the other hand, David Ricardo (1772-1823) focused on
the exchange value driven by commodities from two sources: from their scarcity, and
from the quantity oflabour required to obtain them. Ricardo is regarded as the first to
develop a rent theory in the sense that he explained the determination of profits and
the source of rent focusing on the agricultural sector, in 'An Essay on the Influence
of a Low Price of Com on the Profit of Stock' originally printed in 1815. Currie
(1981, p 12) briefly reviewed the rent theory of Ricardo as follows:
"In thefirst settling of a country with sufficient fertile land for the initial population,
the entire surplus of output over the outgoings necessary for cultivation would
accrue to the owners of capital as profits. Thus if the individual employed capital to
the value of200 quarters of wheat and if, after replacing the capital, the value of/he
remainingproduce - the surplus - was 100 quarters of wheat, the rate ofprojit to the
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capitalist would be 50 per cent. At first increased food requirements consequent upon
population growth might be met by bringing into cultivation land equally fertile and
equally well situated. However. with yet further increase in population, it might be
necessary to resort to land less fertile or less advantageously situated. On such land
more capital would have to be employed in order to obtain the same output. Thus the
equivalent of 210 quarters of wheat might be required to obtain a total output of 300
and a surplus of90. The rate of profit would therefore be 43 per cent. Now the rate of
profit on this grade of land would constitute the 'normal' rate of profit. Competition
would ensure that the same rate of profit of 43 per cent would be earned on the most
fertile land. The remaining 7per cent would accrue to the owners of that land in the
form of rent. If the growth of population required the cultivation of land even less
fertile or even less advantageously situated then the profit rate would be determined
by the surplus on that land. The profit on the first and second grades of land would
fall accordingly. The rent of the mostfertile land would rise. Rent would also be paid
for the land of the second grade. The convenient feature of this hypothesis of the
emergence of differential rents was that the rate of profit earned on the marginal
no-rent land defined the normal rate of profit. On intra-marginal land anything in
excess of the normal rate of profit would be appropriated by landlords in the form of
rent. This explanation in terms of marginal no-rent land permitted a remarkably
simple explanation of a very complicated phenomenon. "
The phrase 'economic rent' was used by Ricardo to indicate the price paid for 'the
original and indestructible qualities of the soil', Hallett (1960) comments, however,
that Ricardo probably realised a difference between 'economic rent' and 'the cash
rent' which is actually paid to a landlord. He notes that the popular writers who
followed Ricardo ignored this distinction, and that they even argued that the landlord
had stolen the land from the people and was receiving money for which he did
nothing.
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4-2-1. Ricardian corn model
According to Ricardo, rent is that portion of the product of the earth which is paid to
the landlord for the use of the original and indestructible power of soil. However,
rent forms no part of the price of agricultural products as understood from Ricardo's
famous sentence: "Corn is not high because a rent is paid, but a rent is paid because
com is high". Modem interpretation of Ricardo's rent theory can be explained by the
so-called Ricardian Com model (Currie, 1981) assuming that there is a given total
amount of unimproved land available for use in the production of a single commodity,
com. It is not required that all the land necessarily be cultivated. It is assumed that, at
any point in time, the wages fund is predetermined as a result of past developments
and, that the total labour force is predetermined by the population level. The simplest
explanation of the definition of rent is displayed in Figure 4-1. Regarding the
agriculture sector as one large farm, APL represents the average product of labour
and MPL represents the marginal product of labour. As a result of competition for
and among hired workers the market wage rate is given by the total wages fund
divided by the fixed supply of labour. The market wage rate is shown as w* in Figure
4-1, and the labour force, L*, determines the marginal product of labour. Profit is
then obtained as a residual: profit per worker is the difference between the marginal
product of labour and the wage rate (i.e., the rectangle, cdew*). Rent is also
determined as a residual: it is the surplus on intra-marginal units of labour
(equivalent to the rectangle, abdc).
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Figure 4-1 The Ricardian corn model
Com
a
APL
c
w*r-------------~--~e
Wages MPL
o
Source: Currie (1981).
L* Labour
The growth of population required the cultivation of land less fertile or less
advantageously situated, and then the scarcity of fertile land raises the level of rent.
The emergence of differential rents represents the difference of productivity defined
by land fertility. To simplify, land quality is expressed in a single dimension F (0 ~
F< 00), where larger values for F indicate higher levels of soil fertility (Randall and
Castle, 1985). The output of a single crop (z;) is written as a function of labour, land
and soil fertility,
Zj =f(L, A, F) (4-3)
Elf I aL-aF >0 and Elf I aA ·aF >0 which imply that increasing fertility has a positive
influence on the marginal productivities of both labour and land. Then the production
function in per acre terms can be expressed by using unit productivity, q; = z, I A, and
unit labour input, I = L I A:
q; = af t], F), afl al> 0, Elfl Ell >0 (4-4)
where aj is a proportionality factor (a; > 0 for all i ) for crop i. The profit for the crop
i per acre, tt, may be expressed as follows:
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n= Pi ·aJ(I, F) - wl-Pr (F) (4-5)
where Pi is the price for crop i, and w is the wage paid. Besides, p, shows the unit
land rent. As labour use per acre is optimised at the levell* ,
Pr (F) =Pi' aJ(l*, F) - wl* (4-6)
Restricting the rent to be non-negative, there is some land for which p, (Fmin) =0, and
Pi . a, f (/*, Fmin) = wl". Randall and Castle (1985) conclude that land rents are
positive and increase with soil fertility for F> Fmin, and that land with F < Fmin is
abandoned and output there would be zero because the revenue is less than labour
cost at the optimal factor combination.
4-3. Land in Neoclassical Economic Theory: Supply and Demand Approach
4-3-1. The stock and flow concept ofthe land market
Within the neoclassical economics which developed in the last decades of the
nineteenth century, like other economic commodities it is assumed that the price of
land is determined by the concept of demand and supply (Harvey, 1974; Lloyd,
1993). However, as Lloyd (1993) remarks, special attention needs to be paid to the
actual definition of 'supply' and 'demand' in the case of land. The term 'supply' does
not have the conventional meaning of 'the amount entering the market in the certain
time period, rather it refers the accumulated stock of commodities, not the amount of
land which is on sale in the given period. The demand for the stock of land may also
be interpreted similarly; all agents who hold land are considered to have a demand
curve, and not simply those who are wishing to purchase land. Therefore, the demand
for the stock of land originates from both prospective purchasers and current owners
of land. Lloyd (1993) cites the concept of stock demand clarified by Wicksteed
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(1910) using the concept of reservation price and offer price.
"Given that each agent has a valuation of land determined by its net present value,
the stock demand curve represents a ranking of those valuations in descending order,
irrespective of whether the individual is seeking to purchase at a particular price or
an owner registering the worth he attaches to the unit he currently owns. Thus we
can define the valuation of a current owner (his reservation price) as the minimum
sum he would be prepared to accept in exchange for his land. Conversely, the
valuation of a prospective purchaser (his offer price) represents the maximum sum he
would be prepared to buy landfor." (p 1117)
Figure 4-2 illustrates a stock concept of the equilibrium land price determination.
The line QS denotes a fixed quantity of land available in the given period, and
demand curve DD shows a ranking of valuations of reservation price. The
interception of these curves represents and equilibrium market price (pe) based on the
demand to hold the stock of land.
Figure 4-2 Equilibrium price determination in the stock market
p s
D
D
o Q Quantity
The flow concept of the land market which is detailed in Harvey (1974) and Lloyd
(1993) is important to understand the mechanism of farmland transactions. It is
important to note that the level of transactions is independent of the equilibrium price
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of land which is determined by fixed supply and accumulated demand curves in such
circumstances. The equilibrium price reflects a valuation of land such that all
individuals (collectively) are prepared to hold the existing stock at a point in time,
but is nothing regarding the allocation of land among individuals. Conversely in the
flow market as shown in Figure 4-3, at the equilibrium price there will be some
individuals who own land but wish to sell (i.e., Pit < pe) when we assume there are i
=1,2,... , n agents in the market at time t, and some individuals who wish to buy land
at the current price (i.e., Pit> pe). Thus, it is assumed that at the market equilibrium
price, there exist individuals who are not in equilibrium. The trade of land will take
place at the equilibrium price to resolve "an intra-market disequilibrium" (Lloyd,
1993, pIII9). Lloyd (1993) explains this mechanism: demand and supply of land in
the flow concept as follows:
" The 'supply of transactions' during a given period, (i.e., the number of units of land
that owners wish to sell in a particular period), will depend on the extent of the
misallocation of land amongst owners in the market. The transactions supply
schedule will thus comprise reservation prices only and ceteris paribus, the higher
the price, the more land will be offeredfor sale. Thus the transaction supply curves
will have a positive gradient as depicted in Figure 1112 (Figure 4-3 in this study).
The quantity of land that owners collectively wish to sell at any given price will be
determined by the number of owners whose valuation of land is less than that given
price. 'Transaction demand' can be thought of in a similar way, in that, it represents
the valuations of agents in the market that wish to purchase land at given prices .
......... The quantity of land that prospective purchasers will wish to buy during any
period will be determined by the number of valuations of prospective owners equal
or greater than the current market price. "(pIII.9)
Thus, both price and the volume of trade of land in equilibrium are derived using
more familiar flow concept of demand and supply, and should not be confused with
the concept of stock of land.
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Figure 4-3 Transaction of land (flow market)
P
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In order to clarify the link between the stock market and flow market concept, now
we assume that at time I, there are n agents, which is equivalent to the number of
agents holding land at time I, in a land market. Each agent possesses an initial stock
of land Qj for i = 1, ... , n, and each agent also has a downward sloping demand curve
in relation to land price, P" for the ownership of land. The demand curve is Du = Du
(P,) for i = 1, ... , n. The equilibrium price of land, p,e reflects the intersection of the
aggregate downward demand curve for land with the perfectly inelastic stock supply
curve (Phipps, 1984) as shown in Figure 4-2.
n n
LDi/(p,e) = LQ;I
,=0 ,=0
(4-7)
Describing the flow market of land by using the concept of the excess demand or
excess supply, it is assumed that m agents (where m :S; n ) have non-negative excess
demand;
ED"(P,)=D;,(P')-Q,, ~O fori= 1, ... ,m (4-8)
and the remaining n-m agents have non-negative excess supply;
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(4-9)
The m agents with a non-negative excess demand are potential purchasers of land,
and n-m agents are potential sellers of land. At lower prices, aggregate excess
demand increases partly because the number of prospective purchasers can increase
and partly because the demand for land ownership increases. Conversely, aggregate
excess supply diminishes with lower price. The intersection of the aggregate excess
supply curve and excess demand curve will be the equilibrium price, P/.
h "
0< I EDi,(p,e) = I ES1, (p,e) > 0
1=1 i=h+1
(4-10)
where h agents have non-negative excess demand and (n-h) agents have
non-negative excess supply. Those agents are considered as individuals who are not
in equilibrium at the equilibrium price. However, considering the land-specific
characteristics such as transaction costs and location problem", the actual amount of
land traded will be smaller than the above;
h g
0< I EDi,(p'e) = I ESi, (p,e) > 0
1=1 1=1
(4-11)
where k « h) agents are actual purchasers of land, g « n-k) being actual vendors of
land. Therefore (n-g-k) agents are content to hold the land they currently own. The
government often introduces some policy instruments in order to resolve those
barriers for the smooth transactions. Meanwhile, as the owners gain nothing by
holding land idle, it is better for them to let the land to farmers as they can receive
the returns from the land, except psychic benefit from land ownership (Harvey,
1974).
4 Lloyd et al. (1991) explains that the transaction cost includes (a) the searching cost, and
negotiation cost, and (b) costs of implementing final contracts. As to location problem, it
often happens that potential buyers of land may not trade because of mismatching the
location preference.
S For example, see the establishment of intermediate agency for farmland transaction in
Japan (3-4 in Chapter 3).
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The rent of land is simply determined by the demand for the service flow,
represented by the curve D, and perfectly inelastic supply curve S as seen in Figure
4-4. This is based on the similar concept to the determination of equilibrium price of
land. This is defined as 'equilibrium rent' by Harvey (1974) under the assumption of
the market being perfectly competitive in rationing the total available supply of
services in each period among the competing agricultural users. In this sense,
'equilibrium rent' is rather conceptual rent than actual rent as this circumstance
unlikely happens in practice. Harvey (1974) also outlines the definition of 'observed
rent', which is actually paid rent (Le., cash rent) by tenant farmers to landowners.
However, the level of rent is not renegotiated each year, but of the end of the tenancy
contract, usually every 2 - 1° years in Japan. Therefore rents are determined in the
market by the new entry of tenants with prospective landowners and renegotiation of
the tenancy contract. Thus, Harvey (1994) notes that the concept of 'market rents' is
defined as either i) the result in each period of new tendered rents or ii) the result of
renegotiations between sitting tenants and landlords in each period, the newly
negotiated rents. In practice in Japan, as outlined in Chapter 3, the rent level had
been directly controlled to reflect agricultural profitability until 1980. Even since
1980, all rent is observed not to exceed the 'standard rents' by the regional chamber
of agriculture'', Therefore, we can assume that 'market rents' would be close to the
'standard rent', and 'observed rents' may contain some gap from 'market rent',
although subject to the duration of the contract period.
6 Th e standard rent is determined by the regional chamber of agriculture to reflect
agricultural profitability in that region. It was revised every three years initially, but it would
be revised every time when required under the new law.
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Figure 4-4 Determination of rent
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4-3-2. Price determination in land market
As the determination of the land market at the aggregated level is explained above,
Currie (1981) concentrates on the interaction between landowners and prospective
tenant farmers, and stipulates the process of rental contracts agreement from the
simplest cases. Based on the analysis of Currie (1981), Lloyd (1993) interprets the
model for the sales market and explains the price determination from the case of two
market participants (current landowner and a prospective purchaser) to the case
which includes a large number of agents. We concentrate on the sales market as
Lloyd (1993) does, and detail here.
(a) Case 1
Firstly, the market which consists of one unit of land and two agents is assumed: a
current landowner and a prospective purchaser. It is also assumed that a current
owner has an offer price, P,.. and a prospective purchaser (agent 1) has a reservation
price, Pr,o' If Pol> Pr,o, trade between agent 1 and the current owner will occur,
However, the equilibrium price (pe) is indeterminate although it should be in the
range of Po I ~ pe ~ Pr,o, which is called 'core' by Currie (1981, p87) or if the
93
valuation of the two agents are exactly same, the equilibrium pnce will be
determined as pe = po,) = Pr,o'However, it is not clear if the transaction is proceeded
or not in this case. Lloyd (1993) describes, "trade is an ongoing phenomenon,
ownership constantly switching between the two agents" (pIIl.1S).
(b) Case 2
Now we consider the third agent as a prospective purchaser in the market. Therefore,
there are one unit of farm and two prospective purchasers in the market. Agent 2 has
the offer price, Po,2, which is Po,l > Po,2 > Pr,o' In this case, the unit will be still sold to
Agent 1, however, Agent 2 plays an important role in the sense that its offer price
narrows the range of 'core' in which the equilibrium price lies because the final
agreed price cannot be less than Agent 2's offer price. Therefore, the equilibrium
price lies in the range of po,) :::pe::: Po,2' Similar to case 1, ifPo,1 = Po,2> Pr,o,it is not
certain which prospective purchaser will obtain ownership. Again, trade will be an
ongoing phenomenon.
(c) Case 3
In the next case, there are two homogeneous units of land and four agents in the
market; two current landowners (Agent A, B) and two prospective land purchasers
(Agent 1,2). The reservation land prices of current owners for Agent A and Bare Pr,a
and Pr,b,and the offer prices of prospective land purchasers for Agent 1 and 2 are Po,l
and Po,2, respectively. It is assumed that Po,1> Po,2> Pr,b> Pr,a' In this case, all unit for
sales will be traded at the same price (i.e., the equilibrium price), because the lowest
offer price, P0,2, exceeds the highest reservation price, Pr.b- The transaction will occur
within the range of the core between Po,2 and Pr,bbecause at price above Po,2 Agent 2
would not wish to purchase the second unit of land, and at price below Pr,bAgent B
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would not wish to sell the second unit of land. All units will be traded at one price
since the prospective owner who pays the higher price and the current owner who
receives the lower price would negotiate until both units of land were traded at the
same price. Therefore, the equilibrium price lies in the range of P0.2 ::: pe ::: Pr.b- This
is illustrated with supply and demand curves of the four agents in Figure 4-5. The
demand curve and the supply curve are represented by DD1DIIDIIID1y and
SSISIISIIISIY.As explained above, the intersection of the transaction function occurs
at 2 units, and the equilibrium price lies between Pr,band Po,2.
Figure 4-5 Determination of the equilibrium price with two owners and two
prospective purchasers: The case of P0,1 > P0,2> Pr,b > Pr,a
Price SlY
0 01
Po,l
Po,l ~
011 0111
Pr,b SII Sill-
Pr,a S SI
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1 2 Units
(d) Case 4
Using the above concepts, we now examine the case where there is a number of
agents in the market in order to allow us to consider the continuous function as used
in the previous section. Similarly, it is assumed that there are m prospective owners
and n current owners of land in the market. In this definition, there are n
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homogeneous units of land. Pr.i and Poj are denoted as the reservation price ofthe ith
owner (i = 1,2, ..., n) and the offer price ofthejth prospective purchasers (j = 1,2, ...,
m), respectively. Now we define the transactions demand and supply curves by
assuming the rank such as:
Po,l 2: Po,22: 2: Po,m
Pr,l 2: Pr,22: 2: Pr,,"
It is also assumed that Po,l 2: Pr,l as the basic condition for the transaction between
these agents. Following the rule as explained above, all transactions will occur at the
same equilibrium price. If k units of lands are agreed for trade in the given period,
the equilibrium price must lie in a range between the offer price of the 'marginal'
prospective purchaser and the reservation price of the 'marginal' owner, which is
given by:
min (Po,k, Pr,k+l)2: pe 2: max (Pr,k, Po,k+l)
This is explained by assuming the simple case where two prospective owners and
two landowners exist in the market with Po,l > Pr,b> Po,2> Pr,a.This case is illustrated
in Figure 4-6; the supply curve and demand curve are DDIDIIDIIIDlv and SSISIISIIISIV,
respectively. It is recognised that the equilibrium price lies in the range such that:
min (Po,1, Pr,2) 2: pe 2: max (Pr,1, Po,2)
and then, Pr,22: pe 2: Po,2.
As explained in this analysis, it is implied that the equilibrium price is determined by
the valuation of the prospective purchaser and the valuation of the current owner at
the margin. However, the concept of the 'stable equilibrium' is also a significant
point to be discussed. Currie (1981) states as follows;
"By construction. equilibrium is necessarily stable. Notice, however, that
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indeterminacy of some sort is inevitable. This indeterminacy may relate to the
contract rent [this case, agreed transaction price], the number of transactions or the
identities of the final farmers. This indeterminacy is attributable to the indivisibility
of operating units. It does not disappear however large the number of participants.
However, it may well become of less practical significance as the number of
participants increases." (P89)
Only after trade has occurred and a stable equilibrium attained, will the 'marginal'
vender and 'marginal' prospective purchasers determine the range the equilibrium
price falls in. Lloyd (1993) develops further discussion about this point in Appendix
III.A (pIII.32-III38).
Figure 4-6 Determination of the equilibrium price with two owners and two
prospective purchasers: The case of Po, I > Pr,b > po,] > Pr,D
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4-4. The Empirical Limit ation of the Supply and Demand Approach
Although the simple capitalisation formula, which assumes that farmland prices are
discounted residual earnings, was used in early studies, the divergence of asset values
from farm income led to the need of alternative explanations, such as productivity
increases, government programmes, and urbanising pressures 7• In the 1960s, these
variables were introduced in land pricing through a supply-demand framework for
empirical studies (e.g., Herdt and Cochrane, 1966; Tweenten and Martin, 1966;
Cowling et al., 1970). Harvey (1974) points out the theoretical pitfalls in the above
approaches; firstly there is unlikely to exist a stable relationship between supply and
demand, and secondly factors which may affect the supply and demand curves also
could cause shifts in both demand and supply curves, which means that the separate
influences cannot be identified. Nevertheless, these supply and demand models
explained farmland price movement reasonably well during estimated periods (e.g.,
Harvey, 1974). However, Burt (1986) explains that a classic supply function for
agricultural land does not exist, because farmland supply is highly influenced by
governmental land use planning or policy, and is not reasonably elastic to land prices.
Traill (1979) also mentions the possibility of farmers' speculative behaviour; farmers
contemplating retirement may postpone to do so when they anticipate a sharp rise in
land prices, or may retire early if they foresee a fall in land prices. Thus, due to a
number of unresolved theoretical and empirical questions surrounding the
supply-demand approaches to the farmland market, most recent empirical studies of
farmland price movements have been focused exclusively on demand side forces
7 Robins on, et al (1985) developed an aggregate two-sector land market model (see
Appendix 4-1 for details). However, as is the case in many countries, land use regulations
such as zoning are applied, responding to the rapid loss of agricultural land due to strong
urbanising pressure.
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(e.g., Weersink et al., 1999), although there are exceptions (e.g., Lopez et al., 1994)8,
Thus, there is general agreement that the demand side of the market, potential buyers,
determine a value of land based on their anticipated future net returns. This present
valuation theory is widely applied for the empirical study.
4-5. Agricultural Land Valuation in Modern Economics
The study of agricultural land price determination has been developed under two
broad model categories: models using the concept of farmland returns and models
using non-farm factors.
The theoretical framework of the first category is mostly based on the asset-pricing
or capitalisation model, implying that the value of an asset is equal to discounted
land rent and prices. The asset-pricing model has been largely developed in finance
and real estate theory, but is also related to the net present value model used in
natural resource economics (Randall and Castle, 1985).
The second category of studies uses mainly non-farm factors to explain the variation
in agricultural land prices. These studies are based on the hedonic pricing model, and
frequently use variables such as the distance to urban centres or highways,
population density, the attractiveness for recreational activities, and/or land and soil
characteristics. Oltmer and Florax (2001) comment that the focus of these studies
ranges from the valuation of urbanisation and urban fringes (e.g., Chicoine, 1981;
Dunford et al., 1985; Shonkwhiler and Reynolds, 1986; Shi et al., 1997), to soil and
8 Lopez et al. (1994) develop a supply-demand model of the amount of land in agriculture to
find the optimal allocation of agricultural land.
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site characteristics (e.g., Miranowski and Hammes, 1984; Xu et al., 1993; Elad et al.,
1994), and erosion control and soil conservation (e.g., Ervin and Mill, 1985; King
and Sinden, 1988; Palmquist and Danielson, 1989).
The former model category can consider the influence of agricultural policy (e.g.,
agricultural product prices and farmers' income) because the returns of land, as the
main constituent of land prices, are likely to reflect the policy. On the other hand, the
latter model category is suitable to evaluate the effect of land use regulations in the
short period, but not the effect of agricultural policy change on the farmland market
in the long run. As this thesis is interested in economic analysis of farmland market
structure in the long run, using time series data, this section focuses on a review of
the first category of model.
4-5-1. Assumptions for analysis of land
For analysing the land market in the present valuation theory, we need to conceive a
number of homogeneous units of land which comprise the immutable stock of land
(Lloyd, 1993). We also assume that this stock of land is to be allocated among
individuals via the price system in the perfectly competitive market. It is further
assumed that each market participant forms a valuation of land on the basis of a
subjective expectation of the discounted net returns from land acquisition over the
period of ownership. Each agent behaves economically rational as maximising its
wealth and utility. The decision is made as described by Lloyd (1993); if the
individual's price valuation of land exceeds the prevailing market price that agent
will wish to purchase land; conversely, if the valuation is below the market price the
individual will not wish to buy (if he does not already own land) and will with to sell
(if he does).
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With regards to the above assumptions, Lloyd (1993) emphasises the following four
points to be made concerning valuations. Firstly, as valuations are based on the
concept of present value, in practice, individuals may use some other method of
valuation, or even no method at all. In other words, the valuation may be the
outcome from a purely random generating process and represents no more than a
guess. Second, the any particular valuation is assumed to hold irrespective of
whether the agent currently owns land or not. Therefore, in this framework, no
transaction cost is considered. As the third point, an agent's valuation will be revised
in light of new information but will hold in the absence of any new information.
Consequently, the valuation encapsulates all information pertinent to the individual
about the future and in an expectation that the individual believes will materialise.
Therefore, under this assumption, each agent acts as if he has perfect foresight.
Fourth, valuations are assumed to vary across agents. Despite the assumption of
homogeneous units of land and perfect information, it is still assumed that
individuals act on past information differently. Net returns to land ownership are
unlikely to be the same for all owners due to, as Lloyd (1993) notes:
"Varying importance individuals attach to non-pecuniary returns of landownership,
differences in farming ability and the discount rate that each participant uses to
convert expectedfuture returns to an equivalent present value." (pIlI.3)
Lloyd (1993) also mentions the importance to make the distinction between income
derived from land ownership and that derived from farming in the precise nature of
the net present value concept. Nevertheless the importance of this distinction would
vary depending on the ownership structure in each country. For example, in England,
there are three types of farmers focusing on the source of labour; capitalist farmers
who rely entirely on hired labour for farming, owner cultivate farmers who own the
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land they farm and use mainly family labour, and tenant farmers who rent farms
mainly from capitalist farmers. Conversely, in Japan, as reviewed in the previous
chapter, the owner of land needs to be the cultivator (i.e., owner-cultivator).
Therefore, we can dismiss the capitalist concept in this analysis (i.e., wealth
maximising just from the ownership of land). Rather, it is assumed that the demand
for land, like any other factor of production, strongly links to the demand for the
agricultural production. Of course, as Lloyd (1993) points out, the present value of a
stream of net rents may not be the only determinant of land price. Individuals may
attach some importance to the ownership of land itself and hence may purchase
land for the subjective satisfaction that owning land bestows, as well as its input
value for production.
4-5-2. Pr esent valuation model (PVM)
As discussed above, the present value theory, in which a stream of future income is
an equivalent sum of money which is available for current consumption, is widely
applied to study farmland prices in many countries. For this analytical framework,
the following points are assumed as Lloyd (1993) listed:
"1. There is a large number of homogeneous ownership units in the land market.
2. There are sufficient agents in the land market to own all ownership units at a
non-zero price, i.e., there is excess demand for land at a price of zero.
3. Each participating agent wishes to hold only one unit of land.
4. There are no transaction costs in transfer of ownership or any other barriers to
ownership.
5. Input and output markets are perfectly competitive.
6. Any non-pecuniary benefit to land ownership is quantifiable.
9 In Japan, the attachment to the ownership of the land often stem from the duty to ancestors
who acquired and maintained the land (i.e., sentimental value), as well as financial security
or future expectation from owing the property.
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7. Individuals aim to maximise their income (pecuniary or otherwise).
8. No government regulation of any kind.
9. The decision to purchase land is based solely on an individuals' net present
valuation of land.
10. Individuals act with perfect knowledge of the present period and subjective
certainty offuture periods.
11. There is a perfect capital market in which the supply of credit is perfectly elastic
for any individual at the prevailing rate of interest." (p 111.5-6)
Under the above assumptions, the value of land is the capitalised value of the current
and future stream of earnings from owning that land,
P, =I E(RI+;)
1=0 (1+ rl+l)(1 + r'+2)... (1+ r'+1)
where P, is the equilibrium land price at the beginning of time period t; R, is the
(4-12)
residual real return generated from owning the land measured at the end of time
period t; r, is the time varying real discount rate for year t; and E is the expectation
on returns conditional on information in period t. If it is assumed that the discount
rate is constant, agents are risk neutral, and differential tax treatments of capital gains
and rental income are ignored (Hamilton and Whiteman, 1985), then the asset
valuation model given by equation (4-12) becomes:
P, =(1+rfI E(R,+I).
,=0 (1+ r)'
Wheno=l /(1 +r):
(4-13)
P, = "f "j E, [R,+j]
j=O
(4-14)
Furthermore, assummg the residual earnings are constant in each period, R"',
equation (4-14) simplifies further to the traditional capitalisation formula:
R'"P, =-
r
(4-14)'
The capitalisation formula of equation (4-14)' has formed the foundation for most
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studies on asset values with residual returns measured by, for example, net farm
income or net rent. If the land were sold at t = 0 and Rt+j represents the anticipated
stream of residual earnings at all subsequent times, using (4-14)', the market value of
this land would be
p. =~o
r
(4-15)
Farmland pnces are influenced by the future possibility of it being used for
non-agricultural purposes, because the residual returns from land would be different.
Randall and Castle (1985) discuss the farmland prices which expect future sales of
land for agricultural use, and Phipps (1984) added the case of urban fringe
agricultural land which has the possibility of conversion to non-agricultural use.
(a) Farmland prices with sales plan for agricultural use at time T
If land is owned by a farmer who plans to sell it at some future time, T, its present
value will be,
T
POA = oL 0 j E, [RHj]+ p/
)=0
(4-16)
POA is the market price of agricultural land at time O. If there is no unexpected
capital gains, p/, which is the market price at time T,must be equal to the present
value at T of the anticipated stream of residual returns from agricultural land use:
p/ = £5i:£5 j E, [RH j]. Therefore, there is no difference between holding land for
)=T
a finite time period and selling the land at time T when there is no change in land use
(Randall and Castle, 1985).
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(b) Farmland prices with sales plan for non-agricultural use at time T
However, if there is a plan to convert the land use in the future, for example to
commercial use or housing, at time T, farmland prices can be distorted as the residual
earnings from non-agricultural use can be higher than those from agricultural use in
general. Assuming that a farmland owner knows that the land will convert to
non-agricultural use at time T, and anticipated residual returns are also assumed to be
perfectly known, then the market value of agricultural land which is going to be
converted will be,
T co
PONA = o~ oj Et [Rt+J+ o~ oj Et [R't+j]
j=O i=t'
(4-17)
where poNA is the market price of agricultural land the use of which may change to
non-agricultural at time T. R' shows the anticipated residual returns from
non-agricultural uses. When a farmer sells land for non-agricultural use, the price
must be equal to the future sequent streams of earnings from the land:
p!,A = of oj Et [R't+J. Therefore, the market price at time t can be also written
j=T
as
T
PONA = o~ oj Et [R,+J+ p:A
j=O
(4-17)'
Generally, the residual returns from non-agricultural use are larger than those from
agricultural use (i.e., R < R'). Therefore, in the farmland market, prices in fringe
areas are often much higher than those in rural areas (i.e., Po A < ptA) in many
countries. This theory explains the price differences in terms of agricultural land
especially between rural agricultural areas and urban fringe areas.
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4-5-3. The measurement of returns to land
As outlined above, the present value of farmland is a function of the 'net returns' to
land. Recently, the majority of papers on farmland prices using PVM have used cash
rents as a measure of returns to land, while early studies often used net farm income
(e.g., Harvey, 1974; Trail, 1979). Lloyd (1993) points out the problem of using net
farm income as the measurement of returns to land as:
" Net farm income. as defined in official statistics actually represents the total return
to the farmers' labour, management and working capital. such as machinery and
livestock purchase and not the return of capital invested in lanio. As a measure of
the return to land, net farm income is therefore clearly inappropriate to the extent
that its choice as a land income measure seems quite puzzling in retrospect."
(pIV.14)
Thus, the residual income is a return to entrepreneurship not land. Scofield (1965)
calls the reinforced use of net farm income as the return to land a 'seeming paradox'
observing the case of rising land prices whilst stagnating or declining net farm
income in the US and UK since the Second World War. In order to explain this
paradox, there are several papers published investigating the influence of factors
such as non-agricultural demand for farmland, technological change and locations.
However, more recently, the use of cash rent has become a more accurate measure of
farming returns as Alston (1986) explains:
"This distinction [the residual income is a return to entrepreneurship not land] is
particularly clear in the land rental market where the landowner obtains rent.
contracted in advance. and the land-user claims any pure profit from the land. The
same distinction should apply whether the landowner rents the land to himself or to
someone else." (pS)
10 Indeed, net farming income as defined in official statistics explicitly excludes the return to
land paid in the form of rent.
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Using cash rents as a measure of farm returns is also favoured from the conceptual
point of view; the model is developed in the framework of present valuation theory.
Thus, the PVM using cash rent is the mostly used model in recent studies on
farmland prices.
4-5-4. Testing PVM
Since the late 1980s, while the popularity of the PVM has been based on the
assumption that there is a consistent relationship between asset prices and returns, the
failure of this model has been pointed out: farmland price movement cannot be
explained well by the asset-pricing model, although it embodies economic theory
(e.g., Burt, 1986; Featherstone and Baker, 1987). Several models have been
considered and tested, including not only agricultural returns, (e.g., Phipps, 1984;
Alston, 1986; Burt, 1986), but also the influence of inflation and real interest rates
(e.g., Feldstein, 1980; AES, 1989; Just and Miranowski, 1993; Lloyd, 1994) and
capital gains (e.g., Melichar, 1979; Castle and Hoch, 1982). Lloyd et al. (1991)
examine three expectation models: adaptive expectations, naive expectations, and
rational expectations. Subtracting EI[Pt+I] and t5EI[Pt+I] from (4-14) which shows
long-run PV rule, Lloyd et al. (1991) form the short-run decision rule as;
(4-18)
Under adaptive expectations, (4-18) may be written as,
E [R + P ] = a(Rt-J + P,) + VI
I t 1+1 l-(l-a)L (4-19)
where (l is the expectations coefficient, L is the lag operator and V, is a random error
term which is uncorrelated with U" Substituting (4-19) into (4-18) and rearranging,
1 8a 1P, = (1- a)p,_1 + R'_I + (Ov, + U, - (1- a)ut-J) (4-20)
1 - 8a 1 - 8a 1- 8a
The naive expectations model is a special case of (4-20) where (l = 1;
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P, =_O_(R'_I +v,)+.-!:!..!_
1-0 1-0
This is rewritten as,
1P, = -R'_I + E,
r
(4-21 )
In order to formulate the rational expectations model, it is assumed that expected
percentage rate of return on land as an asset, stemming from expected capital gains
and expected income flow, is equal to the (constant) real rate of discount,
(4-22)
Furthermore, under this assumption of rational expectations,
where et+1 are serially uncorrelated. Using (4-22) and reducing the subscripts by one
gives;
p, = 0-1P'-I + e, - E'_I [R,_I] (4-23)
Further, if it assumed that rents are modelled by the extrapolative, weakly-rational
predictive model I I ,
n
R, = ¢+I Pi e.;
;=1
(4-24)
then, E'_I[R,-l] in (4-23) can be replaced by the OLS estimate of R,_I from (4-24),
"R t-l , and then,
-I "P, = ° P'-I - R'_I + 77, (4-25)
where 1'/, are also serially uncorrelated. Applying the all expectation models to
England and Wales data from 1971 to 1987, Lloyd et al. (1991) conclude that only
the adaptive expectations model is acceptable, and that real rate of interest has no
IIThis model forming process is based on the discussion in Rayner and Young (1980).
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discernible effect on real land prices. The possibility of short-run cash-flow effect on
the land market is also pointed out as a further consideration.
Meantime, the issue has been raised that if time series data are not integrated by the
same order, the traditional time series regressions may show a spurious relationship
(Engle and Granger, 1987). In the context of 'cointegration theory', testing PVM in
farmland price formation is of interest to researchers. Campbell and Shiller (1987)
test the PVM using financial markets data (i.e., stock prices and dividends data). This
technique can be also applied in the case of farmland valuation theory. If the PVM is
correct, then, (a) net rents and land prices should have the same time series
properties; and (b) past values of the spread between land prices and rents add useful
information in forecasting future changes in net returns. Unit root tests and
cointegration analysis are applied in some studies of farmland market analysis.
Using Campbell and Shiller (1987) procedures, Falk (1991) found that price
movements are more volatile than rent movements, although farmland prices and
rent movements in Iowa are highly correlated. This suggested the possibility of a
rational bubble as one possible explanation of the model's failure. Tegene and
Kuchler (1991) show that farmland prices and rents are cointegrated using data from
five corn belt States in the US, and also estimate the Error Correction Model. Hallam,
et al. (1992) applied cointegarion analysis to the regression·models used in previous
studies using British data, concluding that the simplest model using only cash rent as
an independent variable in a regression model (e.g., Lloyd et al., 1991) is not suitable
to apply for the empirical analysis of the land market in England and Wales. Tegene
and Kuchler (1993) investigate the time-series properties of land prices and rents
with unit root and cointegration tests using data from three farm production regions -
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the Com Belt, the Northern Plains, and the Lake States. The result shows that there is
little evidence to reject the hypothesis that market fundamentals determine farmland
prices. Engsted (1998) re-tested the hypothesis of farmland market theory using the
same data of Tangne and Kuchler but the vector autoregressive (VAR) methodology,
and shows the strong possibility of a speculative bubble in farmland determination in
these regions.
Being mindful of unit root test results of farmland prices and rents in the U.S., Clark,
et al. (1993) also refer to the possibility that the simple capital asset model is not
enough to induce clear policy implications. Lloyd (1994) applied cointegration
analysis on an inflation-augmented PVM of land price determination using England
and Wales data in a VAR framework in order to examine the effect of inflation rate
on real price of land. The result suggested that inflation is important in land price
determination. Weliwita and Govindasamy (1997) applied cointegration analysis on
north-eastern United States data, and found that a cointegrating relationship between
land prices and real rent and rate of inflation was not identified as specified in the
Lloyd (1994) model using England and Wales data. Nevertheless Weliwita and
Govindasamy (1997) found that there is an equilibrium relationship between land
prices and real gross farm income, inflation rate, nominal interest rate, and area
under crops, grass, and pasture.
Falk and Lee (1998) applied the methodology which decomposes farmland price
movements into components driven by fundamental forces and non-fundamental
forces, in order to identify if the derivation between farmland prices and rents are
caused by overreaction (temporary fundamental shock) of rents (Burt, 1986) or a
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speculative bubble (Featherstone and Baker, 1987) in Iowa farmland prices'j. The
result shows that fads and overreaction play important roles in explaining short-run
farmland price behaviour; however, the long-run movements are mostly explained by
permanent fundamental shocks. Roche and McQuinn (2001) test the speculation
behaviour in agricultural land prices of Ireland by estimating a general
regime-switching model, assuming that if there are bubbles, they eventually burst.
The result supports the notion that the boom in the late 1970s and early 1980s was
caused by a bubble.
The details of the testing procedure of PVM using unit root tests and cointegration
analysis are reviewed in the next chapter.
12 This decomposition method is developed in financial economics for analysing stock
market movement See Campbell (1991), Lee (1995) and Falk and Lee (1998).
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4-6. Summary
This chapter is a review of rent and farmland valuation theory and its empirical
application. Rent theory has a long history. In classical economics, land was an
important factor of production, and the nature of rent was discussed in the light of the
generation of wealth and value. David Ricardo developed a rent theory with a
famous corn model. This theory also refers to the concept of land abandonment; too
infertile land is abandoned. Meanwhile, with the development of neoclassical
economic theory, supply and demand became dominant as an analytical framework.
The mechanism of the farmland market is carefully reviewed, focusing on the stock
and flow concept.
Farmland valuation theory was then reviewed. Given the marked movement of
farmland prices in the US and the UK, agricultural land valuation theory has
developed, especially in these countries. A recent development is the model based on
the assumption that the value of an asset is the current and future stream of returns
from owning the land. This is called the Present Value Model (PVM). The
measurement of returns between farm income and cash rent is also discussed. The
PVM using cash rent is the most widely applied model in recent studies. However,
through empirical applications in several countries, the shortcomings of this model
have also been pointed out. The interest of researchers moved on to test the PVM
using recently developed time series analysis (i.e., unit root and cointegraion
analysis).
In the next chapter, the development of time series analysis and the details of the
methodology applied in this study are reviewed.
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Appendix 4-1. Agricultural land market with non-agricultural use demand
Nowadays agricultural lands are facing strong demands for non-agricultural use,
especially in urban areas. Assuming the free competition of land, Robinson et al.
(1985) developed an aggregate two-sector land market model; agricultural and non-
agricultural use. Firstly, a simple capitalisation formula is written as,
(i)
where P, is the value of land at time t, R, is net returns of land at time t, and r, is
interest rate at time t. Since rent is expected to be inversely related to quantity
demanded of land, Q, reflecting diminishing returns, they are related by a
downward-sloping function. Let the aggregate demand for land used in agriculture be
- -0 IR, =a, -a,Q, (ii)
where R, is agricultural rent, and a,o and a} are coefficients which are unique
to this land for agricultural use. Similarly, let the aggregate demand for non-
agricultural purposes be
- -0 I
R *, = P, - P,Q, (iii)
where R *, is non-agricultural rent, and 7J,0 and p/ are coefficients which are
unique to this market for non-agricultural land. Vertical lines Q, and Q *, in Figure
4-7 indicate land currently used for agricultural and non-agricultural uses
respectively. The equilibrium price P, equates the excess supply of land (Q, - Q,cl) in
the agricultural land market to the excess demand for land in the non-agricultural
sectors (Q *~-Q *,). If R, = R *, as described in Figure 4-7, then r, must equal to
r" t, an interest rate for non-agricultural land, since P, = R, / r, and P, = R *, / r *, .
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Figure 4-7 A land market equilibrium condition when Ft = F·t
Panel (a) Panel (b)
R·,
rIP' =R, I-----~i r·,P, = R ..i·..··..·f---+-~
!
I
i
!
!
i
Q.Q
- -d - d -Note: Excess supply (Q, - Q, ) in panel (a) and excess demand (Q ., - Q ., ) in panel (b) is
equal.
Source: Robinson et al. (1985)
A more realistic assumption, where r f. ,." is illustrated in Figure 4-8. In panel (a)
and (b), the rent relationships are expressed for the f-th period. The aggregate
demand equations in panels (a) and (b) are those in equations (ii) and (iii). Panel (b)
describes the equilibrium condition imposed on P,. The ratio of rent realistically
diverges because productivity of land is different and governments tend to put
different tax rates on agricultural land and non-agricultural land. This is reflected by
the differences in the slope coefficients r and ,*, (r, < ,.,) in panel (b). Nevertheless,
since both sectors compete for the acquisition of land they must offer a common
price P, which equates the excess demand in the non-agricultural market
Q .~ - Q ., with the excess supply Q,- Q/ in the agricultural market.
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Figure 4-8 A land market equilibrium condition when r, * r*t
Panel (a) Panel (b)
R"R *,
-<I-
Q, Q, Q Pt
Panel (c)
R* ,
R* I
Q*
Note: Coefficients of the slope Ii, and R *, shows r and ,*" respectively, where r < ,*,.
Excess supply (Q, - Q/) in panel (a) and excess demand (Q *~- Q *,) in panel (c) are
equal.
Source: Robinson et al. (1985)
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Chapter 5. Time Series Analysis
5-1. Introduction
Unit root tests and cointegration analysis are widely applied methods for time series
data nowadays. A unit root test is a test to examine whether each variable is
stationary or non-stationary, and cointegration analysis is based on the basic concept
that all variables in a regression model must be integrated by the same order. The
purpose of this chapter is to review the concept of unit root and cointegration
analysis, as well as outlining testing techniques.
5-2. Unit Root Test
For the time series analysis of farmland prices, it is important to test for the presence
of a unit root because the usual statistical tools for analysing data, which were
reviewed in the previous chapter, may not be appropriate if the series is
non-stationary. The standard classical methods of estimation, which are often used in
applied econometrics, are based on the assumption that the means and variances of
the variables are constant and independent of time. However, recent studies using
unit root tests show that a large number of time series data have unit roots, and do
not satisfy these assumptions. There are several ways to test for the presence of a unit
root (e.g., the cointegration regression Durbin-Watson (CROW) test (Sargan and
Bhargava, 1983), and the Phillips-Perron test). The majority of approaches tests the
null hypothesis of a unit root (non-stationary)', The Dickey-Fuller (OF) test (Dickey
IThere are some exceptions such as the KPSS (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992) test which tests
the null of no unit root (stationary).
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and Fuller, 1979 and 1981) tends to be commonly used because of its simplicity and
its more general nature (Harris, 1995).
5-2-1. Definition of stationary time series
A time series (Y,) is said to be stationary if its mean, variance and autocovariances
are independent of time I (I = 1, 2, ... ,D:
Mean: E(Y,) = J1.
Variance: var( Y,) = E[ (Y, - p )2] =a2
Covariance: cov(Y" Y'+k) = E[(Y,- p)( Yi+k - p)]
(5-1)
(5-2)
(5-3)
Equations (5-1) and (5-2) require that the series have a constant mean and variance,
while (5-3) requires that the covariance between any two values from the series (an
autocovariance) depends only on the time interval between those two values (k) and
not on the point in time (t). Thus, the mean, variance and covariance are required to
be independent of time (Holden and Perman, 1994). On the other hand,
non-stationary series do not have a constant long-run mean, and the variance is time
dependent. Thus the mean, the variance and covariance of non-stationary series are
not independent of time.
Suppose that a variable Y, is generated by the following (first-order autoregressive)
process,
Y, = ¢IY,-I + Ut (5-4)
where Ut is a disturbance (error) term, which is assumed to comprise n random
numbers drawn from a normal distribution with mean equal to 0 and variance rl. The
variable Y, will be stationary if I¢I I < 1, and non-stationary if ¢I = 1. A stationary I
series tends to return to its mean value and fluctuate around it within a constant range,
while a non-stationary series has a different mean at different points in time and its
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variance increases with the sample size (for more details refer to Box 2.1 in Harris
1995).
Figure 5-1 plots a non-stationary series based on a starting value of Yo = O.As can be
seen, the variance of Y, is increasing with time and there is no tendency for this series
to revert to any mean value. Ifwe allow (5-4) to have a constant term (a) and a time
trend (t), it can be written
Y, = a + fJt + ¢1Y,-1 + U, t = 1, ..... , T. (5-5)
If ¢l=1 (and {3=O)in (5-5), and Y, is increasing with time without tendency for the
series to revert to any mean value, this is a non-stationary series. Conversely, in the
first difference series, ~Y, (= Y, - Y,-I), which is also plotted in Figure 5-1, the
variable can be seen to move around its mean (equal to 0 here), having a finite
variance. It will be shown that a number of time series need to be differenced in
order to induce stationarity (Harris, 1995). Conversely, variable Y, will be stationary
if I¢ll < 1 in (5-5), which is plotted in Figure 5-2. If ¢I=1 but {3f.O in (5-5), Y, will
follow the stochastic trend, and it drifts upwards or downwards depending on the
sign of p (as shown in Figure 5-3). This is called a non-stationary series with drift. In
addition, consider the following equation,
X, = a + fJt + u, (5-6)
where a + pt is a deterministic trend and the disturbance, Ut. is the non-trend
(stochastic) component, being stationary (i.e., Ut -IN(O, r?) 2). X, is called
trend-stationary, that is, it may trend but deviations from the deterministic trend are
stationary (see Figure 5-3).
2 This states that the residual is independently and normally distributed with zero mean and
constant variance zr'.
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Figure 5-1 Non-stationary and stationary first-difference
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5-2-2. Dickey-Fuller test
In the simplest form of the Dickey-Fuller (DF) test, the following equation, a simple
first-order autoregressive process with zero mean and no trend component (i.e., no
deterministic variables), is estimated by OLS:
(5-7)
where u, is assumed to follow white noise (i.e., zero mean and constant variance
rl-). The variable Yt will be stationary if I tPl I < 1, and is non-stationary if tPl =1. Here
we wish to test the null hypothesis of a unit root and tPl =1 (i.e., Ho: tPl =1) against
the alternative hypothesis of stationarity and ItPl I < 1 (i.e., HI: I tPl I < 1). If the null
hypothesis is rejected, the variable ft is stationary.
There are two main problems with this procedure. First, the presence of a lagged
dependent variable (ft-I) in equation (5-7) will yield a biased OLS estimator tPl'
Although the standard approach to testing such a hypothesis is through a r-test, the
statistic estimated does not follow a standard r-distribution, but rather a
Dickey-Fuller (DF) distribution. Thus, the conventional r-test statistics for tPl may
not be appropriate, and there is a possibility to conclude that I tPl I < 1 when actually it
is not. The second problem relates to the model assumption. Equation (5-7) is under
the assumption of a simple autoregressive process with a zero mean and no trend
component. However, it is also assumed that ft is zero at time (=0, since the mean of
the series is determined by the initial observation with no deterministic variables.
Thus when tPl =1, the application of OLS to equation (5-7) is not valid because the
overall mean equals zero only when the series is stationary.
Dickey and Fuller (1979) solved these problems by reparameterising (5-7), which
becomes:
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(5-8)
where Ut is assumed to follow white noise. Here the null hypothesis that there is a
unit root and (¢I -1)= 0 (i.e., Ho: ¢I -1 = 0) is tested, against the alternative
hypothesis of stationary 1¢I - 11< 1 (i.e., HI: 1¢l -11< 1). If (¢l -1)= 0 is rej ected,
then Y, is a stationary series. For testing (5-8), DF distributions computed using
Monte Carlo techniques are available from Fuller (1976) since, as explained above,
the statistic computed does not follow the conventional t-distribution. Equation (5-8)
is a pure random walk model, but generally we do not know whether Yo=O. Therefore,
we include a drift (or constant term) (12:
~Y, = a, + (¢z -1)Y,_1 + Ut (5-9)
The test statistic here with the null hypothesis Ho: (¢2 -1)= 0 is also available from
Fuller (1976). Under the alternative hypothesis (i.e., 1¢2 -11< 1), Yt is stationary with
a constant mean and no trend. However, (5-9) cannot validly be used to test for a unit
root when there is a time trend. If the null hypothesis is true, (i.e., ¢2=1), and Ytwill
follow a stochastic trend, it will drift upwards or downwards depending on the sign
of (12. In practice, the most commonly used form of the null hypothesis is that the
series has a stochastic trend against the alternative of trend stationary. Therefore, the
regression equation including a time trend becomes:
~Y, = a3 +Pi + (¢3 -1)Y,-1 + Ut (5-10)
Equation (5-10) indicates now the series which has both stochastic and deterministic
trends. The critical values are also given by the DF distribution (Fuller, 1976).
From (5-10) we can also test the joint hypothesis of unit root and no trend (i.e., Ho:
(¢3 -1) = P3=0) against the hypothesis of trend stationary (Le., HI: (¢3 -1) = P3 ::/;0)
by using the <P3-statisticwith critical values from Dickey and Fuller (1981, Table VI,
pl063). If the (/>3 value is less than the critical value, the null hypothesis is accepted
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and Y, is non-stationary without trend; conversely if the null is rejected, Y, is
stationary with a significant trend. Similarly from (5-9) we can test the joint
hypothesis of unit root and no drift (i.e., Ho: (¢2 -1) = a2 = 0) against the alternative
hypothesis of unit root with significant drift (i.e., Ho: (¢2 -1)= a2 -:j: 0) by using the
critical values computed in Dickey and Fuller (1981, Table IV). If the null hypothesis
is accepted, Y, is non-stationary without drift; conversely if the null is rejected, Y, is
I( 1) with significant drift.
5-2-3. Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test
The DF distributions are based on the assumption that the error term, u.; follows
white-noise. However, if a sample follows a pth-order autoregressive (AR), then the
error term will be autocorrelated and invalid to use with the DF distributions. Two
approaches have been proposed to overcome this problem (Thomas, 1997). First, we
can generalise the equations of (5-8)-(5-1 0) as those also can follow the DF-statistics
(e.g., Said and Dickey, 1980; Phillips, 1987; Phillips and Perron, 1988). It becomes
the form which is called the "augmented" Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. The ADF test is
comparable to the simple DF test, but it involves adding an unknown number of
lagged first differences, and equations (5-8), (5-9), (5-10) become:
k
!iY, = (¢I -1)Y,_1 + IO;!iY,-i + U,
1=1
le
!iY, = a2 + (¢2 -1)Y,_1 + I0L\Y,-I + U,
(5-8)'
(5-9)'
1=1
le
!iY, = a3 +Pi + (¢3 -1)Y,_1 + L0!iY,_1 + U,
1=1
(5-10)'
It is important to select the appropriate lag-length because too few lags may result in
over-rejecting the null when it is true, while too many lags may reduce the power of
the test (Harris, 1995). To define the number of lagged values, there are several
approaches. The Akaike information (AIC) and Shwarz Bayesian criteria (SBC) are
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commonly used to define the lag-length. The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test can be
used to test for serial correction and enables us to check whether the chosen
lag-length is appropriate (Holden and Perman, 1994).
It is clear that there are a number of alternative models to test for a unit root in a
series. It is considered that the presence of unnecessary nuisance parameters (i.e.,
constant and lor trend terms) will lower the power of the tests against stationary
alternatives. Perron (1988) proposes a sequential testing procedure, shown in Table
5-1, which starts with the use of (5-10)' and then removes unnecessary nuisance
parameters. If we fail to reject the unit root hypothesis, testing should continue down
to more restricted specifications and testing stops when we are able to reject the unit
root hypothesis. Steps (i), (ii) and (iii) test the significance of the individual variables
in (5-10)'. In each test, the null hypothesis is that there is no unit root and no trend. If
we cannot reject the null, then the trend which is a nuisance parameter can be
removed (5-10)' and subsequently we consider (5-9)' as the testing equation. Steps
(v) and (vi) are the individual variable tests on the presence of a unit root and no drift
term. If the test statistic on the drift term is not significant (i.e., the null of no drift is
accepted), it is a nuisance parameter and is removed form (5-9)'. Accordingly, we
then use (5-8)' as a testing equation and test the unit root hypothesis in step (viii).
The source of the appropriate critical values for these tests are shown in the last
column in Table 5-1 from Fuller (1976) and Dickey and Fuller (1981).
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Table 5-1 Unit root test procedure using the DF/ADF tests
Steps and Model
Null
Critical Values
Hypothesis
k (¢3 -I) = 0 Fuller (1976,
(i)~Y, = a3 + P3t + (¢3 -I)Y,_I + LB~Y,_I + u,
Test Statistic: 'tt Table 8.5.2,1=1
eq(5-10)' block3, p373)
k /33= 0 Dickey and(ii) ~Y, = a3 + Pi + (¢3 -I)Y,_I + LB~Y,_I + U,
1=1 Test Statistic: 'tpx Fuller (1981,
eq(5-1O)' TableIII, pI 062)
k U3 =0 Dickey and(iii) ~Y, = a3 + fJl + (¢3 -1)Y,-1 + L B~Y,_I+ u,
Test Statistic: 'tIU Fuller (1981,1=1
eq(5-10)' TableII, p l 062)
k (¢3 - 1) = /33= 0 Dickey and
(iv)~Y, =a3 +fJ3t+(¢3 -1)Y,-1 + IB~Y,_I +u,
1=1 Test Statistic: (/)3 Fuller (1981,
eq(5-10)' TableVI, p1063)
k (¢2 - 1) = 0 Fuller (1976,
(v)~Y, =a2 +(¢2 -I)Y,_I + IB&'-I +U,
Test Statistic: 'tp Table 8.5.2,1=1
eq(5-9)' block2, p373)
k U2=0 Dickey and
(vi)~Y, =a2 +(¢2 -I)Y,_I + IB&'-I +U,
Test Statistic: 't1Jll Fuller (1981,1=1
eq(5-9)' TableI, pl062)
k (¢2 - 1) =U2 = 0 Dickey and
(vii)~Y, =a2 +(¢2 -1)Y,_1+ LB&'-I +U,
Test Statistic: (/)1 Fuller (1981,1=1
eq(5-9)' TableIV, pl 063)
k (¢I - 1) = 0 Fuller (1976,
(viii)~Y, = (¢I -I)Y,_I + IB,~Y,-i +U,
Test Statistic: 't Table 8.5.2,lal
eq(5-8)' block I, p373)
5-2-4. Deterministic components and unit roots
Julselius (2000) argues the possibility to make serious interpretational mistakes when
dynamics are introduced as the interpretation of deterministic components, such as a
trend, constant, and dummy variables, is crucially related to the dynamics of the
model, in particular to whether the dynamics contains a unit root or not. Firstly, a
simple regression model for Yt containing a linear trend and a dummy variable to
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describe an intervention at time i:
Y, = i1 + 8Di, + u, + Yo, t = 1, ..., T (5-11)
where the intervention dummy Di, = 1 for t = i, and 0 otherwise, y is a growth rate,
and the residual U, is a first order autoregressive process:
&,
U = _..:,.__
, I-pL
By substituting (5-12) in (5-11), (5-11) is rewritten as:
(5-12)
Y, = i1 + 8Di, + & + Yo
I-pL
Multiplying through with (1 - pL):
(5-13)
(1- pL)Y, = (1- pL)i1 + (1- pL)8Di, + (1- pL)Yo + e, (5-14)
Rewriting (5-14) using LY, =Yt-I:
Y, = PY,-I + y(l- p)t + 8Di, - p8Dit-J + py + (1- pL)Yo + &, (5-15)
From this, it can be recognised that the 'static' regression model (5-10) is equivalent
to the following dynamic model:
(5-16)
where
b, =p
b2 = r(1- p)
b, =po
bo = py + (1- p)Yo
(5-17)
Four cases are considered here:
Case 1.P = 1 and y:f. O. It follows from (5-15) that L\Y, = Y + e, for t = 1, ..., T. i.e.,
the random walk with drift model. It is noted that E(.1Y,) = y :f. 0 is equivalent to Y,
having a linear trend.
Case 2. p = 1 and y = O. It follows from (5-15) that L\Y, = eh for t = 1, ..., T. i.e., the
pure random walk model. In this case E(.1Y,) = 0 and Y, contains no linear trend.
Case 3. IPI < 1 and y :f. 0 gives us (5-16), i.e., a trend stationary model. The
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interpretation of the coefficients bl, b2 and bo should be careful, for example, bz is not
an estimate of the trend in Y" instead y = b2( 1 - p) is.
Case 4. IPI < 1 and y = 0 gives us L\Y, =pY,_1 + (1 - p)Yo + e, i.e., the stationary
autoregressive model with constant term.
Thus, in the dynamic regression model (5-15), i.e., /(1) model, the constant term is a
weighted average of the growth rate y and the initial value Yo, and the impulse
dummy accounts for the intervention effect (outlier effect) in Y, as well as Y,-I. In the
differenced model (p=1), the constant term is only measuring the growth rate, y, and
the intervention effect in Yi now becomes a transitory effect in L\Y,measured by L\Di,.
All variables from case 1 to 3 are strongly trended (Green, 2003), and deterministic
terms interact with the stochastic trends. Therefore, interpretation of the
deterministic terms for the non-stationary variables should be done with care.
Patterson (2000) suggests graphing the data as well as the autocorrelations of the
levels and first differences to become familiar with characteristics of the data. When
the test supports the presence of a linear trend, for example, it is preferable to include
more appropriate information in the model if possible (e.g., population growth, or the
proportion of old/young in a population) because it would even affect the
interpretation of cointegrating relationship between variables (Julselius, 2000).
5-3. Structural Breaks and Unit Root Tests
The presence of structural changes/breaks can change the level of integration of the
series and the failure of the conventional ADF tests, and not taking into account this
change may lead to spurious results and inappropriate model specification (Perron,
1990). Perron (1989) distinguishes between exogenous shocks and endogenous
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shocks, and claims only exogenous shocks cause a permanent effect on the series. He
found only two events (shocks), the Great Crash of 1929 and the oil price shock of
1973, had had a permanent effect on various macroeconomic variables, and in the
above sense he considered those shocks as exogenous. However, he found a
difference in nature between the two shocks. On one hand, the Great Crash created a
dramatic drop in the mean of most aggregate variables, in other words, this kind of
shock appears in the changing of the intercept or level of the series. On the other
hand, the oil price shock changed the slope of the trend for most aggregates, i.e., a
slowdown in growth. Therefore three different models are considered under the null
hypothesis. Perron (1989) developed a procedure for testing the null hypothesis that a
given series, Yt (t = 1, ... , 1), has a unit root with drift and that an exogenous
structural break occurs at time 1 < TB < T, against the alternative hypothesis that the
series is stationary about a deterministic time trend with an exogenous change in the
trend function at time TB. The first model (A) allows for a one-time change in the
level of the series with a dummy variable, D(TB), which is 1 if t = TB+ 1, otherwise 0,
and is termed the 'crash model' (Perron, 1989) (see Figure 5-4). The second model
(B) allows for a change in the slope or rate of growth of the series with a dummy
variable, DU" which is 1 if the t is bigger than that at the point of the structural break
(i.e., t> TB), and ° otherwise, referred to as the 'changing growth model' (Perron,
1989) (see Figure 5-5). The final model (C) allows both changes. The null
hypotheses can be written by adding parameters of the structural break:
Ho: Y, = a + dD(TB) + Y,-I + e, Model (A)
Ho: Y, = al + (a2 -a I)DU, +Y,-I +e, Model (B)
Ho: Y, = al + dD(TB) + (a2 - al )DU, + Y,-I + e, Model (C)
The trend-stationary alternative hypotheses considered are:
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Model (A)
Model (B)
Model (C)
where DT,· = t - TB if I> TB and 0 otherwise. The difference, a2- at, represents the
magnitude of the change in the intercept of the trend function occurring at time TB,
then similarly, the difference, P2 - Pt, represents the magnitude of the change in the
slope of the trend function occurring at time TB (Zivot and Andrews, 1992). Perron
(1990) employed an adjusted Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test, and the regressions
are:
k
i\Y, =aA +pAt+77ADU, +dAD(TB), +yAy,_1 + LB,Ai\y,_i +e,
,=1
(5-18)
k
i\Y, =aB +pBI+oBDT, +yBy,_1 + LB/i\Y,-i +e,
,=1
(5-19)
k
i\Y, = aC + pC t + 77c DU, + oC DT, + de D(TB), + yC Y,-I + L B;ci\Y,_i + e, (5-20)
,=1
In order to test formally for the presence of a unit root, Perron considered the
following statistics computed from (5-18) to (5-20):
(5-21 )
which represents the standard t statistic for testing l These statistics depend on the
location of the break fraction (or breakpoint) A. = TB/ T.
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Figure 5-4 The time series with structural change in level
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Zivot and Andrews (1992) construe Perron's test statistic (5-21) in a different manner.
Perron's model assumes that the break point is already known, however it is unlikely
that the data of the break is known a priori. Zivot and Andrews consider the case that
we do not know the time of break point. They treat the structural break as an
endogenous occurrence, and then the hypothesis of the unit root with nonzero drift
without a structural break of the form for the three models is:
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Ho: Y, = a + Y,-I + e,
As explained above, the dummy variable D(TB) is no longer needed in this model.
Therefore the ADF type unit root testing equations for the three models are,
le
~Y, = aA + pAl + "ADU(i), + yAy,_1 + IB,A~Y,_; + e, (5-18)'
1=1
le
~Y, = a" + pBI +OBDT(i), + yB1';_1+ IB;B ~Y,-; + e,
1=1
(5-19)'
le
cc cAe" c ",",C~Y, = a + p 1+" DU().), + 0 DT()'), + y Y,-I + L,.B; ~Y,-I + e,
1=1
(5-20)'
where DUt(A) = 1 if I > Ts, 0 otherwise, and DT, (A) = I if I > Ts, 0 otherwise. Zivot
and Andrews put "hats" on the A parameters in (5-18)'- (5-20)' to emphasise that they
correspond to estimated values of the break fraction.
There is one disadvantage in the Zivot and Andrews (1992) test. This test can allow
having a break only under the alternative hypothesis. In response to this drawback,
Perron (1997) developed a test which allows a break under both null and alternative
hypotheses at an unknown point in time. He examines three different models under
the null and alternative hypotheses. The first model (Modell) allows only a change
in the intercept under both the null and alternative hypotheses. This is termed the
'innovational outlier model (10)' (Perron, 1997), and the unit root testing equation
becomes:
le
~Y, =a+pt+"DU().), +dD(TB), +yY,-1 + IB,~y,-, +e,
1=1
(5-22)
where DU, = 1 (I> TB) and D(TB)I = 1 (t = TB+ 1). For the second model (Model 2),
both a change in the intercept and the slope are allowed at time TB. The testing
equation is,
le
~Y, = a + pt + "DU()'), + oDT()'), + dD(TB), + yY,-1 + IB/~Y,_; + e, (5-23)
1=1
The third model (Model 3) allows a change in the slope but both segments of the
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trend function are joined at the time of break. This is called the 'additive outlier
model (AO), in the terminology of Perron, and takes the following two-step
procedure for testing. First, the series is detrended using the equation with a dummy
variable, DT,*= t - TB=1.
Y, = a + pt + rDT(A)t * +Y, . (5-24)
Then the test is performed using:
k
Y, = aY,-t +Lei~y,-i + et
i=1
(5-25)
Perron suggests two methods to select TB. First, TB is selected where it gives the least
evidence in favour of the null hypothesis (i.e., the value which minimises the
t-statistic for testing y = 1). Secondly, TB is chosen to minimise either the value of
t-statistic on the parameter associated with the change in the intercept (Modell), or
the value of r-statistic on the change in slope (Models 2 and 3). Then, the test is
performed using the t-statistic for ~ = 1 under equation (5-25) with a selected break
data TB.
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5-4. Cointegration Analysis
The basic idea of cointegration is to identity the existence of a long-run equilibrium'
(i.e., long-run relationship) between variables over time. All variables must be
integrated of the same order to have co-integration between them. Then the error
term of the linear combination of the variables is also integrated to one lower order
of those variables.
DEFINITION:
If two time series Yt and X, are both integrated of order d, which means both series
must be differenced d times before it becomes stationary, denoted I(d), then in
general any linear combination of the two series will also be I(d): for example, the
residuals obtained from regressing Yt on X, are I(d). However if there exists a vector
p, which is called the 'cointegrating vector', the disturbance term from the regression
(et = Ye - fJ'Xt) is of a lower order of integration, I(d - b), where b>O, and then
defined that Yt and X, are cointegrated of order (d, b) (Engle and Granger, 1987).
Thus, if we consider the following regression:
y, = pX, +e, (5-26)
then if the series Yt and X, are both 1(1) and error term et is 1(0), the series are
cointegrated and denoted CI( 1,1). The economic interpretation of cointegration is
that two (or more) series have an (or more than one) equilibrium relationship(s)
between them. Even though the series themselves contain stochastic trends (i.e.,
non-stationary), it is said that those series are cointegrated if they move closely
3 Th e term 'equilibrium' here refers to any long-run relationship among non-stationary
variables, and different from the term economists use to mean the equality between desired
and actual transactions.
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together over time and the difference between them is stationary (see Figure 5-6).
Thus the concept of cointegration implies the presence of a long-run equilibrium to
which an economic system converges over time, and the error term e, can be
interpreted as the disequilibrium error (i.e., the distance that the system is away from
equilibrium at time t) (Harris, 1995).
Figure 5-6 Two series drifting together
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5-4-1. Testing for cointegration
Two main approaches are commonly used to test for cointegraton. One is the
residual-based ADF-approach proposed by Engle and Granger (1987), and the other
is the Johansen's Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) approach (Johansen,
1988; Johansen and Juselius, 1990).
5-4-1-1. Engle-Granger (EG) residual based approach
To test the null hypothesis that Y, and XI are not cointegrated, in the Engle-Granger
framework, it is examined whether the error term e, in the cointegration regression is
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non-stationary (i.e., e,- 1(1» against the alternative that e, is stationary (i.e., e, - /(0».
Although Engle and Granger (1987) list seven alternative tests", they found that the
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) is to be preferred. The test becomes:
k
!le, = p + /it + ~H +Ie; * !le,_; +w,
1=1
(5-27)
where the e, are obtained from estimating (5-26). Trend and/or constant terms in
the test regression equation depend on whether a constant or trend term appears in
(5-26). If the alternative hypothesis of cointegration allows a non-zero mean and a
non-zero deterministic trend for e" then a constant and a trend should be included
in (5-27). Johansen (1992), on the basis of a Monte Carlo simulation, shows that
irrespective of whether e, contains a deterministic trend or not, including a time trend
in (5-27) results in a loss of power (i.e., under-rejecting the null of no cointegration
when it is false and over-rejecting when it is true). The critical value changes
depending on the number of regressors (n) and also whether a constant and/or trend
are included in (5-27) (Harris, 1995). Adjusted critical values are available in Phillips
and Ouliaris (1990), MacKinnon (1991), and Banerjee et al. (1993).
As the next step, the short-run error correction model (ECM) is estimated to obtain
information on the speed of adjustment to long-run equilibrium. The relationship
between error correction models and cointegration was first indicated in Granger
(1981). After obtaining e, = Y,-px, from (5-19), we estimate:
(5-28)
4 CROW test, Dickey-Fuller (OF) test, ADF test, Restricted Vector Autoregression test
(RVAR), Augmented RVAR test, Unrestricted VAR (UVAR) test, and Augmented or higher
order version of the UVAR test (for details, see Engle and Granger 1987, p266). Engle and
Granger (1987) conclude that the ADF test and CRDW test perform best in terms of power
but that the critical values for the CROW are not sufficiently constant across the various
experiments for the test.
S Th is states that the residual is independently identically distributed with zero mean and
constant variance cr.
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where et is an error term with zero mean and constant variance, ro captures the
short-run effect on the change in Y of the changes in X, and p accounts for the
long-run equilibrium relationship between Yt and X; Error correction (Yt- PX,) is the
divergence from the long-run equilibrium and is equal to zero when long-run
equilibrium holds. During disequilibrium, this term is non-zero and measures the
distance the system is away from equilibrium at time I. An estimate of (1 - at) will
provide information on the speed of adjustment, that is how the variable Yt changes
in response to disequilibrium. A negative sign of (1 - al) indicates that adjustments
move in the direction to restore the long-run equilibrium. If both Yt and X, are
non-stationary (i.e., /(1 », and cointegration exists between them, then et is stationary
(i.e., /(0». Therefore all the terms in (5-28) are /(0). This means that classical OLS
estimation and standard 1- and F-tests are applicable.
The Engle-Granger (EG) procedure is popular because it is easy to estimate the static
model using OLS and then perform unit root tests on the residuals from this equation,
and because the second step of the EG procedure enables us to estimate the short-run
ECM as (5-28) explained above (Harris, 1995). However, there a number of
weaknesses or disadvantages in the EG procedure: first, it has low power; second, its
finite sample estimates of long-run relationships are potentially biased, and
uniqueness of the cointegration vector should be assumed due to the single equation
approach; and third, inferences cannot be drawn using standard I-statistics about the
significance of the parameters of the static long-run model (see, Charemza and
Deadman, 1992; Cuthbertson et al., 1992; Harris, 1995). There are several alternative
tests, considering the weakness of the DF procedure. One is the cointegration
regression Durbin-Watson (CRDW) test proposed by Sargan and Bhargava (1983),
which is based on the standard DW statistic obtained from a regression (5-26). This
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test is known to be the uniformly most powerful invariant test of the null hypothesis
that e, is a simple non-stationary random walk (i.e., e, = e,_1 + z,; where zi-- IN(O, cl»
against the alternative that e, is a stationary first-order autoregressive process (i.e., e,
=pe., + z,; where lol < 1 and z, - IN(O, cl» (Harris, 1995). As the EO approach is
using a single equation model, we have to assume that there is only one cointegrating
vector when in fact there are more when there are more than two variables in the
model. Even if there is only one cointegration relationship, estimating a single
equation is potentially inefficient because it does not lead to the smallest variance
against alternative approaches. Therefore, it is useful to extend the single equation
framework to a multivariate framework.
5-4-1-2. Cointegration with multiple equations: The Johansen method
The Johansen technique is rapidly becoming an essential tool for estimating time
series models (Harris, 1995). The Johansen method, which is extended to a
multivariate framework, allows us to examine the existence of more than one
cointegration relationship. The Johansen maximum likelihood approach for
multivariate cointegration is based on the following unrestricted vector
autoregressive (VAR) model involving up to k-Iags of Z,:
(5-29)
where Z, is an (n Xl) vector of I( 1) variables (containing both endogenous and
exogenous variables), Ai is an (n X n) matrix of parameters, and u, is (n Xl) vector of
white noise errors. Johansen works directly with the ECM and adopts a framework
which is based on the assumption that introducing sufficient lags will allow for a
well behaved disturbance term (Holden and Perman, 1994). I1Z, is assumed to be
stationary (i.e., 1(0», and (5-29) can be rewritten into a vector error-correction model
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(VECM) form:
(5-30)
This specification provides information about the short-run and long-run adjustments
to the changes in Z, through the estimates of i,and n respectively. n is denoted n
= afJ', where a represents the error correction term which measures the speed of
adjustment to disequilibrium, and fJ is a matrix of long-run coefficients. Assuming Z/
is a vector of non-stationary 1(1) variables, then all the terms in (5-30) are 1(0), and
nZ/ok is also stationary for u, - 1(0) with the stationary long-run EC relationships.
Information about the number of cointegrating relationships among the variables in
Z/ is given by the rank of the matrix n. If the rank of the Il -matrix, r, is 0 < r < n,
there are r linear combinations of the variables in Z/ that are stationary, together with
(n - r) non-stationary vectors.
Johansen (1988) uses the procedure known as the reduced rank regression" to
estimate the a and fJ matrices. (5-30) can be rewritten as:
(5-31)
It is possible to correct for short-run dynamics by regressing llZ, and Z/-k separately
on the right-hand side of (5-31). This means that the vectors Ro/ and Rk/ are obtained
from the following regressions: .
(5-32)
(5-33)
Residuals can then be used to form residual (product moment) matrices:
i,j= 0, k (5-34)
6 For details of reduced rank regression, see Velu et al.(l986).
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The estimate of p can be found by solving the eigenvalue problem:
(5-35)
where Sao is the residual matrix obtained by regressing M, on its lagged differences
(i.e., M'_I ,.......,M,_k+I), Skk is the residual matrix obtained by regressing Xt-k on its
lagged differences (i.e., l\Xt-k+I), and SkO and SOk are the cross-products of residual
matrixes Skk and Sao. Equation (5-35) gives the n eigenvalues ~ > i2 > ...> in and
their corresponding eigenvectors V = (vI''''' vn). Those r elements in V which
determine the linear combinations of stationary relationships can be denoted
jJ = (VI ,,,., v,), and are called the cointegration vectors. These are called the
canonical variates and the eigenvalues are the squared canonical correlations of Rkt
with respect to Rot (Johansen, 1988). It is noted that all possible choices of the
optimal p can be found from /J by P = /Jp for P. an r X r matrix of full rank. The
eigenvectors are normalised by the condition /J'S kk jJ = I such that the estimates of
the other parameters are given by:
(5-36)
which depends on the choice of the optimising p, whereas
(5-37)
and
(5-38)
and the maximum likelihood is given by:
r
r;n2~T= Isoo In(1- i,)
i~1
(5-39)
do not depend on the choice of optimising p.
138
The null hypothesis to test if there are at most r cointegration vectors (Le. (n - r) unit
roots) is:
where only the first r eigenvalues are non-zero. For testing this null hypothesis, two
likelihood ratio (LR) tests are considered. The first is known as the 'trace' statistic:
n "
A/race=-2In(Q)=-T~)n(l-AJ r =0, 1,2, ... ,n-2,n-1
;=r+1
(5-40)
where Q = (restricted maximised likelihood / unrestricted maximised likelihood).
This tests the null hypothesis that there are at most r cointegrating vectors and thus (n
- r) unit roots. Asymptotic critical values are provided in Osterwald-Lenum (1992),
although if dummy variables enter the deterministic part of the multivariate model,
different critical values are needed depending on the number of dummies included,
and if there is a small sample of observation on ZI, the power and size properties of
this test are likely to be problematic. The second test is called the
maximal-eigenvalue test or A-max test:
Amax =-2In(Q:r!r+1)=-Tln(1-Ar+l) r =0, 1,2, ... ,n-2,n-1 (5-41)
which tests the null hypothesis of r cointegrating vectors against the alternative that
r+1 exists. The critical values for these tests have been derived by Monte Carlo
simulations and tabulated by Johansen (1988) and Osterwald-Lenum (1992). The
inclusion of dummy variables also affects the underlying distribution of the test
statistics, and Reimers (1992) suggests the possibility of over-rejection when the null
is true with a small sample size. Cheung and Lai (1993, p319) reports that their
results " ... support that the finite-sample bias of Johansen's tests is a positive function
of TI(r - nk) ... furthermore, the finite-sample bias toward over-rejection of the no
cointegration hypothesis magnifies with increasing values of n and k (p319)". As to
the Monte Carlo experiments, they also suggest that" ... between Johansen's two LR
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tests for cointegration, the trace test shows more robustness to both skewness and
excess kurtosis (in the residuals) than the maximal eigenvalue (A.max) test" (p326).
A couple of issues should be pointed out for Johansen's approach. First, the
endogenous variables included in the VAR are all I(I). Second, the additional
exogenous variables included in the VAR which explain the short-run behaviour (e.g.,
dummy variable of oil price shock in the 1970s) need to be I(O). The choice of lag
length k (i.e., order) in the vector autoregressive (VAR) needs to be mentioned, since
the result of the Johansen tests can be quite sensitive to the lag length and on the
appropriateness of the normality assumption concerning the error term (Enders,
1996). The Akaike information criterion (AIC), or Schwarz information criterion
(SBC) are often used in the literature. However, the information criteria may not be
adequate when errors contain moving average terms (Cheung and Lai, 1993). As Hall
(1991) argues, the Johansen maximum likelihood estimation procedure for
cointegrating vectors may be sensitive to the selection of the order of VAR. For
example, when the order of the VAR is too low, serial correlation among the
residuals may result and test statistics become unreliable. Conversely, in the case
where the order of the VAR is too high, there is an upward bias in the test statistics
due to small degrees of freedom, although there is no particular problem
asymptotically. Therefore, in the light of this sensitivity to the VAR lag length, Hall
(1991) suggests that when applying the Johansen procedure, the effect of varying the
VAR specification should be examined. In other words, in choosing k, we should first
select an arbitrarily high order for the VAR and then work through the likelihood
ratio (LR) test statistics to determine the validity of restrictions imposed by
successive reductions in its value. The correct order of the VAR is where a restriction
on the lag length is rejected. Mushtaq (2000) uses the adjusted likelihood ratio (LR)
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statistics to test the null hypothesis that the order of the VAR is k against the
alternative that it is k+I, and then substantiates the results with the AIC and SBC
criteria." The fourth issue in Johansen's procedure is whether deterministic
components, constant and/or trend, are to be included in the long-run relationship. In
general, the specification of the model depends upon the characteristics of the data.
Equation (5-23) can be expanded to examine the need of deterministic components
(i.e., intercept and deterministic trend):
(5-42)
where Z,_k = (Z',_k ,I,t). It is possible to specify a theoretical model where t51 = t52=
III = /-l2= 0 (no intercept and no deterministic trend), although this is unlikely in
practice (this is Modell). Therefore the following three models can realistically be
considered (Harris, 1995)8.
Model 2: Restricted intercepts and no trends
If the data exhibit no linear trends in the levels of data, then the constant is restricted
to the cointegrating space (i.e., long-run model), thus t51 = t52 = /-l2= O. The critical
values for this model can be found in Table 1'" in Osterwald-Lenum (1992).
Model 3: Unrestricted intercepts and no deterministic trends
If the data exhibit linear trends in the levels of data, then the constant is restricted in
both the cointegrating space and the short-run model (although the constant in the
cointegrating space is assumed to be cancelled by the constant in the short-run,
7 See Amemiya (1980) Judge et al., (1985, pp870-75), and Lutkepohl (1993) for detailed
discussions of these and other model selection criteria.
8 The number assigned to the models is as in the Cats programme.
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leaving only a constant in the short-run model), so c)l = c)2 = O. The critical values for
this model can be found in Table 1 in Osterwald-Lenum (1992).
Model 4: Unrestricted intercepts and restricted deterministic trends
If the data exhibit no quadratic trends in the levels of data, the trend is not allowed in
the short-run model; but if there is some long-run linear growth in the data (e.g.,
technological progress), then the trend is restricted in the cointegrating space, so c)2
=0. The critical values for this model are in Table 2* in Osterwald-Lenum (1992).
There is another model (Model 5) which is extended from Model 4 to allow for linear
trends in the short-run model (5-35), which means the data exhibit quadratic trends in
levels. This is the case with unrestricted intercepts and unrestricted trends, although
this is economically difficult to justify especially when the variables are entered in
log form, since it implies an unrealistic ever-increasing or decreasing rate of change
(Harris, 1995).
In terms of selecting a model, Johansen (1992) suggests that the joint hypothesis of
both the rank order and the deterministic components (constant andlor trend) is tested
in determining the appropriate model based on the so-called Pantula (1989) principle.
The testing procedure is then to move through the most restrictive model (i.e., r = 0
and Model 2) to the least restrictive one (i.e., r = n-l and Model 4) at each stage
comparing the A.. max- or A.. trace- test statistic to its critical value, and only stopping
when the null hypothesis is not rejected.
The issues of the estimated coefficients being the long-run elasticities in the
cointegrating vector are not clear. This is true when there are only two variables in
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the cointegrating vector, but when there are more, the dynamics of the VAR raise
some doubts about this interpretation (Lutkepohl, 1993, p379-380). Nevertheless,
some authors (for example, Hallam and Zanoli, 1993; Townsend and Thirtle, 1994)
interpret the estimated coefficients as the long-run elasticities. Since cointegration
implies that a stationary long-run relationship exists among the series in the
cointegrated system, and as these series are linked by common stochastic trends,
movements among the variables are not independent and there are systematic
co-movements among them. Moreover, any deviation from the long-run equilibrium
influences the time paths of the cointegrated series. Impulse response or dynamic
multiplier analysis can be used to investigate these interrelationships among the
variables in dynamic models and to assess adjustments to long-run equilibrium. It is
therefore a valuable tool in cointegrated systems (Lutkepohl and Reimers, 1992). If
the deviations from the equilibrium are stationary, any shock to the system will
generate time paths which eventually return to a new equilibrium provided no further
shocks. These time paths of the variables provide insights into the short-run and
long-run relations between the variables. Impulse responses are particularly useful
when there are two or more cointegrating relations, which may be difficult to
interpret on economic grounds.
5-4-2. Cointegration analysis in the presence of structural breaks
As discussed in 5-3, it is often necessary to allow breaks in the deterministic
components. If the series are J( 1), the tests for cointegration (i.e., long-run
equilibrium) between variables are reviewed in 5-4-1. However, if structural breaks
within the two individual series occur either at different times or at the same time,
then the cointegration relation must be tested in a framework which allows breaks in
the deterministic components. Gregory and Hansen (1996) propose a test of the null
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hypothesis (no cointegration) against the alternative which allows a cointegration
with a level shift,or a shift in both the level and the slope (i.e., a regime shift), of
unknown timing. This type of hypothesis test does not provide much evidence
concerning the question of whether or not there was a regime shift. Johansen et al.
(2000) develop the testing model for cointegration with known structural breaks (up
to two) including dummy variables for the years of break, generalising the
multivariate likelihood procedure of Johansen (1988). Two models are considered
with a broken level and with a broken trend. We denote q as the number of periods
into which the sample is divided, and j specifies each period. For example, in the
case of two breaks, the sample is divided into three periods, therefore j = 1, ..., q and
q = 3). Firstly, some dummy variables are introduced. Dj" is 1 for t = 1}-h otherwise 0,
for j = 2, ... , q; t = 1, ..., T. Denote p as number of lags, E, is a vector of q dummy
variables:
with Ej" = 1 (j=I, ..., q) if observation t belongs to thejth period and 0 otherwise, and
E, = (E1,E2, ••• Eq,). The vector error correction model (VECM) is written as:
(5-43)
t = 1, ..., T
Similar to the usual model without structural breaks, rl shows the short-run
parameters for i = 1, ...,p - 1. The dummy parameters kj,i are p-vectors. The long-run
drift parameters are /l. = (;t1/l.2 ... /l.q), a is a matrix of adjustment parameters, and pare
the long-run coefficients in the cointegration vector. 'Y are deterministic components.y
- ( " ')'- Y IY 2··· Yq •
Johansen et al. (2000) examined two models based on (5-43). In the first model,
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there are no linear trends in the levels of the endogenous J( 1) variables and the
first-differenced series have a zero mean. This model corresponds the Model 2
specified in 5-4-1-2. As for the second model, this does not account for long-run
linear growth, and a broken linear trend is present in the cointegration vectors, which
is equivalent to Model 4. Both tests should be applied with care with respect to the
presence of deterministic components in each J(I) variable, as explained in 5-2-4.
5-6. Summary
This chapter is an overview of the development of time series analysis; namely unit
root tests and cointegration analysis. The basic definition of a stationary time series
is that the series has constant mean and variance which are time independent, while
non-stationary data do not have constant mean and variance. Thus we call stationary
series those which do not have a unit root, and non-stationary series those which do
have a unit root. The recent studies using unit root tests show that a large number of
time series data are non-stationary. A majority of unit root tests have a null
hypothesis of a unit root against an alternative hypothesis of no unit root in the series.
Although the ADF test is a popular unit root test, structural breaks are also
considered in some unit root tests. In this chapter, the Zivot and Andrews and Perron
(1997) tests were overviewed.
The basic idea of cointegration analysis is to identify the existence of a long-run
relationship between variables over time. Two main approaches are commonly used
to test for cointegration (i.e., Engle and Granger's ADF-approach and Johansen's ML
approach), and the theoretical background and application for both of them are
reviewed, although only the latter is applied in this thesis due to the convenience of
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the multivariate framework. Extending the concept of cointegration analysis, the way
to test for structural breaks in the series was also reviewed. Johansen et al (2000)
developed the testing model for cointegration with known structural breaks up to two,
by including dummy variables for the years of break.
In the next chapter, these methods are applied to Japanese farmland data in order to
examine if the Japanese farmland market is efficient.
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Chapter 6. Empirical Analysis of Japanese Farmland Market
6-1. Introduction
Having outlined in the previous chapter the procedure of time series analysis (i.e.,
tests for unit root and cointegration), these tests are applied to Japanese farmland
data in this chapter. The main interest of this chapter is to test if the theoretical
Present Value Model (PVM), which assumes that farmland prices are determined by
the current and future stream of returns to land, is applicable to the Japanese
farmland market which is historically strongly regulated. Through the development
of testing procedures for the PVM applied in several countries, it would appear that
the theoretical PVM model cannot explain adequately farmland market movements
even in less regulated market. It is also of interest to study how the change of
farmland policy and regulations in Japan, which are strongly influenced by economic
and social structural change, affect the farmland market structure.
6-2. Model for Farmland Market Analysis
If farmland prices are well reflected by the productivity (or profitability) of the
farmland, then the farmland market is said to be efficient. In this case, farmland price
should equal the expected present value of future rents. This is the so-called PVM
(present value model):
P, = afajE,[R,+j]
j=O
(6-1)
where P, is equilibrium farmland price at the beginning oftime period t; R, is the rent
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paid in period t, a. is a constant discount factor which is equal to 1 / (1+r) when r is
the constant real discount rate, and E, is the conditional expectations operator based
on information available up to time t. Equation (6-1) implies a long-run relationship
between the real price of land and the real return to land. Letting P * and R * denote
the long-run equilibrium price and a constant expectation of equilibrium return
(Tegene and Kuchler, 1991), equation (6-1) simplifies to:
p* = (lIr)R * (6-2)
Applying natural logarithms to (6-2) yields,
In p* = C + In R * where C = In (1 / r) (6-3)
Here the prime interest is to analyse the farmland market in Japan: specifically,
whether the Japanese farmland market is efficient. The linear relationship between
farmland prices and rents indicated in equation (6-3) exists only when both time
series are integrated by the same order. Firstly, unit root tests are applied to examine
whether both farmland prices and rent exhibit a stationary process, because if either
has a non-stationary process there should not be a long-run equilibrium between
them. Next, cointegration analysis is applied to examine the presence of a long-term
relationship between logged farmland prices (In P,) and logged rent (In R,) as in the
traditional capitalisation formula. The vector error correction model (VECM) is
formed through Johansen's Full Information Likelihood (FIML) cointegration testing
approach (see 5-4-1-2 in Chapter 5). Therefore the speed of short-term adjustment
from disequilibrium is also examined through this approach.
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6-3. Data
Japanese data from 1955 to 2000 in 9 regions excluding Okinawa (i.e., Hokkaido,
Tohoku, Kanto, Hokushin, Tokai, Kinki, Chugoku, Shikoku and Kyushu) I for
farmland prices and rents are provided by the Japan Real Estate Institute's 'The
Survey on Farmland Prices and Farm Rents'. Farmland prices and rents show the
real average price (yen/lO are) of 'good' paddy and 'good' vegetable (including
grazing) fields, deflated by the GDP deflator. The logarithm of deflated farmland
price is denoted as: HOKPLOG (Hokkaido), TOHPLOG (Tohoku), KANPLOG
(Kanto), HOSPLOG (Hokushin), TOKPLOG (Tokai), KINPLOG (Kinki),
CHUPLOG (Chugoku), SHIPLOG (Shikoku), and KYUPLOG (Kyushu), while
logarithms of farm rents are labelled as: HOKRLOG (Hokkaido), TOHRLOG
(Tohoku), KANRLOG (Kanto), HOSRLOG (Hokushin), TOKRLOG (Tokai),
KINRLOG (Kinki), CHURLOG (Chugoku), SHIRLOG (Shikoku), and KYURLOG
(Kyushu). The first differences of those variables are denoted by adding D to the
beginning of the name of variable (e.g., DHOKPLOG). Graphs of all data and first
differences are given in Appendix 6-1.
I Regions are specified in the map of Appendix 2-3 (Chapter 2).
149
6-4. The Result of Unit Root Tests
6-4-1. The result of Dickey-Fuller (OF) and augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
tests
Firstly, a DF/ADF test for a single unit root in each senes is applied. The
autoregressive (AR) regression (6-4) is firstly applied including a constant and a
time trend, and then these are removed according to the rejection of the null
hypothesis of a unit root (details are in 5-2-3 of Chapter 5).
k
~y, = a + pt + (¢ -1)Y,_1 +LB~Y,_j + Ut
1=1
(6-4)
The results of the test are reported in Table 6-1. The number of lags is defined by the
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test (see Holden and Perman, 1994), and is given for each
ADF-equation, AR(k), in column 2 of Table 6-1.
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Table 6-1 The DF IADF test results
Test AR
<1>3 <1>." ' PT v; ')J t:au tvariables (k)
HOKPLOG 0 -0.69 -1.98* 0.79 3.98 -1.94 1.96* 2.12 0.74
TOHPLOG 1 -1.10 0.06 1.12 0.88 -1.34 1.34 0.90 -0.02
KANPLOG 0 -0.82 -0.10 0.89 5.25 -3.28* 3.37* 14.45* 3.77
HOSPLOG 2 -2.71 2.36* 2.70* 3.71 -1.90 1.92* 2.96 -1.45
TOKPLOG 0 -1.28 0.59 1.74* 1.83 -2.17 2.20* 4.95* 2.16
KINPLOG 0 -1.11 0.05 1.16 3.47 -2.66 2.72* 8.18* 2.80
CHUPLOG 0 -0.87 -0.10 0.89 0.85 -1.32 1.33 1.38 0.99
SHIPLOG 0 -0.44 -0.39 0.48 1.06 -1.41 1.44 2.46 1.67
KYUPLOG 0 -0.66 -0.42 0.70 1.22 -1.52 1.54 1.81 1.10
HOKRLOG 0 -1.67 0.68 1.75* 2.41 -1.47 1.48 1.27 0.58
TOHRLOG 0 -0.83 -0.07 0.91 1.24 -1.59 1.63 1.95 1.09
KANRLOG 0 -1.67 0.68 1.75* 2.41 -2.10 2.15* 3.17 1.25
HOSRLOG 0 -1.45 0.57 1.52 1.76 -1.81 1.85* 2.37 1.12
TOKRLOG 0 -1.65 0.95 1.69* 1.54 -1.48 1.50 1.34 0.65
KINRLOG 0 -1.76 0.58 1.79* 1.83 -1.83 1.84* 1.75 0.34
CHURLOG 0 -1.56 -0.11 1.61 1.97 -2.00 2.01 * 2.04 0.20
SHIRLOG 0 -1.47 -0.46 1.56 2.58 -2.25 2.26* 2.81 0.67
KYURLOG 0 -1.30 -0.03 1.35 1.55 -1.78 1.79* 1.73 0.47
First Differences
DHOKPLOG 0 -4.86* -1.55 1.52 11.88* -4.54* 0.27 10.36 -4.59*
DTOHPLOG 0 -3.33 -0.74 0.67 5.80 -3.34* -0.00 5.71 -3.42*
DKANPLOG 0 -4.10* -1.41 1.93* 8.45* -3.82* 1.49 7.46 -3.51 *
DHOSPLOG 0 -5.27* -0.47 -0.29 15.13* -5.53* 0.29 15.73 -5.66*
DTOKPLOG 0 -3.50* -0.07 0.35 6.47 -3.64* 0.65 6.75 -3.64*
DKINPLOG 0 -3.18 -0.32 0.64 5.41 -3.31* 0.81 5.62 -3.27*
DCHUPLOG 0 -3.48 0.41 -0.36 6.53 -3.63* 0.00 6.72 -3.71 *
DSHIPLOG 0 -4.10* -0.58 0.89 8.43* -4.10* 0.82 8.41 -4.03*
DKYUPLOG 0 -3.94* -0.15 0.25 8.02* -4.05* 0.27 8.29 -4.11 *
DHOKRLOG 0 -5.58* -0.76 0.81 15.61* -5.56* 0.31 15.50 -5.62*
DTOHRLOG 0 -4.53* -0.50 0.66 10.33* -4.56* 0.48 10.44 -4.58*
DKANRLOG 0 -5.32* -0.53 0.77 14.31* -5.37* 0.68 14.50 -5.38*
DHOSRLOG 0 -5.34* -1.30 1.64 14.35* -5.15* 1.06 13.30 -5.03*
DTOKRLOG 0 -5.46* -0.30 0.47 14.92* -5.51 * 0.45 15.21 -5.55*
DKINRLOG 0 -5.59* -0.47 0.52 15.61 * -5.62* 0.22 15.80 -5.68*
DCHURLOG 0 -5.87* -1.03 0.99 17.25* -5.78* 0.17 16.70 -5.84*
DSHIRLOG 0 -4.29* -0.68 0.68 9.26* -4.27* 0.15 9.20 -4.34*
DKYURLOG 0 -5.13* -0.77 0.80 13.19* -5.10* 0.27 13.03 -5.15*
5% Critical
-3.50 1.68 1.68 6.73 -2.93 1.68 4.86 -1.95
Values
Note: * indicates statistical significance at 5% level. Critical values are from RATS for
Windows (version 4.2), Fuller (1976), and Dickey and Fuller (1981).
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The r, test implies that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root
(non-stationary) in all series of farmland prices and rents. As it is reported in recent
studies that a lot of time series data are non-stationary with unit roots (e.g., Falk,
1991; Hallam et al., 1992), it is also expected that testing variables here have unit
roots (i.e., non-stationary series). The T pr test implies that we cannot reject the null
of no trend in all series except for the logged farmland prices of Hokkaido
(HOKPLOG) and Hokushin (HOSPLOG), and the Tar test implies that we cannot
reject the null of no drift in all series, except for the logged farmland prices of
Hokushin (HOSPLOG), Tokai (TOKPLOG) and logged rent prices of Hokkaido
(HOKRLOG), Kanto (KANRLOG), Tokai (TOKRLOG) and Kinki (KINRLOG).
The <1>3 test is then performed to test jointly the null ofa unit root and no trend. This
test implies that we cannot reject the null of unit root.
Since the T pr test and Tar test show the rejection of both null of no constant and no
trend for the series of Hokushin (HOSPLOG), the Tt test is employed for this series
and it is concluded that HOSPLOG is a non-stationary series with drift and trend.
Except for the series of Hokushin (HOSPLOG), the trend term is then removed and
T p and Tap tests are used to examine the null of a unit root, and the null of no drift,
respectively. The Tp test implies that we cannot reject the null of a unit root in all
series except for logged farmland prices of Kanto (KANPLOG), and then the
Tap test implies that we reject the null of no drift except for logged farmland prices of
Tohoku (TOHPLOG), Chugoku (CHUPLOG), Shikoku (SHIPLOG), and Kyushu
(KYUPLOG) and logged rent series of Hokkaido (HOKRLOG), Tohoku
(TOHRLOG), and Tokai (TOKRLOG). A joint test of the null hypothesis of a unit
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root and no drift, <1>., implies the rejection in the series of farmland prices of Kanto
(KANPLOG), Tokai (TOKPLOG) and Kinki (KINPLOG). Therefore the l'JI test is
employed for all series which show the rejection of no drift by the l'au test (i.e.,
HOKPLOG, KANPLOG, TOKPLOG, KINPLOG, KANRLOG, HOSRLOG,
KINRLOG, CHURLOG, SHIRLOG, and KYURLOG). As the result of the tau test,
only the series of farmland prices in Kanto (KANPLOG) is concluded as stationary
with drift, and the other series as non-stationary with drift. After removing the drift
term, we perform the l' test only on the series of Tohoku (TOHPLOG), Chugoku
(CHUPLOG), Shikoku (SHIPLOG) and Kyushu (KYUPLOG) for farmland prices,
and the series of Hokkaido (HOKRLOG), Tohoku (TOHRLOG) and Tokai
(TOKRLOG) for farm rents. The result implies that we cannot reject the null of unit
root in all series. Therefore those series can be concluded as non-stationary without
drift and trend.
The test results for first differences of all series are now examined. The 1', test
implies that we reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in all series of farmland
prices and rents except for Tohoku (DTOHPLOG), Kinki (DKINPLOG) and
Chugoku (DCHUPLOG). The null of no trend is tested through the rpr test, and
implies that we cannot reject any series, while the rat test rejects the null of no drift
only for farmland prices of Kanto (DKANPLOG). The <1>3 test is then used to test
the null of a unit root and no trend jointly, and shows that we cannot reject the series
of farmland prices in Tohoku (DTOHPLOG), Tokai (DTOKPLOG), Kinki
(DKINPLOG), and Chugoku (DCHUPLOG). The tp and l'all tests are used to
examine the null of a unit root and the null of no drift, respectively. Although the
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results of the T JJ test imply that the null of a unit root is rejected for all series, the
null of no drift is not rejected. Removing the drift, the T test is employed for all
series. The result of T test shows that the null of a unit root is rejected for all series.
Therefore, it is concluded that all series are stationary without trend and drift.
A summary from the DFIADF tests is presented in Table 6-2. It is concluded that
first differences of farmland prices and rents are all stationary series, 1(0). Therefore,
all logged farmland prices and rents, except for Kanto (KANPLOG), are
non-stationary series integrated of order 1 (i.e., 1(1»: the farmland price series of
Hokushin (HOSPLOG) contains both trend and drift, and the farmland price series
of Hokkaido (HOKPLOG), Tokai (TOKPLOG) and Kinki (KINPLOG), and the farm
rent series of Kanto (KANRLOG), Hokushin (HOSRLOG), Kinki (KINRLOG),
Chugoku (CHURLOG), Shikoku (SHIRLOG) and Kyushu (KYURLOG) contain
drift. Conversely, the farmland price series of Kanto (KANPLOG) are concluded
stationary series, 1(0), with drift.
Concerning the deterministic components discussed in 5-2-4 in Chapter 5, the results
of the ADF test for KANPLOG and HOSPLOG have to be discussed here. Seeing
the graph of KANPLOG (see Appendix 6-1), the series look trended. Therefore,
expected results would be a non-stationary series or a stationary series with trend,
not stationary with a constant term. The indicated result, stationary with drift, may
suggest the wrong model for unit root test, possibly due to the existence of a
structural break. Therefore, the final result of unit root test should be considered with
the unit root tests results with structural break. As to HOSPLOG, the result indicating
a liner trend is not likely to be accepted in the case of a non-stationary variable
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because it is difficult to distinguish between a linear trend and a stochastic trend.
Especially in the case of land prices, the series is not likely to have a linear trend,
while the series may contain a stochastic trend (i,e., growth) under macro economic
influences. Thus, a linear trend can be ignored in this analysis.
Table 6-2 Summary of the DF/ADF tests results
Test
variables
1(0) 1(1) Trend Drift
HOKPLOG -/ -/
TOHPLOG -/
KANPLOG -/ -/
HOSPLOG ./ ./ ./
TOKPLOG ./ ./
KINPLOG ./ ./
CHUPLOG ./
SHIPLOG -/
KYUPLOG ./
HOKRLOG ./
TOHRLOG ./
KANRLOG ./ ./
HOSRLOG -/ ./
TOKRLOG -/
KINRLOG ./ ./
CHURLOG -/ ./
SHIRLOG ./ ./
KYURLOG ./ ./
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6-4-2. A structural break and unit root tests
Given the change of rent determination in 1967 and 19802, the possibility of
structural breaks can be considered here, especially in the farm rent data. There are
alternative approaches in terms of unit root tests in the presence of structural breaks.
Zivot and Andrews (1992) consider the case where the points of structural breaks are
unknown. The null hypothesis is formed to test a unit root without an exogenous
structural break:
Ho: Y,=a+Y,_I+u, (6-5)
against the alternative hypothesis of trend stationary with one time break occurring
at an unknown point in time:
(6-6)
where DU, is a dummy, and DU, =1 if time t is bigger than that at the point of the
structural break, TB, (i.e., t> TB)' otherwise DU, = O.The result is shown in Table 6-3
using equation (6-7) which was derived by nesting (6-5) and (6-6):
k
~Y, = a + pt + 8DU, + rY,-1 +LB,~Y,-i +U,
1=1
(6-7)
There are several approaches for testing, but here only the level shift in the series is
tested using the Lagrange multiplier (LM) test to determine the lag length. In Table
6-3, the null of a unit root cannot be rejected for logged farmland prices and rents in
all regions. There is no evidence that the series are stationary with a structural break.
2 Th e maximum level of farm rent was revised in 1967, and direct rent control was ended in
1980. Seeing the graphs (Appendix 6-1), structural breaks can be observed as test results
both after 1967 and 1980.
156
Table 6-3 Unit root tests after Zivot and Andrews (1992)
Test variables lag t-statistics TB
HOKPLOG 0 -2.47 -
TOHPLOG 1 -2.66 -
KANPLOG 0 -3.04 -
HOSPLOG 0 -3.01 -
TOKPLOG 0 -3.32 -
KINPLOG 0 -3.53 -
CHUPLOG 0 -2.58 -
SHIPLOG 0 -2.57 -
KYUPLOG 0 -2.02 -
HOKRLOG 0 -2.53 -
TOHRLOG 0 -2.38 -
KANRLOG 0 -2.92 -
HOSRLOG 0 -3.05 -
TOKRLOG 0 -2.58 -
KINRLOG 0 -3.14 -
CHURLOG 0 -2.60 -
SHIRLOG 0 -4.61 -
KYURLOG 0 -2.59 -
5% Critical Values -4.80
Note: ... indicates statistical significance at 5% level. Critical values are from RATS for
Windows.
Subsequently, Perron (1997) developed a test which allows a break under both null
and alternative hypotheses at an unknown point in time. He examines three different
models under the null and alternative hypothesis. The first (Modell) allows for a
change only in the intercept or level of the series. The second (Model 2) allows for a
change in the intercept and the slope at the break. The third (Model 3) allows a
change in the slope, but both segments of the trend function are jointed at the time of
the break. Here only the simplest model (Modell) is applied in order to examine the
change in level. The null hypothesis is that there is a unit root with non-zero drift,
and with a single exogenous change in the intercept, or level of the series, at an
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unknown point:
(6-8)
where D(TB) I = 1 if t = TB + 1, and if not, D(TB) , = O. The alternative hypothesis is
trend stationary with a single exogenous break in the trend of the following form:
(6-9)
Then the unit root testing equation here becomes:
k
6Y, = a + pt + uDU()'), + dD(TB), + rY,-, +LB,6Y,_; + e,
,~I
(6-10)
The result of this test is seen in Table 6-4. The null hypothesis is not rejected for all
farmland price and rent data, which indicates that farmland prices are all
non-stationary, and that all farm rent series are stationary bar Hokkaido
(HOKRLOG), Hokushin (HOSRLOG), Kinki (KINRLOG) and Chugoku
(CHURLOG) when the year of break is considered. Observing the years of break,
there is no clear year of structural break in common over the regions in terms of
farmland prices, while the test results for rents indicate a structural break in 1979/80
except for Hokkaido (HOKRLOG). Therefore, structural breaks only in rent series
are taken into account here. Considering that the control on maximum level of rent
was terminated in 1980, it may be important to be mindful of the year 1980 in
further analysis.'
3 As Perron 1997 test consider only one structural break in the test model, 1980 is appeared
to be a break year. However, 1967 is to be still considered as a break year in the following
analysis.
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Table 6-4 Unit root tests after Perron (1997)
Test variables lag r-statistic TB
HOKPLOG 8 -3.15 1971
TOHPLOG 11 -3.66 1998
KANPLOG 7 -1.66 1970
HOSPLOG 12 -4.27 1977
TOKPLOG 3 -4.27 1992
KINPLOG 2 -4.04 1991
CHUPLOG 2 -4.80 1976
SHIPLOG 12 -3.40 1972
KYUPLOG 12 -4.96 1980
HOKRLOG 4 -2.54 1993
TOHRLOG 12 -7.07* 1980
KANRLOG 12 -7.44* 1980
HOSRLOG 11 -5.10 1980
TOKRLOG 12 -6.90* 1980
KINRLOG 1 -3.53 1980
CHURLOG 12 -4.67 1980
SHIRLOG 3 -5.43* 1979
KYURLOG 12 -6.61 * 1980
5% Critical Values -5.23
Note: ... indicates statistical significance at 5% level. Critical values are from RATS for
Windows.
6-4-3. The summary of unit root tests results
Table 6-5 presents a summary of all unit root test results (ADF test, Z & A test, and
Perron 97 test). The results strongly reject the stationary hypothesis for all series.
Thus, it is concluded that all logged farmland prices and logged rents are
non-stationary, as expected, and integrated of order 1, i.e., J( 1), since the first
differences for those variables are stationary. Moreover, by the result of the Perron
97 test, 1980 is indicated as a structural break year for farm rent data, except for the
series of Hokkaido (HOKRLOG).
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Table 6-5 The summary of unit root test results
Structural
Breaks
Test variables ADF Z&A Perron 97 Result4 (TB)
HOKPLOG /(1) /(1) /(1) /(1) -
TOHPLOG /(1) /(1) /(1) /(1) -
KANPLOG /(0) /(1) /(1) /(1) -
HOSPLOG /(1) /(1) /(1) /(1) -
TOKPLOG /(1) /(1) /(1) /(1) -
KINPLOG /(1) /(1) /(1) /(1) -
CHUPLOG /(1) /(1) /(1) /(1) -
SHIPLOG /(1) /(1) /(1) /(1) -
KYUPLOG /(1) /(1) /(1) /(1) -
HOKRLOG /(1) /(1) /(1) /(1) (1993)
TOHRLOG /(1) /(1) /(0) /(1) (1980)
KANRLOG /(1) /(1) /(0) /(1) (1980)
HOSRLOG /(1) /(1) /(1) /(1) (1980)
TOKRLOG /(1) /(1) /(0) /(1) (1980)
KINRLOG /(1) /(1) /(1) /(1) (1980)
CHURLOG /(1) /(1) /(1) /(1) (1980)
SHIRLOG /(1) /(1) /(0) /(1) (1979)
KYURLOG /(1) /(1) /(0) /(1) (1980)
4 This is the majority of the results from the three unit root tests.
S The year of the structural break is based on Perron97 test.
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6-5. Results of Cointegration Analysis
As the model for farmland price was discussed in 6-2. farmland prices are assumed
to be a function of farm rent.
InP, =f(lnR,) (6-11)
Johansen's procedure is applied for this equation. The first step of the Johansen
procedure is the selection of the order of the VAR by using
Z, = A1Z,_1 + ... +AkZ,_k +u,. (6-12)
then estimating the vector error correction model (VECM) when k =2 including
dummy variables which only affect the short-run model,
(6-13)
Rewriting the VECM form using farmland prices and rents,
(6-14)
where n = o.P'. in which 0. represents the speed of adjustment to disequilibrium,
while p is a matrix of long-run coefficients. According to the results of unit root tests
with a structural break. we also apply the model considering the case where
structural breaks (up to two) within individual series occur based on Johansen (2000).
The VECM with structural breaks is.
(6-15)
where p is the number of lags and q is the number of periods into which the sample
is divided, and each period is denoted by j. Therefore, in the case of two breaks. the
sample is divided into three periods (j = 1..... q and q = 3). E, is a vector of q dummy
variables E, = (EI,E2, ••• Eq,)' with ~., = 1 (j = 1, ... , q) if observation t belongs to the
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jth period and 0 otherwise, with the first p observations set to zero; and Dj•I-/ (j =
2, ...,q and ;=1, ..., p) is an impulse dummy that equals unity if observation t is the ith
observation of the jth period. y are deterministic components, y = (y'ty'2 ... y'q)'. We
test two cases: no structural break and two structural breaks in 1967 and 1980,
considering the policy change in terms of rent level and its determination.
6-5-1. Selectionoflags
Likelihood Ratio (LR) tests, with the null hypothesis that the order of the VAR is k
against k+l, are undertaken as well as the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) on the VAR with a maximum of four lags. The
results of the model for all regions are shown in Table 6-6 with and without
structural breaks.
Starting from the model without structural breaks, the LR test statistics for Hokkaido
do not reject order two, but reject the VAR with order one. Similarly, the results of
AIC and SBC choose order 1. Therefore, order one is chosen for Hokkaido. For
Tohoku and Kanto, the LR test statistic selects order two, although AIC and SBC
indicate order 1. In this case, order one is chosen in order to prevent
over-parameterising as the time series is short. In the case of Hokushin, the result of
the LR test shows order two, as well as the results of AIC and SBC. Conversely, the
LR test statistic does not reject order two, but rejects order one for Tokai. However,
the SBC result supports order one. In this case it seems wise to proceed with the
two-lag model. The results of the LR test and AIC and SBC indicate the selection of
order two for Kinki and Chugoku. As to Shikoku and Kyushu, the LR test cannot
reject order two, but rejects order one, while both AIC and SBC select order one. In
162
this case, order one is chosen, similar to the case ofTohoku.
In the case of the model with structural breaks, Ale and SBe select order 4 as well
as the LR test for Hokkaido and Tohoku. For Kanto and Hokushin, SBe and the LR
test choose order 2 although order 4 was chosen by Ale, while for Tokai and Kinki,
SBe and the LR test choose order 4 although order 2 was chosen by Ale. In these
cases, order 2 is chosen in order to prevent over-parameterising as the time series is
short. For Chugoku and Shikoku, the results of Ale, SBe and the LR test select
order two and four, respectively. As to Kyushu, the LR test chooses order two, while
Ale selects order four and order three by SBe. In this case, it seems feasible to
select the lowest order, order two, for the prevention of over-parameterisation.
Table 6-6 Test statistics and choice criteria for selecting the order of the VAR
model
1) Hokkaido
Based on 46 observations from 1955 to 2000. Order ofVAR = 4
List of variables included in the unrestricted VAR: HOKPLOG HOKRLOG
List of deterministic and/or exogenous variables: INTERCEPT
Without structural break
Order Ale SBe LR test
4 -480.897 -449.619 ------
3 -489.949 -465.292 6.488[.890]
2 -486.512 -468.670 18.330[.002]
1 -495.531 -484.691 6.957r.1381
With structural breaks (in 1967 and 1980)
Order Ale SBe LR test
4 -13.334 -11.762 ------
3 -12.762 -11.521 21.931[.005]
2 -11.455 -10.545 60.750[.000]
1 -11.417 -10.837 70.395[.000]
Note: AIC=Akaike Information Criterion, SBC=Schwarz Bayesian Criterion,
LR=Likelihood Ratio test, p-value in parentheses.
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2) Tohoku
Based on 46 observations from 1955 to 2000. Order ofVAR = 4
List of variables included in the unrestricted VAR: TOHPLOG TOHRLOG
List of deterministic and/or exogenous variables: INTERCEPT
Without structural break
Order AIC SBe LR test
4 -504.503 -473.225 ------
3 -518.412 -493.755 4.205[.979]
2 -531.382 -513.540 6.316[.612]
1 -533.752 -522.612 11.733[.019]
With structural breaks (in 1967 and 1980)
Order AIC SBC LR test
4 -13.957 -12.385 ------
3 -13.259 -12.017 24.835[.002]
2 -13.026 -12.116 38.950[.001]
1 -12.888 -12.309 50.871 [.001]
Note: AIC=Akaike Information Criterion, SBC=Schwarz Bayesian Criterion,
LR=Likelihood Ratio test, p-value in parentheses.
3) Kanto
Based on 46 observations from 1955 to 2000. Order ofVAR = 4
List of variables included in the unrestricted VAR: KANPLOG KANRLOG
List of deterministic and/or exogenous variables: INTERCEPT
Without structural break
Order AIC SBC LR test
4 -484.707 -453.429 ------
3 -500.246 -475.589 4.424[.975]
2 -516.451 -498.609 4.773[.781]
1 -518.413 -507.573 14.431 [.006]
With structural breaks (in 1967 and 1980)
Order AIC SBe LR test
4 -13.906 -12.333 ------
3 -13.587 -12.346 16.095[.041]
2 -13.627 -12.716 23.943[.091]
1 -12.583 -12.004 56.707[.000]
Note: AIC=Akaike Information Criterion, SBC=Schwarz Bayesian Criterion,
LR=Likelihood Ratio test, p-value in parentheses.
164
4) Hokushin
Based on 46 observations from 1955 to 2000. Order ofVAR = 4
List of variables included in the unrestricted VAR: HOSPLOG HOSRLOG
List of deterministic and/or exogenous variables: INTERCEPT
Without structural break
Order AIC SBC LR test
4 -491.248 -459.970 ------
3 -506.030 -481.373 5.906[.921]
2 -516.725 -498.883 7.050[.531 ]
1 -490.872 -480.032 18.729[.0011
With structural breaks (in 1967 and 1980)
Order AIC SBC LR test
4 -13.261 -11.689 ------
3 -12.897 -11.656 17.138[.029]
2 -12.890 -11.979 26.065[.053]
1 -12.121 -11.542 52.507[.0011
Note: AIC=Akaike Information Criterion, SBC=Schwarz Bayesian Criterion,
LR=Likelihood Ratio test, p-value in parentheses.
5) Tokai
Based on 46 observations from 1955 to 2000. Order ofVAR = 4
List of variables included in the unrestricted VAR: TOKPLOG TOKRLOG
List of deterministic and/or exogenous variables: INTERCEPT
Without structural break
Order AIC SBC LR test
4 -497.813 -466.535 ------
3 -513.820 -489.163 2.849[.997]
2 -533.674 -515.832 2.071 [.979]
1 -527.897 -517.057 22.949[.000]
With structural breaks (in 1967 and 1980)
Order AIC SBC LR test
4 -14.275 -12.703 -----.
3 -13.922 -12.681 16.885[.031]
2 -13.868 -12.958 26.885[.043]
1 -13.016 -12.437 55.231 [.0001
Note: AIC=Akaike Information Criterion, SBC=Schwarz Bayesian Criterion,
LR=Likelihood Ratio test, p-value in parentheses.
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6) Kinki
Based on 46 observations from 1955 to 2000. Order ofVAR = 4
List of variables included in the unrestricted VAR: KINPLOG KINRLOG
List of deterministic and/or exogenous variables: INTERCEPT
Without structural break
Order Ale SBe LR test
4 -524.123 -492.845 ------
3 -533.378 -508.721 7.904[.793]
2 -552.071 -534.229 3.285[.915]
1 -530.705 -519.865 36.213[.000]
With structural breaks (in 1967 and 1980)
Order Ale SBe LR test
4 -14.812 -13.240 ------
3 -14.272 -13.031 21.180[.007]
2 -14.370 -13.460 27.696[.034]
1 -12.884 -12.305 70.632[.000]
Note: AIC=Akaike Information Criterion, SBC=Schwarz Bayesian Criterion,
LR=Likelihood Ratio test, p-value in parentheses.
7) Chugoku
Based on 41 observations from 1955 to 2000. Order ofVAR = 4
List of variables included in the unrestricted VAR: CHUPLOG CHURLOG
List of deterministic and/or exogenous variables: INTERCEPT
With structural break
Order Ale SBe LR test
4 -481.540 -450.262 ------
3 -494.715 -470.059 5.329[.946]
2 -509.443 -491.601 4.478[.812]
1 -496.050 -485.210 25.56010001
With structural breaks (in 1967 and 1980)
Order Ale SBC LR test
4 -12.777 -11.205 ------
3 -12.685 -11.444 37.149[.042]
2 -12.787 -11.877 17.285[.367]
1 -12.304 -11.725 52.507[.001]
Note: AIC=Akaike Information Criterion, SBC=Schwarz Bayesian Criterion,
LR=Likelihood Ratio test, p-value in parentheses.
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8) Shikoku
Based on 41 observations from 1955 to 2000. Order ofVAR = 4
List of variables included in the unrestricted VAR: SHIPLOG SHIRLOG
List of deterministic and/or exogenous variables: INTERCEPT
Without structural break
Order Ale SBe LR test
4 -490.862 -459.584 ------
3 -499.713 -475.056 8.588[.738]
2 -516.993 -499.151 1.521[.992]
1 -520.115 -509.275 15.609[.004]
With structural breaks (in 1967 and 1980)
Order Ale SBe LR test
4 -13.848 -12.275 ------
3 -12.946 -11.704 29.506[.000]
2 -12.882 -11.971 39.741[.001]
1 -12.121 -11.490 67.194[.000]
Note: AIC=Akaike Information Criterion, SBC=Schwarz Bayesian Criterion,
LR=Likelihood Ratio test, p-value in parentheses.
9) Kyushu
Based on 41 observations from 1955 to 2000. Order of VAR = 4
List of variables included in the unrestricted VAR: KYUPLOG KYURLOG
List of deterministic and/or exogenous variables: INTERCEPT
Without structural break
Order AIC SBe LR test
4 -487.440 -456.162 ------
3 -498.416 -473.760 4.989[.958]
2 -515.537 -497.695 2.934[.938]
1 -520.620 -509.780 10.995[.027]
With structural breaks (in 1967 and 1980)
Order Ale SBe LR test
4 -12.832 -11.260 ------
3 -12.813 -11.572 9.198[.326]
2 -12.481 -11.571 25.594[.060]
1 -11.785 -11.206 50.365[.0011
Note: AIC=Akaike Information Criterion, SBC=Schwarz Bayesian Criterion,
LR=Likelihood Ratio test, p-value in parentheses.
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6-5-2. Cointegration results
Only Model 2, with and without structural break in 1967 and 1980, is applied here
because not all series show the evidence of trend as seen in Table 6-2. The results of
cointegration are shown in Table 6-7. The cointegration results without breaks
suggest a long-run relationship between farmland prices and farm rents for Hokkaido,
Tohoku, Kanto, Shikoku and Kyuhu, while the model including two breaks in 1967
and 1980 imply the presence of a cointegration relationship for Kanto, Hokushin,
Tokai, Kinki, Shikoku, and is inconclusive for Hokkaido and Tohoku.
Table 6-7 Cointegration results for farmland prices
1) Hokkaido
Null Alternative Without structural break With structural break
(r) (n-r) (1967 and 198Ql
0 1 20.70* (17.79) 87.52* (29.65)
1 2 6.11 (7.50) 30.19* (14.25)
· . .. · .Note: * indicates that the statistic IS significant at 10% level. Critical value IS In parenthesis,
which is provided by CATS (without structural break) and Malcolm (with structural break).
2) Tohoku
Null Alternative Without structural break With structural break
(r) (n-r) .(1967 and 19801
0 1 35.23* (17.79) 58.18* (29.65)
1 2 6.11 (7.50) 23.17* (14.25)
· . .. · .Note: * indicates that the statistics ISsignificant at 10% level. Critical value IS In parenthesis,
which is provided by CATS (without structural break) and Malcolm (with structural break).
3) Kanto
Null Alternative Without structural break With structural break
(r) (n-r) (1967 and 19801
0 1 29.71 * (17.79) 30.31 * (29.65)
1 2 4.42 (7.50) 8.44 (14.25)
· . .. · .Note: '" indicates that the StatIStICSISsignificant at 10% level. Critical value IS In parenthesis,
which is provided by CATS (without structural break) and Malcolm (with structural break).
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4) Hokushin
Null Alternative Without structural break With structural break
(r) (n-r) (1967 and 1980)
0 1 12.64 (17.79) 31.26* (29.65)
1 2 1.10 (7.50) 11.62 (14.25)
· . · . · .Note: * indicates that the statistics IS significant at 10% level. Critical value IS In parenthesis,
which is provided by CATS (without structural break) and Malcolm (with structural break).
5) Tokai
Null Alternative Without structural break With structural break
(r) (n-r) (1967 and 1980)
0 1 12.98 (17.79) 33.14* (29.65)
1 2 2.09 (7.50) 10.94 (14.25)
· .Note: * indicates that the statistics is significant at 10% level. Critical value IS In parenthesis,
which is provided by CATS (without structural break) and Malcolm (with structural break).
6) Kinki
Null Alternative Without structural break With structural break
(r) (n-r) (1967 and 1980)
0 1 10.52 (17.79) 33.46* (29.65)
1 2 1.91 (7.50) 9.51 (14.25)
· . · . · .Note: ...indicates that the statistics IS significant at 10% level. Critical value IS m parenthesis,
which is provided by CATS (without structural break) and Malcolm (with structural break).
7) Chugoku
Null Alternative Without structural break With structural break
(r) (n-r) (1967 and 1980)
0 1 8.79 (17.79) 25.01 (29.65)
1 2 2.33 (7.50) 6.67 (14.25)
· . · . · .Note: * indicates that the statistics IS significant at 10% level. Critical value IS In parenthesis,
which is provided by CATS (without structural break) and Malcolm (with structural break).
8) Shikoku
Null Alternative Without structural break With structural break
(r) (n-r) (1967 and 1980)
0 1 18.25* (17.79) 66.68* (29.65)
1 2 1.10 (7.50) 12.52 (14.25)
· . · .Note: * indicates that the statistics IS significant at 10% level. Critical value IS In parenthesis,
which is provided by CATS (without structural break) and Malcolm (with structural break).
9) Kyushu
Null Alternative Without structural break With structural break
(r) (n-r) (1967 and 1980)
0 1 25.41* (17.79) 27.34 (29.65)
1 2 2.93 (7.50) 11.76 (14.25)
· . · . · .Note: ...indicates that the statistics IS significant at 10% level. Critical value IS In parenthesis,
which is provided by CATS (without structural break) and Malcolm (with structural break).
169
Particularly based on the test results for cointegration with structural breaks, we can
test for the preference of model using log-likelihood ratios (LR) between models
with and without structural breaks. Assuming one cointegrating vector (r = 1) with a
broken level, and two breaks (q = 3) in (6-15), (Z'_IE,) = (P'_IR'_IE1,E2,E3')' and
parameters in the cointegration vector are (/JfJ.)' = (/Jp/lrfJ.lfJ.2fJ.3) '. In order to test if
structural breaks imply changes in joint long-run price evolution, which is a test of
the equality of the intercepts in the three periods, the null hypothesis is written as;
H~ :fJ' = ( * * 1 1 1) or fJ.1= fJ.2= fJ.3·
If the null is rejected, the constant component of the long-run equilibrium between P,
and R, have not remained stable around a single level. There are also two cases
testing the stability of the intercept between two periods; before and after either 1967
or 1980.
H~ :fJ'=(* * 11 *)orfJ.l=fJ.2.
n; :fJ'=(* * * 11)orfJ.2=fJ.3.
(with a break in 1980)
(with a break in 1967)
The test results shown in Table 6-8 support the application of the model with
structural breaks for Hokkaido, Kanto, Kinki and Shikoku, as the null hypothesis of
constant intercepts in the three periods is strongly rejected. For the other regions (i.e.,
Tohoku and Hokushin), the standard model is preferred. The second hypothesis that
two periods before and after 1980 have a constant intercept is not rejected for
Tohoku and Hokushin, while the third hypothesis of a constant intercept before and
after 1967 is not rejected for Hokkaido, Tohoku, Hokushin and Kinki. Thus, the rent
reform in 1967 and 1980 had a significant impact on long-run equilibrium in
Hokkaido, Kanto, Kinki and Shikoku, although the reform in 1967 implies to have
had a more significant impact than in 1980 only for Hokkaido and Kinki.
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Table 6-8 Hypothesis tests for the model with structural breaks
LR-Statistic [p-value]
Hypothesis
H~ :/11 = /12= /13 H; :/11 = /12 tt; :/12=/13
Hokkaido 22.93 [0.00] 21.49 [0.00] 0.06 [0.81]
Tohoku 0.75 [0.69] 0.74 [0.39] 0.14 [0.70]
Kanto 10.50 [0.00] 3.84 [0.05] 9.20 [0.00]
Hokushin 0.65 [0.42] 1.82 [0.18] 0.00 [0.97]
Tokai - - -
Kinki 13.90 [0.00] 13.00 [0.00] 3.51 [0.06]
Chugoku - - -
Shikoku 32.83 [0.00] 28.79 [0.00] 9.85 [0.00]
Kyushu - - -
Note: The hypothesis tests were not applied for Tokai, Chugoku and Kyushu which
do not imply a cointegration relationship with the structural break model.
Based on the above results, the cointegrating vector is shown as follows:
i) Hokkaido
HOKPLOG = 1.80HOKRLOG - 4.1OEI - 4.54E2 - 4.52E3
ii) Tohoku
TOHPLOG = 0.963TOHRLOG + 4.21
iii) Kanto
KANPLOG = -O.l3KANRLOG + 14.S4EI + 15.03E2 + 15.29E3
iv) Hokushin
HOSPLOG = 1.02HOSRLOG + 4.06EI + 4.19E2 + 3.90E3
v) Kinki
KINPLOG = 0.07KINRLOG + 12.83EI + 13.l5E2 + 13.32E3
vi) Shikoku
SHIPLOG = 0.46SHIRLOG + 9.1OEI+ 9.95E2 + 9.58E3
vii) Kyushu
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KYUPLOG = O.963KYURLOG + 3.763
All show the correct sign (i.e., positive) for coefficients on farm rents except for
Kanto.
Of specific interest here is the coefficient on the rent variable, because the theoretical
model (6-3) implies unit elasticity between farmland prices and farm rent (Lloyd,
1994). For this specific interest, VAR is re-estimated with this coefficient restricted
to unity, which also tests whether the resulting coefficient spans the cointegrating
space. The restriction implies that the coefficients of rent and land price in the
cointegrating vector PI appear with opposite signs, and thus the null hypothesis is
tested that
against the alternative,
As Johansen and Juselius (1990) demonstrate, it is possible to formulate any number
of restrictions on the cointegrating vector as p* = Het>, where (in the trend excluded
case) H is a (n+ 1Xp) matrix of restrictions and et> is an (p X r) vector of parameters
to be estimated from the data, where p reflects the nature of the restrictions".
A
Denoting A.Hi as the ith largest eigenvalue from this restricted model we may
compute a likelihood ratio test,
(6-16)
6 In t he linear trends case, H has dimensions (n Xp) and P has dimensions of (n X r)
and the likelihood ratio statistic is distributed as chi _x2with r (n - p) degrees of
freedom.
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which is distributed as a chi (i) variate with r(n + 1 - p) degrees of freedom under
the null. Here, we formulate the null as,
and
in the case of standard model, and the model with structural breaks as follows;
1 0 0 0 ¢I
-1 0 0 0 and ¢21¢=
H= 0 1 0 0 ¢22
0 0 1 0 ¢23
0 0 0 1
which yields a cointegrating vector l'=(- cl> I cl> 2), and l'=(- cl> I cl> 21 cl> 22 cl> 23) to
be estimated from the data. Combining the cointegrating vector, a long-run
relationship of the form ( cl> IlnP - cl> IlnR - cl> 2) and (cl> IlnP - cl> IlnR - cl> 21- cl> 22- cl>
23) are yielded. Normalising on land prices gives:
The PIt, vector with the unit elasticity imposed is estimated as,
i) Hokkaido
[1.00 -1.00 -3.32 -3.04 -3.04] chi-i(1) = 25.27* [0.00]
ii) Tohoku
[1.00 -1.00 -3.86] (without dummy), chi-x2(1) = 0.03 [0.86]
iii) Kanto
[1.00 -1.00 -4.55 -4.71 -4.38] chi-x2(1) = 9.19* [0.00]
iv) Hokushin
[1.00 -1.00 -4.22 -4.35 -4.07] chi-x2(1) = 0.00 [0.97]
v) Kinki
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[1.00 -1.00 -4.41 -4.73 -4.57] chi-x2(I) = 8.24* [0.00]
vi) Shikoku
[1.00 -1.00 - 4.02 -5.38 -4.45] chi-i(1) = 2.82 [0.09]
vii) Kyushu
[1.00 -1.00 -3.41] chi-i(1) = 0.12 [0.73]
The null of unit elasticity is not rejected at the 5% level for Tohoku, Hokushin,
Shikoku and Kyushu as the critical value is 3.84. Therefore, long-run relationships
with a unit elasticity are applied to only the following regions:
ii) Tohoku
TOHPLOG = TOHRLOG + 3.86
iv) Hokushin
KYUPLOG = KYURLOG + 4.22EJ + 4.35E2 + 4.07EJ
vii) Shikoku
KYUPLOG = KYURLOG + 4.02EJ + 5.38E2 + 4.45EJ
viii) Kyushu
KYUPLOG = KYURLOG + 3.41
These result supports the present value hypothesis of farmland price determination.
We may derive the long-run real rate of discount of farmland through
exponentitating the above equations. The rate of discount, r, is shown in Table 6-9.
For Tohoku, the rate of discount is r = 1 /47.56 = 0.021, i.e., 2.1 %. Similarly, the
discount rate for Kyushu is r = 1 / 30.23 = 0.033, i.e., 3.3%. These figures seem
plausible in the context of the land market, since real rates of discount are obtained
by Burt (1986) for the US of 4 % and by Lloyd (1994) for the UK of 3.6 %.
However, Hokushin and Shikoku have lower discount rates compared to these
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results.
Table 6-9 The rate of discount
The rate of discount (%)
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Tohoku 2.1 .>.>»>
Hokushin 1.5 1.3 1.7
Shikoku 1.8 0.5 1.2
Kyushu 3.3 .>: .>.>
Note: Period 1 is before 1967; Period 2 is between 1967 and 1980; and Period 3 is
after 1980
Next, short-run dynamics are examined for Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto, Hokushin,
Kinki, Shikoku and Kyushu, given the cointegration results with and without
structural breaks. As the vector a shows the speed of adjustment in the error
correction model, the values of (a12 a21)' are found as coefficients on the
error-correction (EC) term in the equations for ~lnP, and ~lnR, as seen in (6-14) and
(6-15). Table 6-10 shows the coefficients for error terms in each equation. The unit
elasticity model was used for Tohoku, Hokushin, Shikoku and Kyushu. The
coefficient of the EC term for either ~lnP, or ~lnRl is expected if the market is
efficient and has a function of adjustment towards the equilibrium state. The results
show that Kanto, Hokushin, Kinki, Shikoku and Kyushu have expected signs, which
imply that there is an adjustment to the long-run equilibrium relationship, although
the speed of adjustment is remarkably slow (e.g., between 3% and 9% from the EC
model of ~lnP,), Table 6-11 shows the speed of adjustment: the proportion of the
adjustment from the disequilibrium after 5 years and 10 years. Particularly the EC
model of ~lnP, implies that the disequilibrium would be adjusted less than 50% even
after 10 years, except in the case of Kanto. Thus, there is a strong impression that the
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speed of market adjustment is very slow although almost all regions show a
cointegrating relationship. This could he the result of the inflexible rent level due to
the rent control system.
Table 6-10 Coefficients on error correction term in ECM
Equation Speed of Adjustment
~lnP, ~lnR, ~lnP, ~lnR,
Hokkaido
0.05 0.05 - -(1.04) (1.04)
0.12 0.12
Tohoku - -(6.97) (6.97)
-0.09 -0.09 0.03 0.03
Kanto
(-3.67) (-3.67) (0.81) (0.81)
-0.05 -0.05 0.18 0.18
Hokushin
(-1.64) (-1.64) (3.61) (3.61)
-0.05 -0.05 0.08 0.08
Kinki
(-2.65) (-2.65) (2.21 ) (2.21)
-0.03 -0.03 0.07 0.07
Shikoku
(-2.07) (-2.07) (6.65) (6.65)
-0.06 -0.06 0.13 0.13
Kyushu
(-2.62) (-2.62) (6.10) (6.10)
Note: The figures in parentheses show the I-values.
Table 6-11 Speed of adjustment Unit: %
~lnP, ~lnR,
Year 1 Year 5 Year 10 Year 1 Year5 Year 10
Kanto 9 38 61 3 14 26
Hokushin 5 23 40 18 63 86
Kinki 5 23 40 8 34 57
Shikoku 3 14 26 7 30 52
Kyushu 6 27 46 13 50 75
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6-7. Summary
This chapter is an application of time series analysis on Japanese data in order to test
farmland market efficiency as the theoretical model suggests. It also considered the
change of the farmland market structure, namely in 1967 and 1980 when the rent
level and its determination were reformed.
Firstly, the ADF unit root test was applied to all regional data. The results indicate
that all farmland prices and rent series are non-stationary, which are integrated of
order 1 (i.e., 1(1», except for the farmland price series of Kanto which was stationary
(i.e., 1(0», although it does not seem a stationary series from the graph (see
Appendix 6-1). Therefore, the final results are determined using the tests with
structural breaks. The Z&A and Perron 97 tests are unit root tests which consider a
structural break in the time series. The results of the Z&A test show that all series are
non-stationary, integrated of order 1 (i.e., I( 1», whilst the Perron 97 test suggests all
farmland prices are non-stationary series, I( I), and for rent data the presence of a
structural break in 1980 is suggested, although some regions (i.e., Tohoku, Kanto,
Tokai, Shikoku and Kyushu) show stationary series, 1(0). Summarising, all series are
concluded as non-stationary, and for rent data, a structural break around 1980 is
noted.
Considering the impact of change in rent determination as structural breaks (i.e.,
1967 and 1980), Johansen's cointegration analysis with and without structural breaks
is applied. The cointegration results without breaks show a long-run relationship
between farmland prices and rents for Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto, Shikoku and
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Kyushu, while the model with breaks supports the presence of a cointegration
relationship for Kanto, Hokushin, Tokai, Kinki, Shikoku, and is inconclusive for
Hokkaido and Tohoku. Only for Chugoku is there no evidence of a cointegration
relationship. Particularly, using the log-likelihood ratios (LR) test for the choice
between the two models, Hokkaido, Kanto, Kinki and Shikoku are appropriate for
the model with structural breaks. Based on the theoretical model, unit elasticity was
also tested. The LR test results support the notion of unit elasticity for Tohoku,
Hokushin, Shikoku and Kyushu. These results suggest that the impact of policy
reform on rent determination was reflected differently on farmland prices in different
regions. The real rates of discount estimated seem plausible for Tohoku and Kyushu,
whilst the period-specific real rates of discount for Hokushin and Shikoku were
considered. Using short-run dynamics, an error correction model was also estimated.
There is evidence for market disequilibrium adjustment except for Hokkaido and
Tohoku, although the speed of adjustment is very slow. Thus, although a
cointegration relationship was suggested between farmland prices and farm rents,
except for Chugoku, there is very small market efficiency overall.
Mindful of these results, the next chapter examines the association between farmland
abandonment and their farmland market with strong regulations.
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Appendix 6-1 Farmland prices and rents in the logarithm term
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2) Tohoku
Farmland prices: TOHPLOG
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3) Kanto
Farmland Prices: KANPLOG
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4) Hokushin
Farmland prices: HOSPLOG
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5) Tokai
Farmland prices: TOKPLOG
14
13.9
13.8
13.7
13.6
13.5
13.4
13.3
13.2
13.1
13
12.9
io r- '" ;0 C"l Lt') r- '" ;:::: C"l
Lt') r- '" 00 C"l Lt') r- '" - C"l Lt') r- '"Lt') Lt') Lt') <0 <0 <0 <0 r- r-. r- r-. eo eo eo eo '" '" '" '" en'" '" '" '" '" '" en '" '" '" '" '" '" '" '" '" '" '" '" '" '" '" '"
Rents: TOKRLOG
9.8
9.6
9.4
9.2
9
8.8
8.6
8.4
8.2
8
1.0 r- '" co '" 1.0 r- '" '" Lt') r- '" - C') Lt') ...... '" - C') U') ...... '"U') Lt') U') to to to to ...... ...... ...... r- r- to to to to to '" 0> 0> 0> '"
'" '" 0> 0> 0> '" '" '" '" '" '" '" '" '" '" '" '" '" '"
0> '" '" '"
First differences:
0.5 - -----
0.4 ,.,\
0.3 ' ,, \
0.2 t
I
\
t
• I . \ \
0.1
0 ~\.~..~ <0 co C'.I "<t <0 co 0 C'.I "<t <0 co 0-0.1 ...... ...... co co co co 0) C) C) C) C) 00) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0- - - - - - C'.I
-0.2 ----- - ~"-_----- ,_ _-_. ----_. -.
[--- .DT~PL6G -_- - D!OK~LOGJ
183
6) Kinki
Farmland prices: KINPLOG
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7) Chugoku
Farmland prices: CHUPLOG
13.6
13.5
13.4
13.3
13.2
13.1
13
12.9
12.8
12.7
12.6
ll) ,_ a> ;;; M ll) ,_ a> M ll) ,_ a> CD M ll) ,_ a> ;; M ll) ,.... enll) ll) II> <0 <0 <0 <0 ,.... ,_ ,_ ,_ ,_ co co co co en a> en ena> a> a> a> a> en en a> en en a> en a> en en en en a> a> en en en en
Rents: CHURLOG
9.8
9.6
9.4
9.2
9
8.8
8.6
II> ,_ a> ;;; M ll) ,.... en ;:: M ll) ,_ a> CD M ll) ,.... en ;; M ll) ,_ a>ll) ll) ll) <0 <0 to to ,.... ,.... ,_ ,.... co co co co en en a> enen en en en en en cn en Cl) Cl) Cl) a> a> a> a> a> a> en en en en a> a>
First differences:
0.5
f
- --- --
0.4
0.3
~
0.2
0.1
0
-0.1
-0.2
,I
,I
, I I
-- DCHUPLOG - DCHURLOG"
185
8) Shikoku
Farmland prices: SHIPLOG
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9) Kyushu
Farmland prices: KYUPLOG
13.4
13.2
13
12.8
12.6
12.4
12.2
"" " en ;c M "" " en ;::: M "" " en co M "" " en c;:; M "" r- en"" "" "" <0 <0 to to " " " " eo co co co en en en enen en en en Ol en en en en en en en '" '" '" en '" en en '" '" '" en
Rents: KYURLOG
10.2
10
9.8
9.6
9.4
9.2
9
8.8
8.6
"" " '" ;c M "" " en M "" " '" co M "" ..... en c;:; M "" " en"" "" "" to to to to " " " " ..... co co co eo en en '" en'" en '" '" en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en en
First differences:
0.4
•
"
•'.
I •
•I,
• ,0.3
0.2
o
-,-
". ,
0.1
-0.1
-0.2
187
Chapter 7. Farmland Abandonment and The Farmland Market
7-1. Introduction
The area of farmland abandonment is notably increasing all over Japan, especially in
the last decade (Figure 7-1). This is considered important particularly in terms of
loss of multifunctionality of agriculture: landscape degradation, loss of biodiversity
and water ecosystem, and in some cases is linked to natural disasters such as
flooding and landslide. Farmland abandonment occurs when agricultural profitability
reaches a minimum threshold. MacDonald, et al., (2000) state that if alternative
more profitable uses for land cannot be found, land is abandoned from productive
use. However, one crucial question is raised; 'Why do those land owners not sell or
lease?' In order to answer this question, it is of interest to focus on the mechanism of
the farmland market and farmland transaction in this study.
Figure 7-1 The area and proportion of abandoned farmland in Japan
(Prefecture level)
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Source: MAFF, Japan, 'Agricultural Census'
Note: The proportion of farm land abandonment is the rate of abandoned lands over the total
area of arable land (including abandoned farmlands).
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In the previous chapters, the efficiency of the farmland market has been examined by
applying time series analysis to farmland prices and rents data in Japan. The results
imply that there is an evidence of a cointegration relationship between farmland
prices and cash rents in all regions, although policy impacts were recognised in some
regions and the speed of market adjustment towards the equilibrium state is notably
slow. At least until 1980, the rent level was directly controlled by the government,
and there was a strong demand of agricultural land for non-agricultural use in the
economic growth period. Thus, it is considered that those factors would have
influenced the attitude of fanners towards farmland transaction and even their land
use.
Japanese agricultural policy has been characterised by strong agricultural
protectionism through such measures as price support and rent and property right
control. However, from the 1980s, the social situation surrounding Japanese
agriculture has changed considerably with increasing international pressure to reduce
protectionism. Responding to the decrease in price support, and the failure to shift
agricultural structures to a more cost efficient basis, agricultural profitability has
declined and marginal small-scale farms have struggled to maintain their businesses.
Besides, the ageing of the agricultural population has been serious, and a lot of rural
areas have faced a shortage of successors, which even threatens the livelihood of
rural communities still highly reliant on the regional economy of agriculture.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the recent increase of abandoned farmland
in Japan, focusing on the mechanism of the farmland market and farmland
transaction. Firstly, the state of farmland abandonment in Japan is detailed.
Subsequently, farmland abandonment is explained theoretically, and a farmland
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abandonment model is formed. Then the model is tested using Japanese data.
7-2. Farmland Abandonment
7-2-1. Causes of farmland abandonment
Figure 7-2 shows the result of a survey on main cases of the increase in farmland
abandonment conducted by the National Chamber of Agriculture in Japan. Four
main causes are pointed out; physical disadvantage of land, ageing and shortage of
workforce, disadvantage of location and production damage from wild animals.
Physical disadvantage of land is particularly serious in hilly and mountainous areas
which have large areas of less-favoured farmland such as terraced paddy fields.
Ageing and the shortage of workforce appear as the most serious cause of farmland
abandonment in all areas. Physical and locational disadvantage of land likely
indicate the low profitability of land (which should be also reflected in a low rent
level). These days the production damage from wild animals in those areas has been
also serious. Profitability loss and ageing may not be a direct cause for farmland
abandonment, but a trigger for farmers to retire from agriculture. If the farmland
market is efficient and transaction cost is low, they would be able to find purchasers
or tenant farmers in the short period. However, as examined in Chapter 6, the
Japanese farmland market requires a long time to adjust to the equilibrium state,
which mean the land transactions are sluggish, leaving a large amount of
misallocated land at each period. Farmers who want to retire but cannot sell or lease
may keep farming as long as they can. However, once those farmers reach a certain
age limit, they have no choice but to abandon those lands. Figure 7-3 shows the
rapid increase in the rate of ageing in the agricultural population (over 70-year-olds),
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which illustrates that a lot of farmers have faced the need of retirement particularly
in the last decade. Besides, farmers who are over 70 would not be encouraged to
enlarge their farms through buying and renting land unless they have a successor in
their family. Insufficient demand for land or restricted entry in the market could be
another reason of farmland abandonment. Thus, in order to explain the recent
increase of farmland abandonment in Japan, we have to consider two steps. It is
assumed that: firstly, farmers face a minimal threshold in terms of business, and
decide to retire from agriculture. Once they decide to retire, they start looking for
purchasers or tenant farmers, and they abandon their lands when they fail to find any.
Figure 7-2 The cause of increase in farmland abandonment
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Note: Multiple answers.
191
Figure 7-3 The rate of agricultural population over 70 years of age
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7-2-2. Farm scale and farmland abandonment
Nowadays, farm structures can be distinguished roughly into two types: high cost /
low productivity and low cost / high profitability. These are denoted as type A and
type B farms here. In Japan, farms of less than 1.0 ha can be categorised as type A,
since the production system tends to be inefficient. On the other hand, farms of more
than 1.0 ha are categorised as type B. Figure 7-4 shows that the rate of farmland
abandonment of type A farms is much higher than that of type B farms. In addition,
the rate of farmland abandonment is high in hilly and mountainous areas, and it has
also increased dramatically in urban farming areas recently (Figure 7-5), which is
also supported by the fact that both areas have a high rate of the type A farms (Figure
7-6).
Of course, in areas where ageing of the agricultural population is serious, there is
less motivation for farmers to change to an alternative land use. In explaining the
economic conditions of these farms abandoning lands, two sets of production cost
curves for type A and B farms are assumed. The type A farm has higher average
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production cost curves than the type B farm. If the producer price of agricultural
products drops to the break-even point, type A farmers cannot gain a profit, although
they can recover some of their fixed costs. In this position, farmers may not 'retire'
until they find a buyer or tenant for their lands, as in general they do not want to
abandon their lands. However, when the producer price reaches the point where they
are unable to cover their variable costs (the so-called 'shutdown point'), the type A
farms abandon their lands, unless an alternative land use which has a lower
production cost is available or the land is sold or let to the type B farm.
Figure 7-4 The rate of farmland abandonment over total arable land by farm
scale (Commercial farms)
Type A Type B
ICl1990 -.1995 020001
Source: Agricultural Census, Japan
Note: Excluding Hokkaido
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Figure 7-5 The rate of farmland abandonment over total arable land by
farming area
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Figure 7-6 The distribution of farm scale over the total number of farms by
farming area (2000)
80
70
60
50
eR 40
30
20
10
o
Urban Farming Flat Farming Area Hilly Farming Area
Area
Mountainous
Farming Area
Source: Agricultural Census, Japan
Note: Data includes only commercial farms, and not hobby farms.
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7-3. Theoretical Application
Farmland abandonment is assumed to be the result of an inefficient farmland
transaction process and rapid ageing, which is particularly serious in hilly and
mountainous areas where there are a lot of high cost / low profitability small-scale
farms. In this section, we discuss the farmland market and transaction within a
theoretical framework. As reviewed in Chapter 4, it is essential to clarify the
distinction between the flow concept and the stock concept in order to analyse the
farmland market. As seen in (a) in Figure 7-7, farmland prices are determined in the
stock market by a supply curve, which is the accumulated stock of land, and the
demand curve based on the demand from all farmers who hold land. The intersection
of a fixed quantity of land QS and demand curve DO represents the equilibrium
market price (pe). If we follow the present valuation concept - assuming that the
residual cash rents are consistent in each period, and the present value of land P
equals the discounted residual return by interest rate, r (i.e., P == R / r) - the
equilibrium rent price Re would equal rl", Figure 7-7 (b) shows the process of rental
contract when a large number of participants are in the rental market (Currie, 1981).
The demand and supply curves are represented by DD and SSISIl, and the
equilibrium level of market rent, Re, is the intersection of the demand and supply
curves. Currie (1981) specifies the number of farms under the tenant contract is Qe;
the number of farms under the owner-occupancy (i.e., the owner cultivator) is (s -
QC). As Lloyd (1993) notes 'the supply and demand of transactions' during a given
period will depend on the extent of the misallocation of land amongst owners in the
market. The equilibrium amount of land under the tenancy contract is determined by
the intersection of demand and supply curves. However, the actual amount of land
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reached in transaction agreement is normally less than the equilibrium amount of
land, Qe. This is often explained by the 'asset market friction' (Lence and Miller,
1999, p259) due to the land-specific characteristics such as high transaction cost and
the mismatch in terms of the location preference and, in the Japanese case, the strict
regulation applied on farmland transaction I.
Figure 7-7 Farmland price determination and rental market
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(b) Rental market
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(a) Price determination
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Source: Currie (1981)
Now, we consider the two types of farms, type A and type B farms, which were
defined in 7-2-2. The type A farm (i.e., small-scale and inefficient) is often
physically less favoured, especially in hilly and mountainous areas, for example,
being terraced paddy fields or located in remote areas. As land use in those areas is
not so different from that in flat fanning areas (i.e., paddy and vegetable fields, see
Table 2-4, p22), these farms tend to be highly labour intensive compared to those in
1 As explained in Chapter 3, there is a strict regulation for rental contract in Japan: i)
farmers can rent land only in the same municipality where they live, and ii) there are limits
to the area they can hold as tenanted land. Although these are different for each prefecture,
generally the size is from 0.5 to 1.S ha.
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more favoured agricultural areas. We consider only the case of arable farms since
extensive liv~stock farming (e.g., grassland and grazing areas) are still not common
in Japan. The supply and demand curves in the rental market of type B farms (Figure
7-8) are assumed to start at a higher level than those of type A farms, as the
profitability is generally more favourable due to the condition of lands. Similar to the
single market case, the equilibrium rent level for type A and B farms are shown as
R~ and R;. Therefore, for the type A farm, (SA -Q~) will be farmed by their
owners, and the rest being tenanted farms. Similarly, for the type B farm, (SB - Q~)
will be owner-cultivated land, and the rest will be under tenant contract. However,
the amount of actual tenanted land could have been smaller than the equilibrium
level. At least until 1980, the rent was strictly controlled, and the rent level for
almost all regions rose considerably after 1980. This suggests that prior to 1980,
the rent level was under the equilibrium level. In this case, the actual amount of trade
for letting is smaller than Q~ and Q~. Seen in Figure 7-9, the amount of land
transaction for letting is very small until around 1980. Therefore, we can state that
one possibility of policy failure for encouraging smooth transaction of land was due
to the rent control.
After 1980, rent control was removed and the market system has become less
regulated. However, farmland abandonment has become more serious in Japan,
although the amount of land transaction (especially in the rental market) has steadily
increased (Figure 7-9). The cause of farmland abandonment is discussed in Japan in
terms of an ageing farm population and a lack of successors have leading to an
oversupply in the farmland market (Kashiwagi, 1994; Odagiri, 1994), and a low
demand (Tanimoto, 1994) due to physical disadvantages for farming and the
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deterioration in agricultural profitability. Kashiwagi (2002) also notes a case study in
a rural area that one lot of abandoned farmland leads to surrounding farmlands (even
relatively favoured farmland) being abandoned due to negative effects such as
outbreak of disease and pests, or damage to the irrigation or drainage system.
We target only type A farms here, and consider the case that supply of land increases
from deterioration of profit due to less government support and ageing. The supply
curve shifts from S A S~ S~ to S~ S~' S~ , and the amount of land under the tenant
contract decreases by (Q~-Q~ *). Younger farmers can remain as owner cultivators,
but farmers who are over 70 years of age with no successors may soon face the
decisive moment when there is no choice but to abandon those lands.
Figure 7-8 Simultaneous equilibrium in markets for two types of farms
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Figure 7-9 The area of farmland transactions for agriculture
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7-4. AModel for Farmland Abandonment
7-4-1. Theoretical model
(a) Farmland price determination
Firstly, we start from the so-called Present Valuation Model (PVM) which has been
reviewed in previous chapters (i.e., Chapter 4 for the theoretical background and
Chapter 5 for the empirical analysis). This model is as follows; the value of the land
is the capitalised value of the current and future stream of earnings from owning the
land:
P, = afa j E, [R,+j]
j=O
(7-1)
where P, is equilibrium farmland price at the beginning of time period t; R, is the rent
paid in period t, (l is a constant discount factor which is equal to 1 / (1+r) when r is
the constant real discount rate, and Et is the conditional expectations operator based
on information available up to time t. Equation (7-1) implies a long-run relationship
between the real price of land and the real return to land. If the non-inflationary
world and constant net cash rent of R per period are assumed (Robinson et al., 1985),
equation (7-1) is simplified to the familiar capitalisation formula:
P=Rlr (7-2)
As discussed and tested applying in Chapter 6, the above model is accepted only
when the long-term equilibrium between farmland prices and cash rents exist, which
means the farmland market is efficient. This situation is not realistic because
farmland prices could be influenced by the financial inflation, and asset markets
often contain friction due to high transaction costs or government regulations. Let Ro
be net returns to land at the current period, assuming that Ra increases at the rate of g
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per period (i.e., the annual growth rate of the current return), and farmland prices
become (Harris, 1979):
Po = (l+g)Ro + (l+g)2Ro + ... + (1+g)nRo
(1+r) (l+r)2 (l+rr
(7-3)
If we consider land to be an asset with infinite life (i.e., e -+ (0) and assume g < r,
(7-3) can induce the following form:
Po = (1+ g)Ro
(r - g)
If the growth rate is greater than zero, the equilibrium land price will increase each
year even if the growth rate and discount rate remain unchanged from year to year
(Weersink et al., 1999).
(b) Farmland transaction in the flow market
Once farmland price is determined, the quantity of land desired is determined by the
flow market which was explained in the previous section (Robinson et al., 1985).
The quantity of land desired by the ith individual in the lth marketing area at the
current period 0, is assumed to depend on marginal net rents Ro.I.; which the ith
individual expects to receive at the discount rate roo As the return of land diminish,
more land is desired. Therefore the downward-sloping function becomes:
R - (1 0 -a. IQ d0.1.1- 0.1.1 0 D.1.i (7-4)
where coefficient (10.1.10 is unique to the ith individual in the lth marketing area at the
current period, O. If g(k) shows the geometric mean of realised (or expected) increase
in cash rent in period k, in the ith period, equation (7-4) is multiplied by
IL [1+ g(k)], and in the tth period, becomes;
k=1
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, ,
Rt,I,i = aO,l/n [1+ g(k)]- a~n [1+ g(k)]Q,,1/
k=1 kl
(7-5)
Assume that the ith individual discovers land in the Ith marketing are being offered
for sale at a price of PI,/, using relationship (7-2) the rent associated with the
maximum offered price of Pt,I is RI,/,/ = rlPt,I. Therefore, the quantity of land the ith
individual demands in area / in the tth period is described as;
o
Q d _ ao,/,;
',I,; - Iao
,
ao
ln [1+ g(k)]
k=1
(7-6)
If Re 1,/,; are rents currently earned on the Qt,I,;th unit of land, the equilibrium quantity
of land which is under the tenancy contract can be obtained as follow;
o
Qe . _ ao,/,i1,/,1 - I
ao
R
e
,,/,; Q"--,----- == 1,1,/
ao
l Il[1+ g(k)]
k=1
(7-7)
As shown above, this could be equivalent to the supply of land. Empirically, as
Robinson et al. (1985) suggest, land transactions happen sluggishly because of high
transaction cost and the equilibrium amount of land does not necessarily match the
equilibrium rent level. This is difficult to observe empirically because those
misallocated lands remain in the market being farmed under owner-occupancy until
those are leased or sold to other farmers. Farmland abandonment is a special case in
that land misallocation is visibly observed; the owners of those lands are keen to
trade, but they abandon because either they could not reach agreement or could not
find any possible tenants in the marketing area. Therefore, the actual supply function
can be extended as:
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o
QS. . = aO,l,;1,1,1 - 1
aO
R".I,i QFA Qd QFA
1 + 1,1./ = 1,1.; + 1,1./
aO
I L [1+ g(k)]
k=l
(7-8)
Therefore, the farmland abandonment model is developed from (7-8):
(7-9)
Thus, the amount of the farmland abandonment is considered as the function of the
net return and the 'actual supply' of land.
7-4-2. Using panel data
For applying the model (7-9), a panel data set, which is combination of t annual
observation and i individuals, is used. The basic regression model is considered as;
Yil = a; +P'x iI+ Eil (7-10)
where t denotes 'individuals' (e.g., household, firm, countries, etc.), i = 1, ..., N, in
each time period, t = 1, ... , T. There are K regressors in Xit, not including the constant
term. a; shows individual effects, which is taken to be constant over time t and
specific to the individual cross-sectional unit i. There are two basic frameworks to
generalise and estimate unobserved effects on a panel data model; the fixed effects
(FE) model and the random effects (RE) model. These models are well explained in
for example Johnston and DiNardo (1997) and Greene (2000). The FE model takes
c., which are correlated with regressors, to be a group-specific constant term in the
regression model. The term of 'fixed' is used here to indicate that the term does not
vary over time although the intercept may differ across individuals, not that it is
nonstochastic (Greene, 2000; Gujarati, 2003). Conversely, the random effects model
specifies a single constant term, a, which is not correlated with the regressors.
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7-4-2-1. Fixed effects (FE)
Let Yi and Xi be the T observations for the ith unit, and let Et be an associated TX 1
vector of disturbance, then (7-10) may be rewritten as;
Yit = iu; + X P + E; (7-11)
Each u; is treated as an unknown parameter to be estimated. (7-11) is rewritten as
follow;
Yl i 0 0 al Xl Cl
Y2 0 i 0 a2 X2 C2= + fJ+
Yn 0 0 i an Xn Cn
or
(7-12)
where d, is a dummy variable indicating the ith unit. Letting the «t» n matrix D =
[d Id2 ... d-], then, assembling all nT rows give;
y=Du+Xp+e (7-13)
This is usually referred to as the least squares dummy variables (LSDV) model. This
is a classic regression model including variables as group-specific effects. The least
squares estimator of p is written as;
b = [X'MoXrl[X'MoY] (7-14)
where
Thus, MoX is a matrix of residuals; each column of MoX is a vector of residuals in
the regression of the corresponding column of X on the variable in D. The columns
of D are orthogonal, so
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MO 0 0 0
Mo = 0
MO 0 0
0 0 0 MO
Each matrix on the diagonal is
MO I 1 .., (7-15)= r--Il.
T
Premultiplying TX 1 vector Z;, (7-15)becomes MOz; = Z; - z i. Therefore, the least
squares regression of MDYon MoX is equivalent to a regression of [Y;I - Yi] on [Xii
- x,], where Yi and Xi show KX 1 vector of means of Yil an d Xii over the T
observation for group i. The dummy variable coefficients can be written with a
which is the estimators of a. as:
D'Da + D'Xb = D'y (7-16)
or
(7-17)
This implies the mean residual in the ith group, and alternatively it is written;
The appropriate estimator of the covariance matrix for b is:
Var[b] =i [X'MoXrl
The disturbance variance estimator is expressed as:
n T
S2 = ~~(y" -a; _X:,b)2 = (y-MoXb)'(y-MoXb)
nT-n-K nT-n-K
(7-18)
Then, ith residual is;
Thus, the disturbance variance estimator, i, is exactly the sum of squared residuals
using the least squares slopes and the data in group mean deviation form. However,
the correction will be necessary as most software will compute with nT - K as the
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denominator not nT - n - K. Therefore, for this estimation of the individual effects,
2
Var[ail = ~ + s;Var[b 1X,~T' .
So, a simple estimator based on i can be computed. For testing the significance of
the group effects, an F-test is used with the hypothesis that the constant terms are all
equal, alternatively the model estimated with an overall constant and (n - 1) dummy
variables is tested. Under the null hypothesis, the F ratio is;
(R; -R~)/(n-I)
F(n -I,nT - n - K) = ---'-----
(1- R;)/(nT - n- K)
(7-19)
where u indicates the unrestricted model and p indicates the pooled or restricted
model with only a single overall constant term.
Three forms of the pooled (restricted) regression model are considered. Firstly, we
consider the original regression form as:
Yit = X 'itP + (l + eit (7-20a)
Second, the deviations from the group means is formed as:
(7-20b)
The least squares estimator of P in this equation, b is called a "between" estimator.
Then, the regression with the group means (average) is:
(7-20c)
With this equation, b is called a "within" estimator',
The LSDV approach can be extended to the model including a time-specific effect. A
simple model is to add the time-specific effects, 't« as additional dummy variables to
the group effects model as:
2 The discussion of the estimators are detailed in Greene (2003, p289 -290)
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Yit =X'itP + aj + 'Yt + cit (7-21)
This model includes additional (T - 1) dummy variables3• If the number of variables
is too large to handle by ordinary regression, this model can be also estimated by
using the partitioned regression. However, since each of the group effects is a
group-specific intercept, whereas the time effects show contrasts to a base period
(the one that is excluded), there is an asymmetry in this formulation. The asymmetric
form of the model is:
v« =X 'itP + Ii + a, + 'Yt + cit (7-22)
where a full n and T effects are included. However, the restrictions are imposed as;
Least squares estimates of P in this model are obtained by regression of:
Y*it = Yil - h-Y., + Y (7-23)
on
* - --X it - Xii - Xi. - X, +X
where the period-specific and overall means are
_ 1 n _ 1 n
Y., =- LY", x, =- LX"
n 1=1 n 1=1
and
Then, the overall constant and the dummy variable coefficients can be derived from
the normal equations as;
A 'bp=m=y-x
(7-24)
=
eX =a =(y-. -y)-(x -x)'b
I I I. I.
3 One of the time effects must be reduced to avoid perfect collinearity (Greene, 2003).
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== ==Yi = c, = (Y., - y) -(x., -x)'b.
The asymptotic covariance matrix for b is computed using the sums of squares and
y. it estimated by (7-23), and
S2 = L~=IL~=I(Yi'-x;,b-m-a, _C,)2
nT - (n -I) - (T -I) - K -I
As this model is more general, it is not used frequently in practice. Green (2003)
notes two reasons. First, the cost in terms of degrees of freedom is considerably high.
Second, when a model of the timewise evolution of the disturbance is required, the
more general model than this simple dummy variables form is usually applied.
As the FE model is relatively easy to estimate, this model has some problems. The
serious loss of the degrees of freedom due to adding too many dummy variables is
already mentioned above. Gujarati (2003) also lists; the possibility of
multicollinearity which might make precise estimation of one or more parameters
difficult; the difficulty to assess the impact of non-time-variant variables such as sex
or nationality; and finally the manipulation of the error term which follows the
classical assumption, such that Ujf - N(O, (}'2) in this case. In order to alleviate the
above problems, especially the degree of freedom and the error term, we now
consider the so-called 'random effects model'.
7-4-2-2. Random effects (RE)
The FE model allows the unobserved individual effects to be correlated with the
included variables (i.e., a.j is correlated with Xit in (7-11». Conversely, the random
effects approach specifies that u, is a group-specific random element, which is
similar to Ej, but not correlated with Xii. The individual differences in the intercept
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values of each group are now reflected in the error term u.: The model is considered
as,
Yit = x;,p+ (a. +Ui) + Git (7-25)
where there are K regressors in addition to the constant term, and the single constant
term is the mean of the unobserved heterogeneity, E[z;]. The term u, is the random
disturbance which is specific to the ith observation and is constant through time; u, =
{z;a - E[z;a]}. The initial model developed by Balestra and Nerlove (1966)
included a time-specific component, kt, as well as the individual effect:
Y« = x;,p+ (a +Ui) + kt, + Gil (7-25')
However, this extended formation is rather complicated for analysis (Greene, 2003),
and has not been used very much in applied work (Kmenta, 1971). In this section,
we focus on the simplest model, (7-11), for the analysis. For the RE model, the
following are assumed;
E[8i1] = E[u;]= 0,
El8"U j J = 0, for all i, t, andj, (7-26)
El8;,8js J = 0, if tis or i i j,
Now we reform the above assumption in blocks of T observations for group i, Yi, Xi,
u,i and e; For these T observations, we set
n« = Eil + u,
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'Ii = ['In, nn, ..., 'liT]'.
In the form of 'lii, "error components model (Greene, 2003)", a homoskedastic
variance is implied as below;
£[77,~]= a; +a; , for all i and t, when i =j and t = s,
E[77,,77i,,] = a; , for i =j, t f.s, (7-27)
El77it77 js J = 0, for all t and s if if. j.
This also means that the correlation coefficient between 'lit and 'lis is
corr('lit, 'liS) = 1, for t = j and t = s
=
2
ae fi'- .2 2 • or 1_ J. t:l s,v; +au
= 0, for all t and s if i f.j.
(7-28)
For the T observations for unit i, let L = £[77,77;]. Then,
a2 +a2 a2 a2 a2e II u II II
a2 a2 +a2 a2 a2 2 I + 2· orL u e II u u = (7-29)= a; T au1]1 T
a2 a2 a2 ... a2 +a2II II II e II
where iT is a TX 1 column vector of Is. As observations t andj are independent, the
disturbance covariance matrix for the full nT observations is:
~ 0 0
o ~ 0n=
o
o
= In®~ (7-30)
o 0 0 ~
The generalised least squares (GLS) estimator of the slope parameter is:
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In order to compute this estimator", we are required to estimate first, 1}-112 =
[In®L 1'1/2. For this estimation, we only need to find L-I12., which is;
~-1/2 _ 1 [1 ()... ]
L.J -- --171 T ,
0"& T
where
Therefore, transformation of Yi and Xi for GLS becomes:
Yil -BY,
I-1/2 v, = _1_ Yi2 -BY,
0"&
(7-31)
and similar to the rows of Xi. The procedure of the computation in the LSDV model
is the special case of the above when () = 1. Likewise for the case of the OLS
estimator, the GLS estimator can be expressed as a weighted average of two OLS
estimators. The "between" estimator (jJ B) is the least square estimator of PB in the
regression equation:
Y=PBX+n.I. I '/1.
..
whereas the "within" estimator (P w) is the least square estimator of Pw in the
following regression;
(Y" - f;) = PW(Xi/ -Xi) + (Cil -6i)
Therefore, the GLS estimator of P becomes
4 For details of the estimation by GLS, see 10.5 in Chapter lOin Green (2003, p 207 -209).
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p = PwW xx + PBAB xx
Wxx + ABxx
where
W - "n "r (X _X)2xx - L,,/=I L"f=1 if i
"n -2Bxx = T L"i=1 Xi ,and
It is possible to determine which of the two kinds of variation has more influence on
P (Kmenta, 1971). When T is large, or when a; is larger compared to a;, A. will
be considerably small and the GLS estimator will be very similar to the "between"
estimator. This case is similar to the case of the LSDV because OLS places too much
weight on the between unit variation compared to GLS.
From these features of the correlation coefficient, firstly it is noticed that for any
given cross-sectional unit, the value of the correlation between error terms remains
the same regardless of the gap between two time periods'. It is also noted that the
correlation structure remains the same for all cross-sectional units. If we do not take
this correlation structure into account estimates of (7-25) by OLS would not be
efficient (Gujarati, 2003). In order to handle the considerably less restrictive case
compared to the FE model, for the estimation of this model, the generalised least
squire CGLS) is used to estimate p.
Testing for random effects, Breusch and Pagan (1980) have devised a Lagrange
Multiplier CLM) based on the OLS residuals of the random effects model. The null
SThis is a strong contrast to the time series model such as autoregression model (AR), the
correlation between time periods declines over time (see Chapter 12, Gujarati, 2003).
212
hypothesis is that '7il and '7is are not correlated, which implies in favour of the
classical regression model with a single constant term. The null hypothesis and
alternative hypothesis are;
Ho: 0'; = 0, (or Corr['7i1, '7iS] = 0),
the test statistics is,
LM= nT
2(T -1)
2
t.[te, r -1
" T
LLe,~
'~I 1=1
(7-32)
"
nT L(Te;)2= ~I -1
2(T -1) :tIe,;
;=1 1=1
Under the null hypothesis, LM is distributed as chi-squared with one degree of
freedom. Letting D be the matrix of dummy variables defined in (7-12) and e be the
OLS residuals.
LM= nT [e
I
DD
l
e_1]2
2(T-l) e'e (7-32),
As discussed, the difference between the FE model and the RE model is if the
time-invariant effects are correlated with the regressors or not. Johnston and
DiNardo (1997) note that, in general, the FE estimator is to be preferred to the RE
estimator unless we are certain that we can measure all of the time-invariant factors
possibly correlated with the other regressors. They also comment that many
researchers find a precisely estimated FE estimate more persuasive than a precisely
estimated RE estimate, although the dummy variable approach has a considerable
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weak point in terms of the loss of degree of freedom. Furthermore, it is also noted
that the evidence suggests that the RE estimators are upward-biased estimates of the
true effect, while the FE estimators are downward-biased estimates of the true effects
(Johnston and DiNardo, 1997). Harris and Sollis (2003) say that the FE model is
more appropriate when focusing on a specific set of N individuals that are not
randomly selected from some large population. For testing random effects, Breusch
and Pagan (1980) devised a Lagrange multiplier test based on the OLS residuals.
7-4-2-3. Hausman's specification test for the random effects model
As is discussed above about selection between FE and RE models, Hausman (1978)
developed a specification test for the random effects model. This is based on the
hypothesis that FE model and RE model estimators do not differ substantially; under
the hypothesis of no correlation, both LSDV in the FE model and generalised least
square (OLS) for random effects model are consistent, but OLS is inefficient, whilst
under the alternative hypothesis, the OLS is consistent, but not for OLS. Therefore,
the test is based on the difference in terms of those estimates. For the covariance
matrix of the difference vector, [b - P]; between the least squares estimator of the
slope vector in the FE model, and the OLS estimator of the slope parameter in RE
model.
Var [b - P] = Var[b] +Var[ jJ] - Cov[b, P] - Cov[b, P]' (7-33)
As the essential result of this test is 'the covariance of an efficient estimator with its
difference from an inefficient estimator is zero';
Cov [Cb-P),P] = Cov[b,P] - Var[p] = 0
or, therefore;
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Cov[b, /J ] =Var[ /J ]
Inserting this result in (7-33) provides the required covariance matrix for the test;
Var[b - /J l= Var[b] - Var[ /J] = '" (7-34)
The chi-squared test is based on the Wald criterion:
(7-35)
For tjI, the estimated covariance matrix of the slope estimator in the LSDV model is
used for the EF model, and the estimated covariance matrix in the RE model,
excluding the constant term. The null hypothesis that the individual effects are
uncorrelated with the other regressors in the model is rejected, W has a limiting
chi-squared with K - 1 degree of freedom. If the test statistic is bigger than the
critical value from the chi-squared table with K - 1 degrees of freedom, the RE
model is not appropriate and the FE model may be preferred.
7-4-3. Unit roots and cointegration in panel data
Testing for unit roots and cointegration in panel data is becoming more common, due
to the development of testing procedures and econometric software packages (Harris
and Sollis, 2003). All developed tests take non-stationarity as the null hypothesis,
testing against a stationary alternative hypothesis (Levin and Lin, 1992 and 1993; 1m
et al., 1997; Harris and Tzavalis, 1999; Harris and Sollis, 2003). For the basic
approach to unit root testing for panel data, a modified version of (7-10) which
contains only a single variable is considered:
Yil = PV'iI-1 + Z'itY + eil (7-36)
with; denoting individuals (i.e., i = 1, ..., N), and t denoting time (i.e., t = 1, ... , 7) as
defined for the panel data model. Here, Zit is a deterministic component, and can take
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several forms (e.g., Zit = Ui or Ui + 'lif, where Ui is fixed effect, and 'lif shows
individual effects varying with time). The Levin and Lin (LL) (1992) test assumes
firstly that ei/ are IID6 (0, (1/), which means individual processes for each i are
cross-sectionally independent and there is no serial correlation, and secondly that Pi =
P for all t. LL (1992) tests the null hypothesis of non-stationarity, Ho: P = 0, against
the alternative hypothesis, HI: P < 1, which means 'all' i cross sections are stationary.
To remove the problems of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity which are apparent
in the LL (1992) test, LL (1993) developed a testing procedure transforming (7-36)
into a first difference form denoting !:lYit = Yi/- Yit-), which is
(7-37)
The null is now Ho: P* = (1 - p) = 0 which means each series in the panel contains a
unit root for all i, against the alternative hypothesis that 'at least one' of the
individual series in the panel is stationary (i.e., HI: P* < 0 for at least one 0. The
main difference from the LL (1992) test is that different lags are allowed across the i
cross sections in the model as well as relaxing the condition for the alternative
hypothesis, HI (Harris and Sollis, 2003). This is augumented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
form, and 1m, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) (1997; 2003) test averages of the ADF
individual unit root test statistics which are obtained from estimating (7-37) for each
i:
_ 1 N
t =-~)p ..
N 1=1
(7-38)
Thus the IPS test is a generalisation of the LL tests. The power of the test is often
discussed, responding to the fact that those tests use a 'within-group' estimator of the
fixed effect. Karlsson and Lothgren (2000) analysed and compared the power of the
LL and IPS tests. Their main findings were " ... the power increases monotonically
6 This is an abbreviation of' independently identically distributed'.
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with: (1) an increased number N of the senes in the panel; (2) an increased
time-series dimension T in each individual series; and (3) an increased proportion ...
of stationary series in the panel (p254)." They also note that" ... for large-T panels,
there is a potential risk that the whole panel may erroneously be modelled as
stationary ... due to the high power of the panel tests for small proportions of
stationary series in the panel. For small-T panels, on the other hand, there is a
potential risk that the whole panel may be erroneously modelled as non-stationary,
due to the relatively low power of tests even for large proportions of stationary series
in the panel (p254)".
For testing cointegration in panel data, an approach using a single equation is
developed by Kao (1999) and Pedroni (1995; 1999), with the null hypothesis of no
cointegration. The test proposed by Kao (1999) sets a panel regression model as
below;
Yit = X 'it-lP+ Z'it'Y + eit
where y and x are presumed as non-stationary series, and
ell = pe,,_1 + v"
(7-39)
(7-40)
and where e,,(=y,,-x;,p-z;,r)are residuals estimated by (7-40). The null of no
cointegration (i.e., Ho: P = 1) in equation (7-39) is tested against the alternative
hypothesis that y and x are cointegrated (i.e., p < 1). This test is similar to the Engle
and Granger cointegration approach using a DF-type test, and Kao developed four
DF-type tests, with Zit in equation (7-39) limited to the fixed effects case (i.e., Zit = u.),
Two of these tests assume strong exogeneity of the regressors and errors in (7-39),
while the other tests make (non-parametric) corrections for any endogenous
relationship (Harris and Sollis, 2003). Kao also extended the test equation (7-39)
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including lagged changes in the residuals, which became an ADF type test. All Kao's
tests take homogeneity in that the slope coefficient {J is not allowed to vary across
the i individual members of the panel. Pedroni (1995; 1999), however, used a model
whose slope coefficient is allowed to vary across the i individual members of the
panel;
Yit = ai + 0, + {JIiXlit+ {J2iX2i'+ ... + {JKiXKit+ Z'il'( + eit. (7-41)
We can think of N different equations, each of which has K regressors. We test for
the null of no cointegration being based on the residuals e;, using:
(7-42)
Since the deterministic components, a; and the slope coefficient, {Ji, are allowed to
vary across the i numbers of the panel, the dynamics and fixed effects can differ
across i. Pedroni (1999) set seven cointegration test models in total, referring to the
within-dimension-based statistics simply as panel coingtegraion statistics, and the
between-dimension-based statistics as group mean panel co integration statistics 7•
First, he constructs a non-parametric variance ratio statistic. The second test statistic
is a panel version of a non-parametric statistic which is similar to the Phillips and
Perron (PP) (1988) rho-statistic. The third test statistic is also similar to the PP
r-statistic. As a fourth test, he constructs a parametric test which is analogous to the
ADF-type test to determine the number of lags in the model. The other three panel
cointegration statistics are based on a group mean approach. The first is similar to
the PP rho-statistic, and the other two are analogous to the PP r-statistic and the ADF
test statistic.
7 Th e within-dimension-based statistics and the between-dimension-based statistics are
denoted as 'panel' and 'group' in his RATS programme, respectively.
218
7-5. Empirical Results
7-5-1. Data and empirical application
A simple linear model is defined from (7-9). Besides, considering the discussion in
7-2 and 7-3 that the ageing in the agricultural population is a crucial factor which
affects both the supply and demand side of farmland, inducing farmland
abandonment, the rate of ageing in the agricultural population is also included as an
independent variable in the farmland abandonment model. For empirical application
and tests of the model, the following data are required: the area of farmland
abandonment at i prefecture at time t, the cash rent period at i prefecture at time t,
and the real supply of land at i prefecture at time t. In addition, considering the
discussion in 7-3 that the increase of farmland abandonment is accelerated by ageing
of the agricultural population, this variable is added in the model:
FAit =Po+ P1Rit +P2Qsit+AGEit + Eit,
where variables are defined as follows:
(7-43)
FAit (arelbousebold): The area of farmland abandonment per agricultural household
at t prefecture at time t. This data is available from 1975 in the Agricultural
Census, Japan, which is published every five years. The area of farmland
abandonment is divided by the number of total agricultural household which is
also available from the Agricultural Census.
Rjf(yen/lOare): The average cash rent paid at i prefecture at time t, provided by the
Japan Real Estate Institute's 'The Survey on Farmland Prices and Farm Rents',
Rents show the real average price (yen/IO are) of 'good' paddy and 'good'
vegetable fields, deflated by the GDP deflator.
Q5 it (arelbousebold): The real supply of farmland at i prefecture at time t. The
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amount of land supplied for tenant farmers is available from the Agricultural
Census. The area of actual farmland supply is assumed as the total amount of the
supplied land for the tenant farmers with abandoned farmland at i prefecture at
time t. This total area of land is divided by the number of total agricultural
households.
AGE It (%): The rate of ageing in the population, which is the rate of agricultural
population over 70 years old out of the total agricultural population.
Thus, the data set used is panel data set; the data from 1975 to 2000, therefore
comprises six sets of annual observations; t = 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995 and
2000; i denotes 43 prefectures in Japan except for Tokyo, Kanagawa, Osaka and
Okinawa'' (see Appendix 2-3), for every survey year from 1975.
The fixed effects (FE) approach considers group effects on the model. Therefore the
model takes Cl; to be a specific constant term for each group. The fixed effects model
for (7-43) can be rewritten;
(FE model) FAit =c. + P1Rit +/lzQs;t +AGEi/ +Ei/. (7-44)
As group effects, all prefectures are treated as regional dummies. Therefore, the FE
model is a classic regression model with regional dummies and specific period
effects. Those effects are tested with an F-test. The random effects (RE) model
contains a group specific disturbance, U;,which is similar to Ei/,but it is assumed that
it is not correlated with each explanatory variable and constant through time. Thus,
the RE model is;
8 Th ese prefectures do not have a consistent data set especially because sales transactions
are quite rare and high priced due to the small area of agriculture in urbanised prefectures
(Tokyo, Kanagawa, and Osaka), and due to historical reasons (i.e. Okinawa's reversion to
Japanese administration was in 1972).
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(7-45)
Before estimating the above models, it is important to examine if all variables are
stationary series (i.e., 1(0» or non-stationary series (i.e., 1(1», because if series in the
linear regression are integrated of a different order, the relationship can be spurious.
Therefore, panel unit root and cointegration tests are applied.
7-5-2. Panel unit root and cointegration test
In order to test if variables used for this study are stationary or non-stationary series,
panel unit root tests and cointegration tests are applied in tum. Firstly, Table 7-1
presents some summary statistics.
Table 7-1 Summary statistics
Valiables Obs Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
FA 258 3.50 3.09 0.40 21.04
R 258 13852.28 4384.80 6119.79 3319l.16
QS 258 9.53 6.06 2.27 58.17
AGE 258 13.65 4.10 6.52 24.85
Table 7-2 shows the results of two panel unit root tests, the LL-ADF test and the
IPS-ADF test. These are tests based on ADF regressions in a panel context, and have
a one-tailed standard normal distribution. All variables are expected to be integrated
by the same order before applying the linear model. The test without trend, both the
LL test and the IPS test reject the null hypothesis that there is a unit root only for R,
while for all variables the null was rejected by both tests with trend except for R.
Considering the statement of the power of the tests for small-T panels (i,e, the risk,
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of appearing non-stationary for small-T panels) (Karlsson and Lothgren, 2000), it is
plausible to conclude here that all variables are stationary series, /(0).
Table 7-2 Panel unit root test statistics
LLADF IPSADF
Variables without with without with
trend trend trend trend
FA 6.73 -5.02* 8.17 -6.67*
R -1.65* -0.72 -2.45* 3.22
QS -1.22 -4.14* -5.33* -6.01 *
AGE 12.67 -7.09* 20.14 -12.84*
Note: Lag length is set at 1. * denotes the rejection of the null of a unit root at the 5% level
(Critical value: -1.64). The results were obtained using RATS.
7-5-3. Model estimation
Firstly, the simple linear model is estimated by OLS,:
FAit = -4.38+ 0.000076Rit +0.31 QSi/+0.28AGEi/ +Ei/
(-7.54) (2.81) (15.28) (9.55)
R2 = 0.62, DW = 0.88
with t statistics in the parentheses.
The result shows that the rate of farmland abandonment has a positive association
with the level of rent, the amount of real farmland supply, and the rate of the aged
population, although the coefficient of the level of rent is very small, showing
minimal association. The coefficients are all significant and show the expected signs
from equation (7-9). Next, the fixed effects model and random effects model are
considered in turn.
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7-5-3-1. Tests for fixed effects
The fixed effect approach takes a; to be group-specific constant terms in the
regression model as seen in (7-44). The results of the parameter estimation of FE
models are seen in Table 7-3. The group effects model includes dummies of 43
prefectures as group-specific effects, which are denoted as DG; (i.e., i = 1, ... , 43).
For this model, an F-statistic is estimated as 23.27. As the 95 % critical value is 1.44,
the test result is strongly in favour of a group-specific effect in the data. Moreover,
the majority of the coefficients for each group dummy are statistically significant.
The same estimation is applied on the time effects. The estimation regression is also
seen in Table 7-4, with an F-statistic of 14.21. The 95 % critical value is 2.25, and
similarly the test result strongly supports the time effects in the data. However, the
individual coefficients of the time effect are significant only for period 1975, 1980
and 1985. For the joint test of group and time effects, the F-statistic is estimated as
4.48 which is larger than the 95 % critical value, 1.42, and the coefficients of all time
dummies are statistically significant except for 2000. Thus, among the three fixed
effects models, the group effects model has a high goodness-of-fit, and expected
signs for the three variables except for the group and time effect model. In addition,
the coefficients of the cash rent are not significant for all fixed effects models, and
those for ageing was not significant either for the group and time effects model.
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Table 7-3 Farmland abandonment model with group and time effects
Variables No effects Group Group Effects Time Group and Time
Means Effects Effects
Constant
-4.38" -6.23** 4.40
(-7.54) (-2.79) (1.26)
R
0.76E-04** 0.59E-04 0.12E-04 0.35E-04 0.33E-04
(2.81) ( 1.00) (0.41 ) (0.36) (0.62)
Q' 0.31** 0.43** 0.091** 0.34** 0.082*(15.27) (13.96) (3.25) ( 15.67) (2.24)
AOE
0.28** 0.35** 0.39** 0.19** 0.014
(9.55) (2.85) (13.76) (2.13) (0.08)
001 -6.31* *(5.07) 9.63**(7.86)
002 - 1.21(-1.35) 1.00( 1.13)
DO) -2.25** (-2.81) 0.60(0.78)
004 -2.92**(-3.06) -0.38( -0.43)
DOs -3.97**(-4.49) -1.61*(-1.90)
006 -3.30**(-3.72) -0.58(-0.75)
007 -0.40(-0.43) 2.36**(2.96)
DOs -2.51**(-2.88) 0.32(0.42)
009 -3.57**(-4.38) -0.81(-1.04)
0010 -2.39**(-2.87) 0.84(1.18)
0011 -2.24**(-2.81 ) 0.60(0.79)
0012 -2.15*·(-2.44) 1.21(1.68)
DOll -2.83**(-3.53) 0.00(0.00)
0014 -3.90**(-5.18) 0.00(0.00)
oo., -2.47**(-3.21) 0.90(1.24)
0016 -2.63**(-3.34) -0.90( -1.16)
0017 -2.99**(-3.78) 0.93(1.25)
0018 -3.16**(-3.68) 0.20(0.26)
0019 -4.49· *(-5.89) 0.10(0.14)
0020 -1.95**(-2.35) -0.22( -0.30)
0021 -4.89*(-6.00) - 1.65·(-2.12)
0022 -2.16··(-2.62) 1.0 1(1.36)
002) -4.36*·(-5.43) -2.02* *(-2.72)
0024 -4.56**(5.84) 1.48(2.09)
D02s -4.70·*(-6.09) -1.83**(-2.26)
0026 -3.20·*(-4.06) -0.81(-1.11)
DOn -4.01**(-5.23) 0.00(0.00)
0028 -4.06*·(-5.05) -1.52*(-2.05)
0029 -2.98**(-3.68) -0.05( -0.07)
00)0 -2.94 **(-3 .68) -0.39( -0.52)
0031 -3.25**(-4.04) -0.68(-0.97)
0032 -4.00* *(-4.90) 0.86(1.19)
DOn -3.10·*(-3.73) 1.05( 1.41)
00)4 -3.16**(-4.00) 1.19(1.44)
DO)s -3.19**(-3.90) 0.27(0.34)
00)6 -4.08*·(-5.01) 0.31 (0.44)
00)7 -3.73·*(-4.53) 0.29(0.40)
DOn -2.76**(-3.17) 0.76( 1.03)
00)9 1.48*( 1.73) 0.09(0.12)
0040 -2.93**(-3.27) -0.75(-1.02)
0041 -2.96**(-3.58) -0.21 (-0.37)
0042 -3.84**(-4.56) 4.22**(5.36)
004 -3.61**(-4.36) -0.07(-0.10)
DTI -4.31**(-3.97) -4.38**(-2.35)
OT2 -2.32*(-1.94) -3.85**(-2.40)
DT3 -2.80*(-1.84) -3.85**(-2.80)
OT4 -2.22( -1.42) -2.33·(-2.03)
DTs -2.63(-1.50) -1.77**(-2.48)
OT6 -2.42( - 1.17) 0.00(0.00)
If 0.63 0.84 0.80 0.65 0.77
F statistic 23.27 14.21 4.48
Note: The numbers in the parentheses are r-values, * and * * show significance at 5 % and 1%, respectively
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7-5-3-2. Tests for random effects
Following the Breusch and Pagan (1980) method, the LM test statistic is estimated
for random effects. The least squares estimates for the farmland abandonment
estimation are given in Table 7-4. The LM test statistic is 19.20. The 95 % critical
value for chi-squared distribution with one degree of freedom is 3.84, thus the result
of the LM test strongly rejects the null hypothesis that the classical regression model
with a single constant term is inappropriate for these data (i.e., the rejection of the
random effects model). The estimates by random effects model are also displayed in
the Table 7-4 with residual estimators. a; and a; are the residual variance
estimator in the within-units (LSDV) regression and the residual variance estimator
in the between-units (FGLS) regression, which are far from 0 of the null hypothesis.
Besides, the estimated within-groups variance is larger than the between-groups
variance. Therefore it is concluded that the classical regression model with a single
constant term is inappropriate for these data.
The specification test between fixed effects approach and random effect approach is
developed by Hausman (1978). Based on the fixed effects and random effects
estimates (Table 7-3 and Table 7-4), the two estimated asymptotic covariance
matrices are'':
[
0.868D-09
Est. Var[bFd = 0.249D - 06
-O.l67D-06
0.249D-06
0.0008
-0.0004
- 0.167 D - 06]
-0.0004
0.0008
9 D +nn or D-nn means multiplied by 10 to + or -nn power. For example, 0.6D-03 is 0.6 X
10-3•
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[0.708D-09
Est. Var[bRE1= 0.120 D - 06
-0.730D-07
0.120D- 06 -0.730D -07]
0.0005 - 0.0002
- 0.0002 0.0007
The test statistic is 44.44, while the critical value from chi-squared table is 7.814,
which is far less than the test value. As the hypothesis is that the individual effects
are uncorrelated with the other regressors in the model, the model cannot be rejected.
Based on the LM test, which shows that there are individual effects, and Hausman's
test, which suggests that these effects are uncorrelated with the other variables in the
model, it is concluded that the fixed effects model is the better model for this
analysis.
Table 7-4 Farmland abandonment model with random effects'"
Variables No effects Group
Effects
Constant
-4.38**
(-7.54)
R 0.76E-04**
(2.81 )
QS 0.31
(15.27)
AGE
0.28**
(9.55)
A 2
(J'e
A2
(J'u
-3.67**
(-6.77)
0.53E-04*
(2.01)
0.20**
(8.54)
0.33**
(12.63)
2.49
1.11
Note: The numbers in the parentheses are I-values. * and .* show significance at 5 % and
1%, respectively.
10 Similar to FE models, the model with time effects, and the model with group and time
effects were also applied, which dose not show the significant results.
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7-6. Farmland Abandonment and Social Impact
In order to understand the social impact of farmland abandonment theoretically, the
concept of externalities can be applied. Demand and supply are usually defined by
the private marginal willingness to pay and marginal willingness to sell, respectively,
and it is assumed that the free market mechanism is capable of achieving efficient
resource allocations II. Thus, the 'true' (total economic) value of many public-type
goods which provide externalities has been underestimated or ignored in the free
market (Turner et al., 1994).
Due to government policy intervention in agriculture before 1980, the farmland
market in Japan was distorted. Farmland prices were higher than the level
determined in the free market. High priced farmland, as well as a highly regulated
rental market gave type A farms incentives to retain their lands. This indicates the
failure of an efficient allocation of resources in the sense that the policy target to
enlarge farm scale could not be achieved. However, the area of farmland
abandonment was low during this period. Considering that farmland abandonment
has brought with it the loss of positive externalities, it could be argued that the
farmland price in this period was equal to a level that included the cost of these
externalities.
Since removing a factor which distorted the farmland market (i.e., the end of rent
control after 1980), the market has been less distorted. The association between
farmland market efficiency and the increase of farmland abandonment are
J J An efficient allocation of resources means that there is no alternative allocation that
leaves everyone at least as well off and makes some people better off (Turner et al., 1994).
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statistically investigated through the analysis in this chapter. What should be stressed
here is that a lot of farmers who abandon their farmlands do not want to. They often
feel a duty to their ancestors to maintain the land. Besides, they also often consider
the impact on the local communities, such as the break of an irrigation path or the
landscape. As the farmland market has become more efficient, the market value of
farmland has fallen. In addition, production support has been reduced, and
agricultural profitability has fallen, which has led to a further decrease in farmland
prices. Under these circumstances, inefficient small-scale fanners have struggled to
maintain their lands, which could have led to a drastic increase in farmland supply
(including potential supply) since 1985. There are a limited number of buyers and
tenants in the market due to deterioration of agricultural profitability, strong
regulation on the farmland transaction and the serious increase in the ageing
population in agriculture. Therefore, there is no choice, especially for older fanners
without any successors, other than abandoning those lands.
Although Godo (1998) claims that farmland abandonment should not have appeared,
if the farmland market was efficient enough, it is not realistic to expect the free
market to reallocate those abandoned farmland in an effective way. Even if there
were no regulation in terms of land use, nobody would take those marginal lands (i.e.,
physically disadvantage lands) for the productive purpose of fanning. Considering
that a negative externality (i.e., loss of multi functionality due to farmland
abandonment) has appeared as the market became less distorted after 1980, rather it
is better to consider the result of market failure due to land-specific characteristics.
The government has to introduce an alternative support system if the positive
externalities of agriculture are to be retained especially in Less Favoured Areas
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(LFAs) where there are a large number of type A farms but high positive externalities
are anticipated from agricultural activities.
7-7. Conclusion
With concern over the rapid increase of farmland abandonment in Japan, this chapter
focuses on the mechanism of farmland abandonment in light of the farmland market.
Firstly, the data of farmland abandonment is detailed and the main causes are
discussed. The increasing supply of land due to high demand of retirement from
agriculture is often cited as a main cause of farmland abandonment. The financial
struggle as a result of the reduction in governmental production support and the
physical disadvantage of land has encouraged farmers to retire from agriculture. In
addition, serious ageing of the agricultural population and strong regulation on
farmland transaction could have been the direct cause of the recent rapid increase in
farmland abandonment, because which makes sluggish or impossible to redistribute
those lands to potential buyers or tenant farmers.
A farmland abandonment model was developed based on the Present Valuation
Model, and tested using a panel data set. The model is specified in relation to farm
cash rent, real supply of land and the rate of ageing in the agricultural population. As
a panel data set is used, panel unit root tests and panel cointegration tests were
applied. The results show that all variables may be non-stationary series, and suggest
cointegrating relationships. Therefore, a linear regression model was estimated,
considering both fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE). The results supported
FE models, but not the RE model. The coefficients appeared with expected signs for
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all models except for the group and time effects model. The result does not show as
the coefficient of cash rent significant except for the model without any effects. This
may imply that farmland abandonment is mainly caused by the rapid increase of
farmland supply and ageing of the agricultural population. The level of cash rent (i.e.,
profitability of land) has no or little influence.
The social impact of farmland abandonment was also discussed. It is of interest to
note that the 'true' value of many public-type goods is underestimated in the free
market, and farmland abandonment in Japan has even increased since the market
shifted towards a less regulated system. As farmlands are recognised as a unique
commodity with positive externalities in Japan (e.g., multi functionality) and, it is not
realistic to rely on the free market system to resolve the farmland abandonment
problem. Even under a perfect free market, due to the unique characteristics of land
as a commodity, it is hardly expected to achieve the smooth allocation of lands. In
addition, the farmland (or farming) is sometimes recognised as a public good in
terms of positive externalities which is provided to the public (e.g., amenity space,
biodiversity and landscape). In order to retain these positive externalities from
agriculture, the government has to take a role, especially in the LFAs.
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Chapter 8. Summary, Discussion and Conclusions
8-1. Introduction
The modernisation and development of farm structure has been an important aim of
Japanese agricultural policy during the period of rapid economic growth, since the
mid-1950s. However, Japanese agriculture has been characterised as highly
protectionist, allowing small-scale inefficient farmers to retain their agricultural land.
Japanese agriculture is now under pressure to open-up the domestic market within
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) framework, and to achieve international
competitiveness. Although agricultural structural reform and rural development have
been policy targets, the reform of agricultural land policy has been a sensitive matter,
because Japanese farmland has been strongly regulated in the post-war period.
Although regulation has been eased gradually, some people still believe that
fundamental change of this policy framework may lead to the loss of Japanese
indigenous agriculture and rural society. However, the current agricultural problems
relating to farm structure are strongly influenced by this farmland policy framework.
Farmland issues have been discussed in Japan mainly in the areas of sociology,
geography and agricultural engineering, but little in the area of economics. Farmland
problems are complex issues. In this study, the main interest has been to analyse
three aspects: farmland policy, the farmland market and the association of these to
farmland problems. The following section briefly summarises the chapters.
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8-2. Summary
Chapter 2 overviewed the history of Japanese agricultural policy and the
characteristics of Japanese agriculture. As Japanese agricultural policy established a
staple food supply (rice, wheat and barley) in the immediate post-war period, it has
been regarded as strongly protectionist since the beginning of the period of rapid
economic growth. However, since the end of the 1980s, Japan has carried out
agricultural policy reform responding to international trade pressure and new
objectives such as food security, safety and enhancement of agricultural
multifunctionality. It is also very important to understand the problems facing
Japanese agriculture today: ageing of the agricultural population, minimal increase of
farming scale, and increase of abandoned farmlands. One of the key aspects of these
problems is the failure in development of the farming structure. It is of interest to
focus on agricultural land policy and market structure here, because those should
have influenced the development of structural reform.
In order to highlight the impact of farmland-related policy on Japanese agricultural
problems, Chapter 3 outlined Japanese farmland policy. Firstly, it is noted that the
basic principle of 'owner-cultivators', which was established in the immediate
post-war period and more recently recognised as 'cultivators' protectionism', has still
been retained within the policy framework. Although the enlargement of farm scale
became an important policy target, the regulations for cultivators' right protection
and restriction of farmland ownership could have been obstacles for smooth farmland
transactions. The impact of regulations on sales and the rental market of farmland
were also discussed. Although the influence of urbanisation on the general land price
trend is clear, it is also important to note that farmland prices started falling in the
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1980s, reflecting the decline of agriculture in Japan. On the other hand, the rent level
was directly controlled by the government until 1980, and one can recognise a big
rise after abolishment of rent control. However, rent has declined gradually reflecting
the profit deterioration since then. Mindful of that, the policy impact of rent control
on the farmland market is also considered in this study.
Chapter 4 reviewed the rent and farmland valuation theory from classical economics,
such as David Ricardo's theory of rent, to neo-classical economic theory. Particularly,
the mechanism of the farmland market is carefully reviewed, focusing on the stock
and flow concepts, as land is a unique commodity. For the empirical application of
the theory, the Present Value Model (PVM), based on the assumption that the value
of an asset is the current and future stream of returns from owning that asset, was
outlined. However, it was noted that in spite of the empirical applications of this
model in several countries, its failure to capture market behaviour is apparent. The
chapter also outlines recent development to test the theoretical model, which assumes
that the farmland market functions efficiently.
Chapter 5 overviewed the development of unit root tests and cointegration analysis,
which are applied in Chapter 6. The basic definition of stationary time series is that
the series has a constant mean and variance which are time independent, while
non-stationary data do not have a constant mean and variance. The basic idea of
cointegration analysis is to identify the existence of a long-run relationship between
variables over time. Recent studies using unit root tests show that a large number of
time series data are non-stationary. Structural breaks in the series are also considered
in some unit root tests. In this chapter, the Zivot and Andrews and Perron (1997) tests
were overviewed. Extending the concept of cointegration analysis, the way to test for
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structural breaks in the series was also reviewed in the last part of this chapter.
Johansen et al (2000) developed a testing model for cointegration with up to two
known structural breaks by including dummy variables of the years of break. This
model is the one chosen for the empirical application.
Chapter 6 reported on an application of time series analysis on Japanese data in order
to test for farmland market efficiency as the theoretical model suggests. It also
considered the change of the farmland market structure, namely in 1967 and 1980,
when the rent level and its determination were reformed. From the results of unit root
tests, without and with a structural break, all series are concluded as non-stationary,
and for rent data, a structural break around 1980 is especially noted. Given these
results, cointegration analysis with and without structural breaks was applied to all
regions. The results support the presence of a cointegrating relationship between
farmland prices and rent in all regions bar Chugoku. However, the results of testing
the application of unit elasticity and an error correction model suggest that there is
very low market efficiency overall.
The main interest of Chapter 7 was the mechanism of farmland abandonment in light
of the farmland market, given the concern about the rapid increase in farmland
abandonment. Falling profitability, due to the reduction in governmental production
support, and the physical disadvantages of land, encourage some farmers to retire
from agriculture. This increases the supply of land. In addition, serious ageing of the
agricultural population and strong regulation on farmland transactions could also
have contributed to the recent rapid increase in farmland abandonment. A farmland
abandonment model was developed, based on the Present Valuation Model including
the influence of ageing in the agricultural population, and tested using a panel data
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set. The results imply that farmland abandonment is mainly caused by the increase of
farmland supply and ageing of the agricultural population, but the level of cash rent
(i.e., profitability of land) has no or very little influence.
8-3. Farmland Policy, the Farmland Market and Farmland Abandonment:
Discussion
In order to discuss the farmland problems in Japan, we start from policy impacts on
farmers' behaviours towards farmland. Having strict regulations in terms of farmland
(see Chapter 3), agricultural policy and farmland policy often struggled to
correspond in Japan. As in many countries, agricultural policy mainly targeted
increases in farmers' income through improvements of agricultural productivity and
enlargement of farming scale. While agricultural productivity improved, the
enlargement of farm scale has not been sufficient to achieve international
competitiveness (i.e., the average farm size increased from 0.98 ha in 1960 to 1.79 ha
in 2000). This is because, as explained in Chapter 7, high-cost / low-profitability
farmers (i.e., small-scale farmers having less than 1 ha), were able to remain in
agriculture due to well-supported producers' prices and strong cultivators' right
protectionism. This protectionist policy framework prevented farmers from engaging
in smooth farmland transactions, and could have also been one of the factors which
kept farmland prices rising until at least the late 1980s. Farmland was also
considered as a stable asset for farmers to hold. Under these circumstances,
small-scale farmers could hold lands expecting a future stream of income from
agriculture. The failure of the enlargement of farm scale was caused by policy failure
in the sense that the government could not establish a clear picture of the process of
smooth farmland transactions. In other words, the attitude of the government was
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contradictory: encouraging large-scale farming, whilst being very protective to
small-scale farmers.
Farmland policy should have impacted on the farmland market as well. In this study,
the farmland market was examined within the theoretical framework of farmland
price determination. Unit root tests and cointegration analysis in Chapter 6 show the
evidence of a long-term relationship between farmland prices and farm rent,
supporting this theoretical framework. However, the market function is not as
efficient as observed in the US or England and Wales. Land is a unique commodity,
and generally farmland transactions are sluggish due to high transaction costs and
location problems. In order to understand this mechanism, this study distinguishes
carefully between the stock market and flow market concepts. The flow market
depends on misallocation of land amongst owners in the market. Farmers who want
to sell or lease their lands remain in the market as owner-cultivators until they find
purchasers or tenants. Due to strict restriction on ownership status (e.g., non-farmers'
cannot possess land) and location (e.g., tenant farmers should live within the same
administrative area), the transactions have been more sluggish than the case in the
US or England and Wales. Actually, farmland transaction often happens between
neighbours or relatives due to these restrictions.
The rapid increase of farmland abandonment recently has to be discussed carefully,
considering the association between the mechanisms of the farmland market (i.e.,
farmland transaction process) and farmland policy change. Abandoned farmland
should be reallocated to other farmers if possible. Therefore, the amount of
abandoned farmland is a part of the misallocation of land which should also be
included in the farmland transaction model. The results of empirical application of
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the farmland abandonment model show that the increasing supply of land and rate of
ageing in the agricultural population are significant contributory factors. As
explained above, farmers who want to sell or lease their lands tend to remain in the
market as owner-cultivators for as long as they can. Nevertheless, farmers abandon
their land when they cannot keep farming anymore.
Therefore, it is also of interest to discuss why nobody wanted to buy or lease those
lands. Firstly, the condition of the land could be a big obstacle. If the farmland were
located in a remote area or on a steep hill, few people would be interested in farming
there. Besides, those farmlands tend to be irregular in shape, which incur higher
labour costs. Second, ageing in the agricultural population is a crucial factor which
increases the supply of land and decreases the demand for land. When farmers who
want to retire from agriculture and seek opportunities to sell or lease lands, reach a
certain age, they have little choice but to abandon their land. At the same time,
farmers who are not thinking to retire, but are themselves quite old, are less likely to
extend their scale of farming unless they have young successors. Considering a lot of
farmland transaction happens between neighbours and relatives, the rate of ageing
has a strong association to the demand for land. Thirdly, even in farming areas where
the rate of ageing is not high, it is difficult for small-scale family farmers to extend
their farming scale given the state of Japanese agriculture. As the majority of
small-scale family farmers are part-time (see Table 2-6 in Chapter 2), they may rather
prefer to maintain their current scale, or even diminish the scale when they find
agriculture is not profitable enough. The farmland market in Japan is assumed to be
less distorted after the abolislunent of rent control, which should have impacted
positively for enlarging farm scale, enhancing smoother farmland transactions. It is
possible to see this effect in Figure 7-8, which shows the increase of letting area.
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However, at the same time, a lot of high-cost / low-profitability farmers faced
difficulty surviving due to the serious drop of producers' prices (especially rice) and
a high rate of ageing in the agricultural population, which started highlighting the
misallocation of land as observed in farmland abandonment.
Finally, it should be also remarked that in most cases in Japan, farmlands are
property not only bringing economic wealth for farmers (i.e., profit), but also are
associated with the memory of ancestors, who maintained and developed the
farmlands. Sometimes farmers are criticised for the failure of farm scale
enlargement: farmers are too keen to retain lands rather than to sell or lease them
(e.g., Godo, 1998). However, it is rational for farmers to retain their lands as long as
they can keep farming, and moreover this was possible at least under the policy
framework until 1980. For example, even though selling and letting land look
economically more advantageous than retaining it, farmers would have a different
choice in terms of utility maximisation. Farmers often feel a duty/commitment (i.e.,
utility) to pass well-maintained lands to their successors, in the name of their
ancestors. Nevertheless, the fact that the area of farmland abandonment has
drastically increased recently illustrates that the small-scale family farm system,
which has played a major role in Japanese agriculture in the post-war period, has
reached the limit for its sustainability. Since the overall agricultural structure in Japan
is now fragile, it is important to shift the fundamental approach of agricultural land
management from targeting the individual farm to a collective approach, especially
in rural areas facing serious problems such as depopulation and high rate of ageing
population in order to achieve efficient reallocation of lands. This is recognised in a
new support system introduced by the Japanese government from 2000, concerned
with the loss of positive externalities of agriculture arising from farmland
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abandonment, especially in the LFAs.
8-4. Policy Reform and Direct Payment Support for Preventing Farmland
Abandonment
Japan has reformed agricultural policy, responding to the social and international
political change towards agriculture. The basic policy movements are shifting to the
free market system, with decoupled policy instruments (such as direct payments) so
as not to distort markets. 'Direct Payments to Farmers in Hilly and Mountainous
Areas', introduced in Japan in 2000, are one of the new policy instruments targeted
to avoid further abandoned farmland. The mechanism of this Japanese support policy
is to subsidise the difference in production costs between favoured and less-favoured
areas.
The purpose of the direct payments to hilly and mountainous areas is to maintain not
only stable domestic agricultural production, but also agriculture's
multi functionality I which has been of particular concern because of the recent
increase in farmland abandonment. The target areas for the direct payments are the
so-called LFAs for agricultural production, which are disadvantaged in terms of
natural, economical and sociological conditions (MAFF Japan, 1999). The direct
payments are subject to the Basic Law on Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas
(enacted in 1999):
"The State shall take specific measures for the fulfilment of the multifunctional roles
IMul tifunctionality of agriculture here refers mainly to water-storing and prevention of
floods or landslide on terraced paddy fields.
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of agriculture in hilly and mountainous areas, by providing support to compensate
for disadvantage in agricultural production conditions so that such areas can
maintain adequateproduction activities. " (Article 35, Clause 2).
There are two main reasons why the Japanese government favours direct payments
as a form of agricultural support: one is the response to international pressure from
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to reform price-related agricultural support; the
other is the urgent need to preserve the multifunctional role of farmland, particularly
in hilly and mountainous areas.
Following the Agriculture Agreement of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations (GATT2) in 1994, by which countries had to cut trade-distorting
subsidies, Japan was seeking an alternative form of agricultural support which would
be categorised in the 'green box':'. Concurrently, Japan faced a serious increase in the
area of abandoned farmland, which more than doubled in 15 years (Figures 2-10 and
7-9) and became an urgent issue in terms of land preservation and prevention of
natural disasters, for example floods and landslides. Given these circumstances,
direct payments to LFAs, which were introduced by the European Union (EU) in
1975 under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and categorised in the green box,
attracted attention in Japan. Furthermore, there is a widespread belief that
price-related agricultural subsidies are inequitable, favouring the larger and generally
richer farmers (see, for example, Howarth, 1990). With direct payments, support can
be better directed at specific needs and objectives, and at producers rather than at
production.
2 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, now superseded by the WTO.
3 That is, agricultural support payments which have no trade-distorting effects.
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With a view to changing the system of agricultural support, an advisory panel was
set-up under the Japanese MAFF. Direct payments to farmers with paddy fields
proved controversial, because Japan had faced chronic overproduction of rice since
the late 1960s. Some people were concerned that direct payments to paddy fields in
LFAs would discourage rice production in more favoured areas unless the payments
were limited, as land use varies little between the different farming areas in Japan
(Table 2-4). Others, however, insisted that farmland preservation and production
control were different policy objectives and should be treated as such. They were
concerned that to enforce strict production control in the LFAs would be quite severe,
particularly regarding crop conversion". Therefore they thought the direct payment
measure combined with a particular level of production control would not bring
visible effects on LFAs.
The advisory panel concluded that production control would be obligatory when
shuraku' a greed to direct payments", whilst recognising that the payment itself has a
different purpose from production control. The extent of production control has
increased in recent years (Table 2-1). generating disquiet amongst some farmers. The
process of getting shuraku to agree to direct payments provides an opportunity for
government to reach a consensus for production control in order to achieve the
targeted area.
4 Crop conversion in LFAs is harder physically and economically than in the more favour~d
areas.
S Shurak u is a word to describe the smallest autonomous group in a village. An
administrative area is divided into a number ofshuraku.
6 Th e payment is subject to reaching agreement by unit of a group in shuraku. A single farm
unit is also acceptable only when farmers operate more than 3 ha in prefectures (more than
30 ha in Hokkaido), and more than 100 ha of grassland under the condition of payment.
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8-4-1. Introduction of a new agricultural support system: Formulation of
direct payment in hilly and mountainous areas
The level of direct payment
The amount of direct payment was set at 80 per cent of the difference in production
costs between flat farming areas and hilly and mountainous areas. This was regarded
as an appropriate amount which does not discourage farmers' motivation for
productivity growth in the favoured areas. The government subsidises one half of the
payments and local authorities cover the remainder, with total payments not
exceeding the amounts shown in Table 8-1. Initially the direct payment is made to
the shuraku', and then it is distributed to individuals, with the amount received by an
individual farmer determined by the shuraku.
Table 8-1 Direct payments for hilly and mountainous areas
Classification
Meadow
Grade of inclination Yen per 10are £ per 10are
11100-1120 8,000 42
>1120 21,000 111
8-15 degrees 3,500 18
>15 degrees 11,500 61
Proportion of grassland 1,500 8
(>70%)
8-15 degrees 3,000 16
>15 degrees 10,500 55
8-15 degrees 300 2
>15 degrees 1,000 5
Paddy field
Vegetable field
Grassland for
pasturing
Source: MAFF, Japan (1999).
Note: £ I = 190 yen. 1,500 (500) yen for paddy (vegetable) fields are added to the above
amounts in the case of new farmers or when farmers enlarge their fields by including farms
in less-favoured areas.
7 Shurak u is the smallest autonomous group in a village. An administrative area is divided
into a number of shuraku.
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The implementation of direct payments in Japan
An overview of the implementation of direct payments in targeted areas in Japan is
given in MAFF (2001). The number of cities or towns in receipt of payments is 1,687,
about 80% of the targeted local authorities. The total number of participants is
489,000 and the total amount of payments is about 42 billion yen (£22 million). The
total area covered by the agreements is 541,000 ha, of which 538,000 ha is under
shuraku and 3,000 ha is under individual agreements. Average data on the payments
per shuraku are also given in Table 8-2: £7,368 per shuraku, and £421 per each
member for prefectures',
Table 8-2 Direct payment agreements per Shuraku (arithmetic means)
Prefectures Hokkaido
Area (ha) 10 672
Number of members 19 31
Total Payment:
(£) 7,368 68,421
(Yen million) 1.4 13
Payment per member:
(£) 421 2,210
(Yen 'DOD} 80 420
Source: MAFF, Japan
8-4-2. Direct payments in LFAs in Japan and the EU: a brief comparison
The system of direct income support in Japan is based on the direct payments used in
the EU since 1975. However, it is regarded as Japanese 'in style' for a number of
reasons. A brief comparison with the EU's direct payments in LFAs gives a clearer
idea of the characteristics of the Japanese system.
8 These figures are estimated as £ t = t 90 yen.
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(a) Purpose
The direct payments in the EU are under Directive 75/268 for the purpose of
sustaining farming through income support in marginal regions. The EU has tended
to focus on the negative environmental aspects associated with intensive farming as
well as on maintaining the landscape, while Japan insists that agricultural activity
plays a major positive role in maintaining multi functionality in terms of land
conservation.
(b) Targeted areas and criteria
The EU directive has definitive criteria to designate LFAs, which include the degree
of altitude. Japan set a criterion in terms of the degree of inclination of the land,
although some areas were designated in terms of depopulation and rural development.
However, the farmlands targeted by direct payments and those areas designated as
depopulating do not always overlap. Principally, targeted areas are defined subject to
the inclination of the farmland (see Table 8-1). Some farmlands that do not qualify
can be designated when the governor of the prefecture identifies a need.
(c) Payment
In general, the payment levels in Japan (see Table 8-1) are fixed and the same over
the whole country, although there is some variation in the distribution between
shuraku and individuals, compared to the situation in the EU where there is wide
flexibility in the level of payments. Under the condition of the shuraku agreement,
members should focus on activities which help to maintain multifunctionality''. Thus,
in theory, farmers, receive direct payments conditional on the use of their land,
9 For example, activities for land conservation, expanding recreational opportunities and
maintaining the ecosystem.
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irrespective of their economic situation. In this context, direct payments in Japan are
made not as income compensation, but for agri-environmental activities. Furthermore,
in principle, the payments are not to individuals but to shuraku, as the average size of
farm is much smaller than that in Europe. In this sense, Japanese direct payments can
have a direct impact on the survival of a rural community.
(d) Production control
Both Japan and the EU argue that the purpose of direct payments for LFAs is far
removed from the principle of production control. The EU combines production
control with agri-environmental schemes, as a way of reducing environmental
problems caused by intensive agricultural practice. However, in the case of Japan,
the acceptance of production control is also a part of the shuraku agreement for the
direct income support. Thus, the attitude towards production control, particularly in
LFAs, is still not clear in Japan.
The characteristics of Japanese direct payments can be summarised as follows. In
general, target areas are designated only subject to the level of inclination. However,
there are several conditions necessary to receive the payment. Farmers have to accept
the requirement of production control in terms of rice, and they have to undertake
activities which help to maintain or develop multi functionality in agriculture.
Moreover, the amount of support is fixed nationwide and flexible only in terms of
distribution between shuraku and individuals. In this sense, the payment is an
agri-environmental payment as part of regional support rather than income support.
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8-4-3. The effectiveness of Japanese direct payments
As overviewed in 8-4-1, over 80% of the targeted local authorities accepted the direct
payment. However, given the results of 'The Report of Surveys to Representatives of
Shuraku Agreements' released by MAFF, Japan, in September 2004, nearly 90% of
respondents answered that a part or all of farmland would be abandoned if the direct
payment support is abolished, while 85% of respondents admitted that the support
worked well to avoid farmland abandonment.
A serious problem in the LFAs is that the farming system is still labour-intensive and
physically quite tough for the ageing agricultural population in these areas. The
direct support is paid for maintaining farmlands as they are, and cannot cover the
extra expenses of introducing new crops or other agricultural activities. This
underlines the limitation that direct payment support can be effective in the short
term, but not enough to establish sustainable agricultural activities for the long term.
For example, the Nagato-Otsu region, which has a high proportion of terraced paddy
field (i.e., 31 % of all farmland), applied a form of direct payment support at a
regional level to a completely new land use (i.e., cattle pasturing) prior to the
introduction of the national scheme in 200010. Shogenji (1998) noted that breeding
livestock is dominant as a land use in LFAs in EU member countries, and claimed
that it is also important in Japan to apply such extensive land use which has a
comparative advantage over rice production in LFAs. Although it is encouraged to
change land use under the new support scheme, regions have often faced difficulty to
discover the best or better land use in LFAs, as well as the cost problems of
introducing new land use. In sum, Japanese direct payments are giving a good
incentive for rural communities to reconsider their strategy for development, but are
10 Details of this case study ar e in Shigeto and Hubbard (2004).
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not enough to support a fundamental change in land use in the regions. Therefore, for
the long-term development, regions need to search for other financial sources.
8-5. Policy Implications
The main stream of agriculture is moving towards the free market system in both
domestic and international markets. Focusing on the farmland market in this study,
the impact of the policy change on the market structure and farmland problems,
namely the failure of farm scale enlargement and the increase of farmland
abandonment, are analysed. With a shift towards the free market system, further
improvement of the farming structure is required in order to achieve a more efficient
and competitive agriculture in Japan. There are two main questions which Japan
faces in terms of the future direction of agriculture.
1) How can a strong agriculture which has international competitiveness be
achieved?
2) In achieving this target, how can the multi functionality of agriculture be
maintained?
The answer to the first question is two-fold: to improve the efficiency of production
by enlarging the farming scale and thereby reducing the unit cost, and to develop
new markets for value added products (e.g., branded food such as Kobe beef),
However, in terms of farming scale, the policy attitudes towards small-scale
inefficient farms are still confusing. Do we ignore those inefficient farms, or do we
subsidise them, accepting their multifunctional role, as does the EU? The
implementation of direct payment support in LFAs is a response to the second
question. This scheme is a big challenge for the Japanese government, not only in the
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sense that this new policy instrument is copied from the EU which has very different
agricultural structures, but also in the sense that the definition of LFAs was not clear
and had to employ new criteria.
As discussed in Chapter 3, Japanese farmland policy is characterised by 'cultivator
protectionism'. Under this principle, only people who engage in agriculture can own
farmlands, and their property right is well protected. This has played an important
role in protecting small-scale inefficient farms to retain their farmland. Meanwhile, it
has been also a major obstacle for the smooth transaction of land between farmers,
and for new entry farmers or organisations to obtain sufficient farmlands. An
ownership problem also affects the regional land use programme. As an example of
abandoned farmlands, if a local authority wants to collect adjacent land for a new use
and the ownership of a part of that land is unknown, they have either to give up the
programme, or to apply the programme excluding that land!!.
The farmland policy framework based on the Agricultural Land Law enacted in 1952
is outdated. As analysed throughout this study, farmland policy has affected the
farmland market, and moreover influenced farmers' behaviour to land use. Although
the government tried to adjust to the change of policy aim through revisions to the
regulations, the enlargement of farming scale could not be achieved as planned due
to policy failure, and the area of abandoned farmland has increased drastically in
recent years because of market failure. Thus, the basic framework of farmland policy
should be further reformed to achieve the new policy target. In order to carry out
further general agricultural policy reform, it is important to be clear about the
IIThis example is derived f'rom an interview with the local authority ofNagato-Otsu region.
This interview was conducted by the author in November 2003.
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concept of land use nationwide. Particularly, a clear distinction is needed between
favoured areas where efficient farming activities are required, and LFAs where
agricultural activities enhancing multifunctionality are required. Then, a clear vision
can be discussed to establish sustainable support systems to both areas. Following the
above procedure, three pillars can be suggested in terms of agricultural land policy
reform:
1) To make the regulations more flexible on ownership and property rights.
2) To prevent the speculative possession of agricultural land by maintaining
strict regulations in terms of land usel2, rather than type of ownership. A
variety of farming bodies may bring dynamism or a new perspective to
Japanese agriculture.
3) To establish a monitoring system in agricultural areas based on the legal
procedure, in order to pursue the second pillar.
8-6. Limitations and Future Research
Although this study is an economic analysis focusing on the association between the
farmland market and farmland abandonment, there are a lot of regional factors which
may influence farmers to abandon their lands. As seen in a case study in one region
in Japan (Shigeto and Hubbard, 2004), three factors are important besides the three
elements employed for the model in this study: the labour-intensive farming system
in LFAs, the increase of production damage from wild animals, and the pressure for
set-aside or crop conversion. Thus, each region tends to have its specific problems
12 Even under the current policy framework, farmlands located in designated 'farming areas'
must be farmed for the next 10 years, and not allowed to be abandoned. However, it is often
pointed out that there is no strict system to monitor or penalise.
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towards farmland abandonment, and the selection of factors for a generalised model
can be difficult or even controversial. The discussion of the factors in this study for
the generalised model is limited, but could be developed further, with details of
regional studies in the future.
It is also necessity to further explore why farmland abandonment is a problem in
Japan. This could be an ethical problem as well as an economical and social problem.
There are some lands which have less of a social impact when abandoned, because
they are located in remote area (e.g., in the mountains). In this case, abandonment
could be better in terms of the ecosystem. However, other cases may bring serious
problems to rural communities in the sense that they are linked to natural disasters
such as flooding and landslides. Moreover, the government is seriously concerned
about the lower self-sufficiency of food, and aims to increase it. In this respect, the
loss of farmland is a concern for the government, and it is an urgent matter to find
ways to utilise those lands for agriculture. This matter is also closely related to the
rural development issue. It is important to have a view that regional problems are
also a reflection of national (or international) problems. The issue of farmland
abandonment should be further explored at both the regional, national and
international level.
For example, farmland abandonment is a problem in mountainous areas in Southern
Europe (MacDonald et al., 2000). The EU has also faced difficulties in trying to
improve the profitability of small-scale farms, particularly in mountainous areas, and
has tackled farmland abandonment through income support to LFAs. However, the
situation may worsen because many of the Central and Eastern European countries,
which have recently joined the EU and have experienced change in policy and
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market structure, have already witnessed a rapid increase in farmland abandonment.
Therefore, the prospect of more widespread farmland abandonment is a serious threat
and poses an additional concern for policy-makers in Europe. In the light of the
transition from a strictly regulated market to a less regulated market, the time series
analysis of the Japanese farmland market (Chapter 6), and the impact of the farmland
market on the increase in farmland abandonment (Chapter 7), may give useful
insights into future strategic opinion to counter farmland abandonment in the
enlarged ED. Furthermore, the new direct payment support in LFAs in Japan is based
on an adaptation of existing EU policy measures. Considering that the EU consists of
a wide variety of countries which have very different backgrounds in the social,
political and cultural context, a comparative study between the ED and Japan, which
is fairly alien from Europe, may also provide interesting insights.
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